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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the various ways in which prescription accruing
against a mineral servitude operates, and how extinguishment of the
servitude might be avoided. As will be seen, our scrutiny is not limited to 
“interruption,” but also includes “extension” and “suspension” of the
prescription of nonuse. In the absence of one (or more) of these
prescription-altering events, the mineral servitude will come to an end.1 
Because a mineral servitude might actually exist forever (our common law
friends would say, “in perpetuity”) if necessary actions are taken to avoid
the accrual of the prescription of nonuse, one might wonder if the tag line 
of the title of this Article should have been “All Good Things Might Come
to an End.”
This examination draws on an array of writings of this author,
including the text materials employed in his class in Mineral Rights, taught
at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University, as well as
other law schools in Louisiana.2 
Additionally, the author has utilized portions of a paper presented to
the Louisiana Mineral Law Institute in 1997, entitled “A Primer on the
Copyright 2021, by PATRICK S. OTTINGER.
* Ottinger Hebert, L.L.C., Lafayette, Louisiana; Member, Louisiana and 
Texas Bars; Adjunct Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Reporter, Mineral Law Committee of
the Louisiana State Law Institute; Chairman, Advisory Council, Louisiana 
Mineral Law Institute.
1. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1) (2018). There is an important exception to this
statement in the case of what, in industry jargon, are euphemistically called
“imprescriptible minerals,” a topic beyond the scope of this Article. See id. at 
§ 31:149.
2. PATRICK S. OTTINGER, A COURSE BOOK ON LOUISIANA MINERAL RIGHTS
(12th rev. ed. 2011).
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1132 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Mineral Servitude,”3 as well as a chapter in the Mineral Law Treatise on 
the subject of mineral servitudes.4 
Finally, certain aspects of this Article, pertaining to mineral leases
burdening a mineral servitude, are an adaptation of this author’s Treatise
on Mineral Leases.5 
The cited materials have been adapted, principally by way of
reorganization and supplementation, for purposes of this Article.
Thus, this Article examines the creation, duration, and extinction of a
mineral servitude, or, as the alliterative title indicates, the “launch, life,
and loss” of this important real right.6 
While this Article’s title suggests a broad array of coverage of the
mineral servitude—from its creation (“launch”), its duration (“life”), to its
ultimate extinguishment (“loss”)—the principal focus is the “life” of the
servitude, particularly how it is, or is not, perpetuated. That broad range of
topics does not address the multitude of significant or unique issues
attending this real right; these matters—important as they are—are 
addressed elsewhere, including this author’s previously identified writings
on the subject of mineral servitudes.7 
In order to develop these issues, Part I of this Article considers the fact
that a mineral servitude is subject to a prescriptive regime of nonuse, and
explicates certain consequences arising out of that characterization,
including interruption of prescription. In Part II, the ways in which
prescription might be interrupted are discussed in detail. The extension of
a mineral servitude is taken up in Part III of this Article, while the notion
of suspension of prescription is examined in Part IV. The burden of
proving the facts pertinent to the status of a mineral servitude is covered
in Part V.
3. Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 44th ANN. INST.
ON MIN. LAW 68 (1997).
4. PATRICK S. OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE Ch. 4 
(Patrick H. Martin ed., 2012) [hereinafter OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE 
TREATISE].
5. PATRICK S. OTTINGER, LOUISIANA MINERAL LEASES: A TREATISE (2016)
[hereinafter OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE].
6. The Louisiana Supreme Court has referred to the mineral servitude as
“the most valuable property in the state.” DeMoss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 484 (La.
1918). Alluding to the continued relevance of this statement since it was first
made by the state Supreme Court, in a later decision the Court noted that “since
that date, [oil and gas has] mushroomed into an industry of almost unbelievably
gigantic proportions.” Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 34 So. 2d 746, 773 (La. 1946)
(Fournet, J., dissenting).
7. See OTTINGER, supra note 2; see also Ottinger, supra note 3; OTTINGER,
MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 4.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1133
I. THE MINERAL SERVITUDE—A PRESCRIPTIVE REGIME
A. Preface8 
“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land belonging to
another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals and
reducing them to possession and ownership.”9 
A mineral servitude is a mineral right.10 As such, it is “subject either
to the prescription of nonuse for ten years or to special rules of law
governing the term of their existence.”11 
Concerning the mineral servitude, it is the former—a prescriptive
regime.12 However, as will be seen, it is permissible to impose a term on
the duration of a mineral servitude.13 
Indicatively, the Mineral Code provides that a “mineral servitude is
extinguished by . . . prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years.”14 
A comment on nomenclature is necessary: there are three kinds of
prescription recognized by Louisiana law—acquisitive, liberative, and
nonuse.15 The prescription pertinent to a mineral servitude is of the third
kind. In many cases, commentators and even judges incorrectly
characterize the prescriptive regime as one of liberative prescription.16 
8. The jurisprudential development of the mineral servitude has been
examined in Eugene A. Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Royalty
Doctrines: A Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana State Law
Institute, 25 TUL. L. REV. 30 (1950) (Part 1); 25 TUL. L. REV. 155 (1950) (Part 2);
26 TUL. L. REV. 172 (1952) (Part 2 continued); 26 TUL. L. REV. 303 (1952) (Part 3).
9. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2018).
10. “The basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner are the
mineral servitude, the mineral royalty, and the mineral lease.” Id. § 31:16.
11. Id. 
12. This tenet is a codification of the essential ruling of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 
1922).
13. See infra Part I.G.2.
14. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1). This Article does not consider other
modes of extinction of a mineral servitude such as “confusion,” id. § 31:27(2), or
“renunciation of the servitude on the part of him to whom it is due, or the express
remission of his right,” id. § 31:27(3).
15. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3445 (2018).
16. See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. Kiene, 437 So. 2d 940, 946 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1983) (“Thus, there was no use of the servitude within ten years
sufficient to interrupt the running of liberative prescription.”); Ultramar Oil & Gas
Ltd. v. Fournet, 598 So. 2d 645, 646 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (“However, there
was no production south of the canal which would have interrupted the running
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  26 5/26/21  11:49 AM










    
   





   
   
  
   
 
 
    
 
 




        
    
     
        
     
  
      
       
 
  
       
  
 
    
 
  
1134 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Even the Mineral Code utilizes this incorrect nomenclature,17 justifying a 
historic observation or two on the topic of prescription under Louisiana
law.
When the Mineral Code was adopted in 1974,18 the Civil Code did not
at that time distinctly identify the prescription of nonuse as a species of
prescription. Rather, prescription was then of two distinct kinds— 
acquisitive and the familiar liberative prescription.19 However, at that time,
then-article 783(2) indicated that servitudes are extinguished “[b]y
prescription resulting from non-usage of the servitude during the time
required to produce its extinction,” while article 790 recognized that a
“right to servitude is extinguished by the non-usage of the same during ten
years.” Additionally, prior to its amendment and reenactment in 1982,
former Civil Code article 3546 provided that “[t]he rights of usufruct, use
and habitation and servitudes are lost by non-use for ten years,”
recognizing the prescription of nonuse as a “species of liberative
prescription.”20 Yet, as previously observed, the Civil Code did not, prior
to 1982, denominate that mode of extinguishment distinctly as a
prescription of nonuse.21 
of liberative prescription.”); Corley v. Craft, 501 So. 2d 1049, 1051–52 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1987) (”Appellants argue that even if an obstacle were created which
prevented the use of the servitude on August 7 through August 10, and even if
that obstacle were such that it could not be prevented or removed, and that even
if it had the effect of suspending prescription, the most which could be said for
the position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that liberative prescription accrued on or
about August 20, 1984.”).
17. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:156, 31:206(A) (2018).
18. Title 31, Louisiana Revised Statutes, enacted by Act No. 50, 1974 La.
Acts Vol. III, effective January 1, 1975. There are a number of academic articles 
that predate the adoption of the Mineral Code, but are nevertheless instructive as 
to the pre-Code law. See, e.g., Lawrence F. Donohoe, Jr., Acknowledgments, Joint
Leases and Prescription, 11th ANN. INST. ON MIN. LAW 82 (1964); D. Ryan 
Sartor, Jr., Basic Principles of Liberative Prescription, 18th ANN. INST. ON MIN.
LAW 186 (1971).
19. Former article 3457 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided as
follows: “Prescription is a manner of acquiring the ownership of property, or
discharging debts, by the effect of time, and under the conditions regulated by
law. Each of these prescriptions has its special and particular definition.”
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3445 cmt. (b) (2018) (“Article 3546 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 indicates that the prescription of nonuse is a species of
liberative prescription.”).
21. Id. (“However, liberative prescription, being a bar to an action, is clearly
distinguishable from prescription of nonuse, which is a mode of extinction of real
rights other than ownership. For this reason, in accordance with modern
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  27 5/26/21  11:49 AM





   
    
 
     









   
  
    
 




    
 





   
 
    
       
     
  
  





2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1135
Legislative action in 1982 implemented a comprehensive revision of
the law of prescription.22 Thus, article 3445 of the Civil Code now informs
that “[t]here are three kinds of prescription: acquisitive prescription,
liberative prescription, and prescription of nonuse.” Relevantly, article
3448 of the Civil Code defines the prescription of nonuse as “a mode of
extinction of a real right other than ownership as a result of failure to
exercise the right for a period of time.” 
Notwithstanding the absence in the Civil Code of explicit recognition
of nonuse as a discrete kind of prescription on the date of the Mineral
Code’s enactment, several articles of the Mineral Code allude to the
prescription of nonuse.
Seemingly, other articles, including articles 156 and 206A of the
Louisiana Mineral Code, were not amended so as to clarify and recognize
the newly identified species of prescription of nonuse. Thus, while perhaps
not inaccurate at the date of its enactment, the Mineral Code—in 
continuing to refer to “liberative prescription” in these two articles—does 
not accurately identify the precise genre of prescription that now pertains 
to the real right. 
This is not a matter of mere semantics. As will be seen, a significant
difference between liberative prescription and the prescription of nonuse
is that, in the case of the former, a prescribed right (such as a personal
debt) can be revived by renunciation after prescription has accrued,23 
while, in the case of the latter, a real right that has prescribed for nonuse
is not susceptible to post-extinguishment resurrection by way of
acknowledgment.24 Rather, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has often
noted, “It is well settled by our jurisprudence that a mineral servitude,
conceptual technique, Article 3445 declares that there are three kinds of
prescription: acquisitive prescription, liberative prescription, and prescription of
nonuse. The slight change in conceptual technique does not involve a change in
the law.”).
22. Act No. 187, 1982 La. Acts Vol. I, effective January 1, 1983.
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3449 (2018).
24. See, e.g., id. art. 3448 cmt. (c) (2018) (“Liberative prescription bars
action. See Article 3447, supra. However, the prescription of nonuse extinguishes 
the right itself. Thus, after the accrual of prescription of nonuse, no natural
obligation remains.”); see also Wise v. Watkins, 62 So. 2d 653, 656 (La. 1952)
(“The courts have on occasions referred to an extinguished servitude as being a
dead thing or, in other words, no longer in existence. . . . This Court has also
pointed out that a servitude can only be established by acts such as are used in the 
transfer of title to immovable property. . . . Since the servitude in this case has
become extinct, it cannot be re-created or established anew except by title.”).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  28 5/26/21  11:49 AM









    
  
  
    
    
 








     
    
 
       
    
   
 
   
  
       
      
    




     
    
       
    
 
   
  
1136 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
having once become extinct by prescription, is a dead thing.”25 Certainly,
as one court has noted, “[D]rilling on the Property will not affect
prescription which has already accrued.”26 
B. Effective Date of Creation of a Mineral Servitude
A mineral servitude is one of the “basic mineral rights that may be
created by a landowner.”27 Indeed, a “mineral servitude may be created
only by a landowner who owns the right to explore for and produce
minerals when the servitude is created.”28 What article 24 means is that, to 
the extent that an existing mineral servitude already burdens the land, a
landowner cannot create a second servitude, but the landowner may create 
a servitude as to any unencumbered rights it holds in the minerals.29 As the 
courts have stated, “[O]nly a landowner may create a mineral servitude
and then only to the extent of his mineral interest.”30 
Obviously, it is necessary to discern the date on which a mineral
servitude is created to ascertain when, in the absence of a use, it will be 
extinguished. A decade is a decade, with both a start and end date. Unless
the duration of the prescriptive period has been modified pursuant to the
limited authority conferred in article 74 of the Mineral Code,31 the 
servitude will be extinguished after the lapse of 10 years of nonuse.32 
This rule of prescription embodies a matter of public policy that a
contract cannot fundamentally vary or defeat.33 Often, it is important to
25. Delta Ref. Co. v. Bankhead, 73 So. 2d 302, 306 (La. 1954); see also
Bailey v. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co., 28 F. Supp. 25, 31 (W. D. La. 1939) (“[T]he
Louisiana jurisprudence is clear that prescription already accrued could not be 
revived, as it was a dead thing. Therefore, the payments that Bailey received and
the royalties that he later received (similarly received in the case of English v.
Blackman) in no manner revived the dead mineral servitude.”).
26. Porter-Wadley Lumber Co. v. Bailey, 110 F.2d 974, 976 (5th Cir. 1940).
27. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:16 (2018) (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 31:24.
29. Wall v. Leger, 402 So. 2d 704, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (“Article
24 is a limitation on mineral servitudes, not on mineral leases. . . . A mineral lessor
does not transfer ownership of mineral rights when he enters into a lease. . . .
Ownership of mineral rights remains with the mineral lessor.”).
30. Elkins v. Townsend, 296 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1961).
31. See infra Part II.G.2.
32. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1) (2018).
33. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., Inc., 131 So. 2d 635,
651 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961). (“The public policy, as relates to the prescription
of nonuser as applied to mineral servitudes, is directed against attempts to
renounce prescription in advance, or to suspend or to interrupt prescription by
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  29 5/26/21  11:49 AM















   
   
    
   
   
  
      
 
   
  
   
  
  
       
  
     
    
 
       
   
   
     




      
   
       
    
   
      
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1137
determine the exact time of creation of a mineral servitude, which marks
the beginning of the 10-year period. The ordinary rule is that the servitude
is created, and prescription commences, when the landowner effectively 
vests the right in another person who may then exercise the rights it gives
him.34 When this occurs is, of course, determined from the ordinary rules
of property.35 
The courts have taken up the issue of when prescription commences
with respect to instruments other than a stand-alone sale document,
including agreements preparatory to the sale in which a mineral
reservation might be contained,36 such as a contract to sell37 or a lease with 
an option to purchase.38 
For example, in Ober v. Williams,39 the Court held that a mineral
servitude was created on the date of the passage of the act of sale, not on
the earlier date of the contract to sell, which envisioned the mineral
reservation in the case of the later passage of an act of sale.
Then, in Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Ayer Timber Co., Inc.,40 the 
court examined five-year leases that contained an option to purchase at the
end of the lease term, with a reservation of a mineral servitude in the event
means other than user or other means expressly recognized by law, such as
acknowledgments made specifically for the purpose and with the intention of 
interrupting the running of prescription. What the courts have considered as
contrary to public policy are agreements which seek to cause the lands to be
burdened with mineral servitudes for more than 10 years without user.”).
34. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:28 (2018) (“Prescription of nonuse of a mineral
servitude commences from the date on which it is created.”); see also Cohort
Energy Co. v. Caddo-Bossier Pars. Port Comm’n, 852 So. 2d 1174, 1178 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 2003) (“The ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date
the mineral rights are acquired or created.”).
35. Irrefutably, a mineral servitude is “property.” See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:2,
31:16, 31:18 (2018). See sources cited, supra note 6, such that all laws of
Louisiana pertinent to immovable property apply, except as otherwise might be 
provided. Guy Scroggins, Inc. v. Emerald Expl., 401 So. 2d 680, 684 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1981) (“Mineral rights . . . are classified under the Mineral Code as 
incorporeal immovables and are subject to the Civil Code articles respecting
immovable property.”). In the interest of full disclosure, the author represented
the defendant in this suit. This proposition includes rules incident to the creation
or transfer of property in the nature of a real right.
36. See Chapter 14 of Title VII of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code,
composed of articles 2620 through 2630.
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2623 (2018).
38. Id. art. 2620.
39. 35 So. 2d 219 (La. 1948).
40. 131 So. 2d 635 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
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1138 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
of the exercise of the option, and held that prescription began to run when
the option to purchase was exercised, not when the leases were granted.
From time to time, a variety of schemes have been devised in an
attempt to circumvent the 10-year prescriptive period and effectively
separate the enjoyment of the land from the enjoyment of the minerals for
more than 10 years without the necessity of operations on or production 
from the property. For the most part, such schemes have been invalidated
as being contrary to public policy.41 
Illustratively, in LeBleu v. LeBleu,42 the court determined to be
unenforceable an agreement that created a mineral servitude and that
purported to obligate the defendants to convey to the plaintiff a new
mineral servitude in the event the earlier servitude should prescribe.
Declining enforcement of that stipulation, the court stated that this
undertaking
constitute[d] a scheme or a device to circumvent or avoid the law
and public policy of this state that a mineral servitude will be
subject to the prescription of ten years, that contracts which 
purport to extend such a servitude for a longer period of time
without use will not be enforced, and that a party cannot waive or
renounce the prescription applicable to a mineral servitude before 
it has accrued.43 
While courts will not enforce clauses of this type, the mere inclusion
of such a provision does not invalidate the agreement in which it is
contained. For example, in Kirkland v. Faulhaber,44 an offer to sell land
contained the following provision, to-wit: “I have had several offers on the
160 acres I own adjoining your property and have decided I will offer it
for sale at $75 per acre with a reservation of mineral rights for ten years
plus a ten-year extension at the close or end of that period.”45 
After the plaintiff-offeree accepted the offer, the defendant-offeror
notified the offeree that she had accepted another offer. The offeree sued
to enforce the offer by specific performance. The defendant asserted, in
defense, “that defendant’s offer and plaintiff’s acceptance comprehended
41. Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code, article 11 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 embraced this proposition, which provided, in
relevant part, that “[i]ndividuals can not by their conventions, derogate from the
force of laws made for the preservation of public order or good morals.” See LA.
REV. STAT. § 31:3 cmt. (2018).
42. 206 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
43. Id. at 557.
44. 175 So. 2d 917 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
45. Id. at 918.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  31 5/26/21  11:49 AM




    
     
 
   















   
  




    
   
 
    
     
    
 
   




   
    
     
     
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1139
an invalid agreement with respect to the reservation of minerals for a
period in excess of ten years.”46 “It is urged that defendant is released from
her agreement because the offer and acceptance contemplated the
inclusion of a condition for the extension of the reservation of minerals
which would not be valid under the laws of this State.”47 
The court was confronted with the issue of whether the stipulation for
an extension of the mineral servitude was “a principal cause for making
the contract.”48 The court found that it was not a principal cause, stating as
follows:
Nor do we find that the contemplated extension of the mineral
reservation could, in any event, be considered as ground for the
avoidance of the agreement to sell. The extension is not illegal; it
is not void; it is not prohibited, but it is simply unenforceable by
law. Despite the fact that plaintiff would be under no legal
obligation to comply with the agreement for extension, it cannot
be said that he could not voluntarily grant the extension.49 
The court granted specific performance to enforce the sale and
required that the sale contain a mineral reservation “for a period of ten
years, together with the right of an extension of said reservation for an
additional period of ten years.”50 Notwithstanding that courts will not
enforce this stipulation, its inclusion permits the parties to abide by it
if they wish to do so voluntarily, but without the prospect of judicial
intervention if the landowner declines to do so.
More recently, in Weyerhauser Co. v. A. D. Hinton, L.L.C.,51 the court
refused to enforce a written agreement on the part of a landowner by which
it had obligated itself to acknowledge an outstanding mineral servitude,
upon request of the servitude owner.52 The court noted that the “difference
46. Id.
47. Id. at 919.
48. Id. The argument was based upon former article 1823 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code, which provided that, in order for an error of law to invalidate a 
contract, it must bear upon the principal cause for the making of the contract. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2034 (2018) (“Nullity of a provision does not render the whole
contract null unless, from the nature of the provision or the intention of the parties,
it can be presumed that the contract would not have been made without the null
provision.”).
49. See Kirkland v. Faulhaber, 175 So. 2d 917, 919 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
50. Id. at 920.
51. No. Civ.A.06-0272, 2006 WL 3845005 (W.D. La. Dec. 29, 2006).
52. The agreement provided, as follows:
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1140 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
between an invalid attempt to extend the life of a mineral servitude beyond
the ten years dictated by public policy and validly extending the life of a
servitude by interrupting prescription with a written and recorded acknow-
ledgment is the conscious choice of the landowner.”53 
C. Types of Prescription-Altering Events
Prescription of nonuse accruing against a mineral servitude can be
interrupted, extended, or suspended. There are significant differences
attributable to each type of prescription-altering event.
“If prescription is interrupted, the time that has run is not counted.
Prescription commences to run anew from the last day of interruption.”54 
By contrast, “extension” does not create a new servitude, but merely
extends the prescriptive period pertinent to an existing mineral servitude
for a period of time—usually for the term of a mineral lease. If a sufficient
use is made during that extended period of time, an interruption occurs.55 
When “suspension” occurs, time stands still for the duration of the
suspending event. When the suspending event is abated or removed, time
starts again, effectively adding the period of the suspension to the
remaining “life” of the servitude.56 
The Louisiana Supreme Court explained the difference between
interruption and suspension of prescription in a non-mineral rights case
wherein the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of
Louisiana law to the state’s highest court.57 In the course of the decision
(which involved the one-year prescriptive period applicable to torts), the
From time to time upon the written request of the duly authorized agent 
for then owners of such mineral interest, Willamette would execute such
instruments as may be necessary for the purpose of interrupting or tolling
the running of liberative perscription [sic] against the mineral servitudes 
created by the reservation. Each such instrument shall contain a
provision holding Willamette and its officers and directors harmless
from any and all loss or damage of whatsoever kind and character by
reason of executing such instruments if, but only if, in the opinion of
counsel for Willamette it is then lawful for Willamette to execute same.
Id. at *1.
53. Id. at *5.
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3466 (2018). See infra Part II.
55. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:57 (2018). See infra Part III.
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3472 (2018) (“The period of suspension is not counted
toward accrual of prescription. Prescription commences to run again upon the
termination of the period of suspension.”). See infra Part IV.
57. Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 440 So. 2d 93 (La. 1983).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1141
Supreme Court explained the essential difference between interruption and
suspension as follows:
The basic difference between interruption and suspension of
prescription is the length of the prescriptive period when
prescription begins to run anew. When prescription is interrupted,
the prescriptive period starts over in its entirety upon cessation of
the interruption. Thus, when a one-year prescriptive period is
interrupted at any time during the year by the filing of suit and the
suit is subsequently dismissed without prejudice, the plaintiff has
another full year in which to bring another suit, and that second
one-year period begins to run from the last day of interruption. See
La.C.C. Art. 3466. On the other hand, if a one-year prescriptive
period is suspended for any reason, the “clock” merely stops
during the suspension and starts again at the cessation of the
suspension, so that the obligee has only so much of the one year
as was remaining when the suspension began. Only the period of
suspension is not counted toward the accrual of prescription. See
La.C.C. Art. 3472.58 
D. Mineral Servitude Subject to Conditional Title
An important circumstance that might result in the extinguishment of
a mineral servitude is presented if the owner’s title to the land burdened
by the servitude is subject to a “condition divesting the title.”59 Article 25
of the Louisiana Mineral Code establishes this precept, and it reads as
follows:
A mineral servitude may be created by a landowner whose title
terminates at a particular time or upon the occurrence of a certain
condition but it is extinguished at the specified time or on
occurrence of the condition divesting the title.60 
Concordant with this principle is article 27(5) of the Mineral Code,
which establishes that a “mineral servitude is extinguished
by . . . extinction of the right of him who established the servitude.”61 
Examples of the existence of a condition that predates the creation of
the mineral servitude include a landowner whose land is burdened by a
58. Id. at 97 n.8.
59. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 3-08.
60. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:25 (2020).
61. Id. § 31:27(5).
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1142 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
mortgage or other security interest. Unless it is subordinated in favor of
the subsequently created mineral servitude, any enforcement of the
superior mortgage or other security interest would result in the termination
of the servitude upon the judicial sale of the burdened property.62 The 
purchaser at a judicial sale is entitled to receive title to the encumbered
land in the state or condition it was in on the date of the filing of the
mortgage being enforced, as that is the state of title for which the lender
bargained by way of mortgage.
Additionally, if the landowner acquires the land subject to a right of
redemption, the mineral servitude later created by the landowner would be
extinguished upon the timely exercise of the right of redemption.63 
Yet another illustration is presented where the land burdened by a
mineral servitude is already subject to an agreement preparatory to a sale
to a third party that is reflected of record. This preparatory agreement
might be an option to sell,64 a contract to sell,65 or a right of first refusal
(sometimes called a “preferential right to purchase,” or simply a “pref
right”).66 Any mineral servitude created on the face of one of these types
62. “The property is sold subject to any real charge or lease with which it is
burdened, superior to any security interest, mortgage, lien, or privilege of the
seizing creditor.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2372 (made applicable to executory
proceedings by article 2724(A)); see also P.J.’s Army Surplus & Co., Inc. v. G.D.
& G., 635 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1994) (“In this case, the
question is whether a lease, recorded after the mortgage upon which the property
was foreclosed, survived the judicial sale without subsequent recordation of a new
lease or ratification of the earlier lease, such that a third party purchaser would be 
bound by that lease. We find that it does not.”). See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE 
TREATISE, supra note 5, § 12-11(c); see also Patrick S. Ottinger, Enforcement of
Real Mortgages by Executory Process, 51 LA. L. REV. 87, 132 (1990).
63. “A purchaser under a reserved right of redemption may establish a predial
servitude on the property, but it ceases if the seller exercises his right of 
redemption.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 713 (2020). “The seller who exercises the right
of redemption is entitled to recover the thing free of any encumbrances placed
upon it by the buyer. Nevertheless, when the thing is an immovable, the interests
of third persons are governed by the laws of registry.” Id. art. 2588.
64. See id. art. 2620.
65. Id. art. 2623.
66. Id. art. 2625; see Robert J. Sergesketter, Preferential Rights to Purchase:
The Basics, and the Most Interesting Pref. Rights Case You’ve Never Heard
About, 5 HLRE 43, 46 (2015) (“First, let us get some nomenclature out of the way.
Preferential Rights to Purchase often are referred to as Rights of First Refusal, or
‘RoFRs.’ They also are referred to as Preferential Purchase Rights (the naming
convention primarily used in this Article), Preferential Rights, Pref. Rights,
Preemptive Rights, and Contingent Rights.”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1143
of agreements would be extinguished if a third person avails such rights to
purchase the property.
The premise underlying this rule finds support in the well-established
principle that one may not grant to a third person any rights greater than
those the grantor holds.67 As stated, the mineral lessee who proposes to
operate on land burdened by a conditional mineral servitude—more 
accurately, a mineral servitude inferior to a valid, pre-existing right of a
third party to acquire or reclaim the land—would be prudent to seek either
to subordinate that superior right to the mineral servitude and mineral
lease,68 or to secure a “protective lease” or “top lease” from the party in
whose favor the minerals would revert in the event of extinction resulting
from the occurrence of the condition.69 
One must note that an extinguishment of a mineral servitude resulting
from the occurrence of a pre-existing “condition divesting the title” is in
no manner dependent upon or tethered to the existence or lack of a use that
would otherwise perpetuate the servitude. Indeed, the servitude will
conclude upon the occurrence of the terminating condition even if, on the
date of extinguishment, there exist multiple drilling or producing wells on
the lands that the mineral servitude burdens that would otherwise
constitute a use sufficient to interrupt prescription.
Additionally, even if a mineral servitude is properly acknowledged,
even a few days before its prescriptive date, it will still be extinguished if,
thereafter, the divesting condition is effectuated.
Early jurisprudence recognized an exception that might pertain to the
extinguishment of a mineral servitude because of the loss of title in the
party creating the servitude. Thus, in Jefferson v. Childers,70 the facts
disclosed that, subsequent to granting a mineral lease, the vendor sued the
lessor to annul the sale because of non-payment of the purchase price for
the land.71 
Although the sale of land to the lessor was annulled, the annulment
was without prejudice to the rights of the mineral lessee because the lessee
relied on the “public records doctrine.”72 The Court stated:
67. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 2-09.
68. See id. § 12-11(c).
69. See id. §§ 6-02, 6-05; cf. Wahlder v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., 337 So.
2d 669 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
70. 179 So. 30 (La. 1937).
71. The deed was recorded in the conveyance records of Bossier Parish,
Louisiana, and apparently not in the mortgage records. However, “[u]nder this
Article [2561 of the Civil Code] the right to dissolution is effective regardless of
recordation in the mortgage records.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2561 cmt. (h) (2020).
72. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 1-14.
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1144 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Even if plaintiff is successful in her suit against defendant, she can
only recover the property subject to transactions affecting it made
by her apparent vendee with third persons acting in good faith. In
effect, she becomes the lessor of intervener, to the same extent as
though she had been the original lessor.73 
E. Rule of Non-Contiguity
When one examines a particular event or activity to determine whether
it constitutes a use of a mineral servitude sufficient to interrupt
prescription, it is essential to be cognizant of the rule of non-contiguity.74 
In a rule of public policy that differs from the principle respecting a
mineral lease,75 it is not possible to create a single mineral servitude over
non-contiguous tracts of land. Thus, in Lee v. Giauque,76 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held as follows:
But that section does not form a continuous tract with any other
part of the lands in controversy, being removed from all the other 
lands mentioned in said reservation, except that the southwest
point of said section 31 is common to the northeast point of the
lands in section 1 of township 13 north, range 12 east.
We are of opinion that the exercise upon any part of a continuous
tract of land of a servitude extending over the whole tract
preserved the servitude over the whole for the reason that there is
but one servitude on the whole tract.
On the other hand, we think that servitudes extending over
separate tracts of land constitute distinct servitudes; and that the 
exercise of the right over one of these tracts will not serve to
preserve the right over other and distinct tracts. For instance, the
right of passage on lands to my right, and also on lands to my left,
clearly constitute two distinct servitudes, although created by the 
same title; and by exercising my right only on one side[,] I indicate
no intention of preserving my right on the other.
73. Jefferson, 179 So. at 32.
74. Although often called the “rule of contiguity,” this author suggests that it 
more accurately is the “rule of non-contiguity,” but as the phrase goes, “what’s in
a name?”
75. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:114 (2020) (“A single lease may be created on two
or more noncontiguous tracts of land . . . .”).
76. Lee v. Giauque, 97 So. 669 (La. 1923).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1145
And to constitute a single tract of land the lands must be so
situated that one may pass from one part to the other without
passing over the lands of another. But, as it is impossible to pass
through a mere point, it follows that one cannot pass from said
section 31 to section 1 without passing over other lands.77 
This rule of non-contiguity is now enshrined in three articles of the
Mineral Code, as follows:
Art. 64. Presumption when servitudes created on noncontiguous
tracts
An act creating mineral servitudes on noncontiguous tracts of
land creates as many mineral servitudes as there are tracts unless 
the act provides for more.78 
Art. 66. Right of owners of contiguous tracts to create single 
servitude
The owners of several contiguous tracts of land may establish a
single mineral servitude in favor of one or more of them or of a
third party.79 
Art. 73. Single servitude may not exist on noncontiguous tracts
A single mineral servitude may not be created on two or more
noncontiguous tracts of land.80 
So, what is the test of contiguity? An appellate court has held that
“[t]wo tracts of land which touch only at a common corner are not
contiguous.”81 
The courts have further recognized that “‘[c]ontiguous tracts of land’
must be tracts or bodies of land which have one side, or at least part of one
side, in common.”82 
Consequently, if an instrument of grant or reservation describes tracts
that are not contiguous, the instrument establishes as many distinct mineral
77. Id. at 670.
78. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:64 (2020).
79. Id. § 31:66.
80. Id. § 31:73.
81. Turner v. Glass, 195 So. 645, 646 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
82. Baham v. Vernon, 42 So. 2d 141, 145 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
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1146 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
servitudes as there are non-contiguous tracts involved, “unless the act
provides for more.” Each tract would be subject to its own use requirement
such that a use on one servitude will have no bearing on the accrual of
prescription against other non-contiguous servitudes,83 except to the extent
that it is unitized such that the tenets of articles 30, 33, 34, 35, or 37 of the
Mineral Code might operate. 
Article 64, which states that the rule stated therein applies “unless the 
act provides for more,” recognizes the opportunity to make the use
requirements more (but not less) burdensome by providing that more
servitudes are created than the precise number of non-contiguous tracts.
An example, albeit unique, is a stipulation that each named governmental
section (or portion thereof) in a larger contiguous tract of land constitutes
a separate and distinct servitude even though each distinct section is
contiguous to one or more other governmental sections (or portion
thereof).
Thus, where a tract of land was “dismembered into two tracts” by the
intervention of a railroad strip owned by a third party in full ownership
(and not merely in nature of a personal servitude of right of use), a use on
one side of the railroad strip only interrupted prescription accruing against
the mineral servitude on the side where the use occurred, but not on the
other side.84 
A common situation that invokes a factual or legal examination under
the “rule of non-contiguity” is presented when a stream or river completely
traverses a servitude-burdened tract of land described as a continuous body
of land. If the stream or river is navigable, the State of Louisiana owns its
bed,85 and the tract is rendered into two non-contiguous parcels, such that
a use on one side of the intervening water will not interrupt prescription
on the other side of the stream or river.86 
83. “On the other hand, we think that servitudes extending over separate
tracts of land constitute distinct servitudes; and that the exercise of the right over
one of these tracts will not serve to preserve the right over other and distinct
tracts.” Lee v. Giauque, 97 So. 669, 670 (La. 1923); see LA. REV. STAT. § 31:64
(2020).
84. Calhoun v. Ardis, 141 So. 15, 17 (La. 1932); see also Patton v. Frost
Lumber Indus., Inc., 147 So. 33 (La. 1933).
85. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2020) (“Public things are owned by the state
or its political subdivisions in their capacity as public persons. Public things that
belong to the state are such as running waters, the waters and bottoms of natural
navigable water bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore.”).
86. Vermilion Bay Land Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 646 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1994), writ denied, 650 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1995).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1147
Illustratively, in a recent case, an appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s conclusion that the landowners “failed to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that Bayou Dolet was navigable when Louisiana was
admitted to the Union in 1812,” thus defeating a claim that the servitude
was divided.87 
So foundational is the rule of non-contiguity as it pertains to a mineral
servitude, that principles of warranty or estoppel will not defeat its
operation if a tract of land is, in fact and in law, non-contiguous.88 
F. Disposition of Rights to Minerals upon Extinguishment of a Mineral
Servitude
When the accrual of prescription of nonuse extinguishes a mineral
servitude (or by other means of extinguishment as enumerated in article
27 of Mineral Code), the rights to the minerals revert to the person who is
the landowner at the time of extinguishment. In the jargon of the industry,
such a person to whom minerals revert upon extinction is often referred to
as the “then owner of the land.”89 
This is an essential tenet of law that is a matter of public policy and
was established in the case of McDonald v. Richard90 in which the
Louisiana Supreme Court cogently explained as follows:
The question in the case is this: If the owner of a tract of land sells
the land and reserves the mineral rights, and if, thereafter, within
the period of 10 years, the purchaser of the land sells the mineral
rights (which he does not own) to a third party, and if, thereafter,
but within 10 years from the date of the sale of the land, the buyer
87. Furie Petrol., L.L.C. v. SWEPI, LP, 285 So. 3d 91, 94 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 2019).
88. See, e.g., Ultramar Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Fournet, 598 So. 2d 645, 646 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (involving a mineral royalty, rather than a mineral
servitude, court rejects royalty owners’ contention that the landowners were
estopped to assert non-contiguity where their royalty deed described one
continuous tract of land, and made no reference to the canal that bisected the 
royalty tract). It must be noted that the court deemed highly relevant the fact that
the case involved a mineral royalty, which is passive in nature.
89. See Williams v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 193 So. 2d 78, 81 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1966) (“[T]he mineral servitude, upon its expiration, reverted free of
any encumbrance, to the then owner of the land.”) (emphasis added); Corley v. 
Craft, 571 So. 2d 718, 722 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990) (“Thus, upon expiration of
a mineral servitude, the mineral rights revert to the owner/owners of the land.”) 
(emphasis added).
90. 13 So. 2d 712 (La. 1943).
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1148 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
sells it to a fourth party, and if the original seller of the land loses
his mineral servitude by the liberative prescription of 10 years for
nonuser, to whom do the mineral rights inure,—to the party who 
bought the mineral rights from one who had no such rights,—or
to the party who owned the land at the time when the servitude or
mineral rights reserved by the original landowner lapsed by the
prescription of 10 years? The judge of the district court decided
that, inasmuch as the mineral rights reserved by the Morley
Cypress Company were merely a real obligation, or mineral
servitude imposed upon the land, the lapsing of the obligation or
servitude inured to the party who owned the land at the time when
the obligation lapsed. Our opinion is that the judgment is correct.91 
This rule is so robust that contracting parties are not allowed to alter it
under the guise of reserving or otherwise dealing with the so-called
“reversionary interest,” or the expectancy that a mineral servitude will 
prescribe.
This fundamental precept was first announced in Hicks v. Clark,92 an 
important case in which Mr. Raines sold land to Mr. Brown on December
9, 1941 and reserved a mineral servitude as to one-fourth of the minerals.
Within fewer than 10 years from that date, Hicks acquired ownership of
the surface of the land.
On July 16, 1948, Hicks sold the land, subject to the earlier Raines’s
servitude, to the ancestor-in-title of Clark. In this sale, Hicks reserved a
mineral servitude in and to one-fourth of the minerals and the “right of
reversion” of the outstanding one-fourth of the minerals held by Raines.
After December 9, 1951 (the date of extinguishment of the Raines’s
servitude by reason of nonuse), Hicks sued the surface owners to be
recognized as the owner of a servitude in and to the one-fourth of the
minerals over which he had reserved the “right of reversion.”
The Court rejected Hicks’s institution as being “an effort to
circumvent the public policy of this state, and [] therefore refused[d] to
recognize or give effect to it.”93 Thus, the Court refused to allow a “right
of reversion” to be treated as an object of commerce.94 
91. Id. at 714.
92. 72 So. 2d 322 (La. 1954).
93. Id. at 325.
94. That recognition of the so-called “right of reversion” would be entirely
repugnant to our civil law of property is concordant with the simplicity inherent 
in our law. See State v. McDonogh’s Ex’rs, 8 La. Ann. 171, 251 (La. 1853) (“The 
general idea of property under the Roman law, and under our system, is that of
simple, uniform and absolute dominion. The subordinate exceptions of use,
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1149
The rule of Hicks v. Clark is now codified in article 76 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code that provides as follows: “The expectancy of a landowner
in the extinction of an outstanding mineral servitude cannot be conveyed
or reserved directly or indirectly.”95 
In an unpublished decision,96 a court has held that the rule of article
76 is only violated when the servitude prescribes for nonuse, but does not
prevent parties from dealing with the servitude if there has been a use.
Thus, in Estate of Riggs v. Way-Jo, L.L.C.,97 the sale of land contained the 
following reservation, to-wit:
SELLER HEREIN SPECIFICALLY TRANSFERS Reserves
AND CONVEYS UNTO PURCHASER ALL MINERALS AND
MINERAL RIGHTS EXCEPT FOR THE ROYALTIES
PRESENTLY BEING PAID TO SELLER, WHICH
ROYALTIES ARE HEREBY RESERVED UNTIL TWELVE 
(12) MONTHS AFTER SELLERS [SIC] DEATH. AFTER THE
LAPSE OF SAID TIME, ALL ROYALTIES SHALL BE PAID
TO PURCHASER OR ITS SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS.98 
The efficacy of the sale of land was attacked on several theories
(including an allegation that it was a forgery and constituted a fraud). The
mineral reservation was also challenged on the basis that it violated public
policy as enunciated in article 76 of the Mineral Code. The trial court
agreed with the challenge to the mineral reservation and held it invalid.
On appeal, all challenges to the sale were rejected, and the court then
took up the issue of the validity of the mineral reservation. The court’s
analysis centered on the underlying policy articulated in the Hicks case, 
usufruct and servitudes are abundantly sufficient to meet all the wants of
civilization, and there is no warrant of law, no reason of policy, for the
introduction of any other.”).
95. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:76 (2020).
96. While an unreported decision is not binding precedent, it is persuasive to
the court. Although it was previously provided that a case that is “not designated
for publication” should not be quoted or cited in any respect, Roberts v. Sewage 
& Water Bd., 634 So. 2d 341, 343 (La. 1994), since 2006, there is no longer a
prohibition against citing “unpublished opinions of the supreme court and the 
courts of appeal,” provided that they are “posted by such courts on the Internet
websites of such courts.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2168 (2020).
97. Est. of Riggs v. Way-Jo, L.L.C., No. 2011 CA 1651, 2012 WL 6737835
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 28, 2012).
98. Id. at * 2 (emphasis by court: strike through indicative of changes made
by hand to the typed mineral reservation; bold type is the operative language of
the reservation, eliminating interlined words).
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1150 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
that is, that it is contrary to public policy to burden land with a mineral
servitude for a period longer than 10 years without use.99 The court deemed
that the construct presented in Riggs did not offend this announced policy
because the court found as follows:
There was mineral production on the Greensburg property from a 
period prior to the 1999 sale to Way–Jo through the time of trial.
Unlike the mineral servitude at issue in Hicks, Riggs’ mineral
servitude did not terminate due to ten years non-use, but rather due 
to the contractual agreement the parties made at the time of the
1999 sale. Under such facts, the rationale and holding of Hicks is 
not applicable.100 
Because no public policy was implicated where there had been a use
of the mineral servitude, the court found that “the provisions of La. R.S.
31:76 also are not applicable, particularly since La. R.S. 31:3 grants parties
contractual freedom to deviate from the provisions of the mineral code, as
long as the deviation does not affect the rights of others and is not contrary
to public policy.”101 
The Riggs decision upholds the language of the reservation that
reserves the rights to minerals to the seller for a stated term (“until twelve
(12) months after sellers [sic] death”). The court concluded that this
reservation did not offend the rule of Hicks v. Clark, now embodied in
article 76 of the Mineral Code, because “the continuous mineral
production”102 meant that, unlike the relevant facts in Hicks, there was a 
use of the mineral servitude. Hence, the public policy articulated in Hicks
was not violated. Rather, the “freedom of contract” enunciated in Mineral
Code article 3 permitted the parties to construct this type of reservation, 
and the court enforced it.
Article 76’s prohibition against dealing with the expectancy of
extinguishment is subject to exceptions set forth in the three sequentially
following articles, which address the unique circumstance of an
“oversale,”103 a matter which, while vitally important, is beyond the scope 
of this Article.104 
99. LeBleu v. LeBleu, 206 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
100. Est. of Riggs, 2012 WL 6737835, at *16–17.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *16.
103. An “oversale” situation arises when a series of sales or reservations of
rights to minerals result in claims to minerals that, in the aggregate, exceed 100%
of rights in minerals. 
104. See OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 416.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1151
G. Opportunity to Invoke “Freedom of Contract”
1. Preface
While both a mineral lease and a mineral servitude confer upon their
owner the right to conduct operations on the burdened land, these two
basic mineral rights differ in significant respects.105 For present purposes,
one of the most significant differences between these two mineral rights is
that the mineral lease is susceptible to robust alteration under the principle
of “freedom of contract,” a notion the Mineral Code affirms,106 while the
Louisiana Mineral Code dictates and establishes, for the most part, the
intrinsic attributes of the mineral servitude, with minimal opportunity for
contractual alteration.
Nevertheless, within certain limitations, the principle of “freedom of
contract” is available with respect to the mineral servitude. Two particular
articles of the Mineral Code are implicated here—articles 74 and 75.
2. Alteration of Prescriptive Period or Imposition of Term
Article 74 provides, “Parties may fix the term of a mineral servitude
or shorten the applicable period of prescription of nonuse or both. If a
period of prescription greater than ten years is stipulated, the period is
reduced to ten years.”107 
If parties “fix the term,” the mineral servitude comes to an end upon
the accrual of that stated term, even if there then exists an activity that
would otherwise constitute a use sufficient to perpetuate the servitude. 
If, instead, parties merely “shorten the applicable period,” a use
accomplished within that shorter period of time can still perpetuate the
mineral servitude, and so on, but it will thereafter extinguish if the
truncated time period accrues without a use.
These issues were considered in St. Mary Operating Co. v.
Champagne,108 and the court stated the issue as follows: “Under the 
105. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 1-19.
106. “Unless expressly or impliedly prohibited from doing so, individuals may
renounce or modify what is established in their favor by the provisions of this
Code if the renunciation or modification does not affect the rights of others and is
not contrary to the public good.” LA. REV. STAT. § 31:3 (2020). The important
principle of “freedom of contract” is addressed in Part I of Chapter Two of
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5.
107. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:74 (2020).
108. 945 So. 2d 846 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2006), writ denied, 954 So. 2d 140 
(La. 2007).
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1152 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Louisiana Mineral Code, does the phrase in a cash sale document, ‘for a 
period of 10 years,’ create a fixed, ten-year term, not subject to
prescription, or is this phrase a reaffirmation of the parties’ adoption of the
regular ten-year prescriptive period, making it subject to interruption?”109 
The court explained as follows:
Taking all of these provisions into account, it is never possible to
create a mineral right that will last for more than ten years if it
goes unused. However, if parties create a mineral right and specify
that it will last for more than ten years, then the right is for a fixed
term. A fixed term means that the mineral right will end at the
terminus of the number of years stated, regardless of whether
prescription might have been interrupted by good-faith attempts
to recover minerals from the tract of land. Even if parties create a
fixed term, it will still be subject to prescription if the right goes
unused for ten years from the date it was created.110 
The court held that “because there is no such affirmative statement
specifying that the mineral servitude created for a period of ten years
would not be subject to prescription, we find that it is subject to
prescription.”111 Thus, the court found that “prescription was interrupted 
in March of 2003, when good-faith mining activities were begun. The
mineral servitude will, therefore, continue to exist until there is a ten-year
period of nonuse.”112 
In St. Mary Operating Co. v. Guidry,113 a similar issue was
presented—whether an instrument created a mineral servitude subject to a
prescriptive period of seven years “after which the mineral rights would
revert to the land owners or was this simply a shortening of the ten year
prescriptive period provided for in R.S. 31:27.”114 
The court relied on the comments to article 74 of the Louisiana
Mineral Code, which, in part, read as follows:
Thus, it is suggested that in the absence of some expression to the
contrary in the instrument in question, the specification of a period
less than ten years for a mineral servitude should be construed as
an agreement on a prescriptive period less than ten years, and the
interest should be considered subject to the rules of use and thus
109. Id. at 848.
110. Id. at 850–51.
111. Id. at 852.
112. Id.
113. 954 So. 2d 397 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2007).
114. Id. at 399.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1153
renewable by exercise of the rights granted or reserved. Parties
are, of course, free to specify that the stated number of years is the
term of the interest and not a prescriptive period.115 
The court found that “[t]he co-mingling agreement did not specify if
the seven-year period prescribed in the document was an agreement on the
prescriptive period or on the term of the mineral servitude itself. Thus, we
find it was not error for the trial court to look beyond the four corners of
the document in order to ascertain the intent of the parties.”116 
The court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the instrument
“created a mineral servitude subject to a prescriptive period of seven years
and not a servitude for a fixed term of seven years.”117 
At dispute in Moffett v. Barnes118 was whether a mineral servitude was
subject to a “fixed” 10-year term.
The plaintiffs owned two tracts of land that they purchased from the
defendants. The act of sale stated, “Vendor retains all oil, gas and other
mineral rights in the land herein conveyed for ten (10) years.”119 
The defendants granted mineral leases covering the tracts, and the
lessees drilled and established production on each tract before the tenth
anniversary of the plaintiffs’ purchase of the land. 
The plaintiffs argued that the act of sale’s statement that the
defendants retained mineral rights “for ten (10) years” established a 10-
year fixed term. Accordingly, the plaintiffs posited that the mineral
servitudes terminated on the tenth anniversary of the act of sale, regardless
of the existence of production.120 
The trial court disagreed, finding that the mineral servitudes were not
subject to a fixed term and that prescription had been interrupted by
drilling operations conducted, and production obtained, by the defendants’
lessees. 
Affirming, the appellate court stated that the act of sale’s reservation
“merely confirm[ed] the normal 10-year limit for a servitude, and does not
115. Id. at 401 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 31:74 (2020) cmt. (emphasis
omitted)).
116. Id. at 402.
117. Id. at 398.
118. Moffett v. Barnes, 149 So. 3d 475 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014).
119. Id.
120. “A mineral servitude is extinguished by: . . . (4) expiration of the time for
which the servitude was granted. . . .” LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(4) (2020); see
OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 408(4).
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1154 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
reject or renounce the normal operation of nonuse and interruption 
provided by the law.”121 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that they should have been
allowed to present evidence regarding the intent of the parties, stating that
the act of sale was unambiguous, and therefore evidence of intent was not
appropriate.122 
Finally, Taylor v. Morris123 is a case with facts very similar to those
presented in Moffett. However, a different panel of the same appellate
court similarly held that an act of sale referring to a “period of ten (10)
years” did not establish a fixed term, but instead merely referred to the
law’s default prescriptive period.124 
Notably, one judge submitted a concurring opinion stating that, under
the court’s decision, “the literal words for a term period of years are being
avoided and effectively interpreted out of the contract,”125 but that such a 
result was justified “[i]n this unusual setting.”126 
In his concurrence, the judge identified two conceivable
interpretations in cases under article 74, one being the “Prescription
Construction” (“the presumption that the parties were only referring in
their contract to such normal prescription”),127 and the other being the
“Literal Construction” (“words as literally expressing a term that could 
extinguish the servitude”).128 He ordained the former as the “priority
construction,” saying as follows: “However, in the absence of such
clarifying extrinsic evidence, I would hold that the near absurdity of a
fixed-term mineral servitude on land, undeveloped for oil and gas, should
make the Prescription Construction the priority interpretation which a
court should apply.”129 
While this approach would certainly be workable, it is discordant with
case law that suggests that, in the case of two possible constructions, the
court should adopt that interpretation that tends to unburden the land.130 In
121. 149 So. 3d at 478.
122. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 1-16, for a
thorough discussion of the “parole evidence exclusionary rule.”
123. 150 So. 3d 952 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014).
124. Id. at 954.
125. Id. at 959.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 960.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 961.
130. See, e.g., Whitehall Oil Co. v. Heard, 197 So. 2d 672, 678 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 199 So. 2d 923 (La. 1967) (“Ultimately, we conclude that,
where the instrument could as reasonably be interpreted either way, the proper
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1155
a close case, the rule of interpretation is that “[d]oubt as to the existence,
extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in
favor of the servient estate.”131 
3. Alteration of Rules of Use
With regard to the permissible alteration of rules of use pertaining to
a mineral servitude, article 75 of the Mineral Code provides as follows:
The rules of use regarding interruption of prescription on a
mineral servitude may be restricted by agreement but may not be
made less burdensome, except that parties may agree expressly 
and in writing, either in the act creating a servitude or otherwise,
that an interruption of prescription resulting from unit operations
or production shall extend to the entirety of the tract burdened by
the servitude tract regardless of the location of the well or of
whether all or any part of the tract is included in the unit.132 
Because article 30 requires “actual drilling or mining operations” in
order for drilling to interrupt prescription, the article announces a “rule of
use” which, under article 75, “may not be made less burdensome.” Thus,
in an instrument of grant or reservation, parties are not free to provide that
preparatory work short of “spudding in” interrupts prescription.
On the other hand, because it is permissible to “restrict,” or make more 
“burdensome,” the rules of use, parties might, for example, stipulate that— 
rather than being tethered to the date on which “actual
drilling . . . operations are commenced”133—the date of interruption of
prescription only occurs upon drilling the well to a stated depth under the
earth, or by attaining a depth which represents a stated percentage of the
total objective depth of the test well, provided that such activity in its
entirety would constitute a “good faith” operation in accordance with the
strictures of article 29. Clearly, this liberality of “freedom of contract” may
not be used as a subterfuge to avoid the underlying policy enunciated in
article 29.
Additionally, parties could permissibly stipulate that only production 
would be sufficient to interrupt prescription accruing against a mineral
interpretation is that which least restricts the ownership of the land conveyed, as
in the case of mineral servitudes.”).
131. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 (2020) (emphasis added) (made applicable to the
mineral servitude by LA. REV. STAT. § 31:2 (2020)).
132. Id. § 31:75 (2020).
133. Id. § 31:30 (2020).
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1156 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
servitude, and that a dry hole would not have that effect.134 Care should be 
taken, however, to negate any intention to thereby convert the mineral
servitude to a mineral royalty—while the prescriptive regime would be the
same (a dry hole would not interrupt prescription accruing against a
mineral royalty), the two interests differ in terms of the executive right
enjoyed by the owner of a mineral servitude, but not by the owner of a 
mineral royalty.135 
Although it was presented in a recent case involving a mineral royalty,
not a mineral servitude, the court recognized the ability to impose term
restrictions on the life of a real right (while not altering the usual
prescriptive period).136 There, the mineral royalty deed provided as
follows:
This conveyance shall be for a period of Four (4) years & Six (6)
months from July 18, 1996, and as long thereafter as oil, gas or
other minerals are produced from said lands, or from lands with
which said lands are pooled or unitized, and also as long there-
after as drilling or reworking operations are being conducted on
said lands, or on lands pooled or unitized therewith, without more
than 90 days cessation of operations, in an effort to produce oil,
gas or other minerals, and if said operations result in the pro-
duction of minerals, then for as long thereafter as oil, gas or other
minerals are produced from said lands, or from lands pooled or
unitized therewith. A shut-in gas well shall be considered as a
producing well and shall perpetuate the term of this con-
veyance.137 
No production was obtained during the four-year, six-month period
mentioned in the clause, although there was drilling on the burdened tract.
The landowner contended that the royalty prescribed. The trial court
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The 
royalty owner appealed.
134. See Keebler v. Seubert, 120 So. 591, 592 (La. 1929) (“The right to the
continued use of the servitude retained is not dependent upon the successful
outcome of the exploiting, unless it be made so by contract.”) (emphasis added);
see also Texas Co. v. Crawford, 212 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1954) (language of
reservation required production to continue the servitude beyond a stated term of
25 years).
135. Cf. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:111 (2020).
136. Lamoco, Inc. v. Hughes, 850 So. 2d 67 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
860 So. 2d 1156 (La. 2003).
137. Id. at 69 (second emphasis added).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1157
The appellate court stated that “the Royalty Deed does not present a
reduction of the prescriptive period of nonuse, and we find that the 
provision at issue only constitutes the term of a mineral royalty.”138 
The court sustained the condition of the term of the royalty interest,
that is, the necessity to conduct drilling operations without more than 90 
days of cessation of operations. Even though drilling may not interrupt
prescription from accruing against a mineral royalty interest,139 still, the
court seemingly allowed for drilling to continue the term of the royalty
interest. In other words, the continuation of the royalty was restricted, not
as a matter of prescription, but because drilling operations lapsed (which
had no bearing on prescription). “However, the Royalty Deed is still
subject to the ten-year prescriptive period of nonuse.”140 Summary 
judgment in favor of the landowner was reversed.
Although this case did not involve a mineral servitude, it illustrates a
situation when the circumstances resulting in perpetuation of a real right
were made more onerous than the default rules that would otherwise be
pertinent.
II. INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION BY USE
A. Interruption by Drilling as a Use
1. General
As the principal object of a mineral servitude is to exploit mineral
resources for commercial purposes, it is self-evident that a “use” of such
servitude must be made in “good faith” for such “use” to interrupt
prescription. The jurisprudence has envisioned that a “use” is in “good
faith” if it is undertaken with some “reasonable expectation” that minerals
will be discovered and produced in “paying quantities.”141 Any lesser
138. Id. at 71.
139. Cont’l Oil Co. v. Landry, 41 So. 2d 73, 75 (La. 1949) (“It is also well
settled that this right is merely one to share in the production of oil, gas, and other
minerals if and when they are produced from the property subject to the right. It
is passive in its nature, and there is no obligation on the royalty owner to develop
the property, nor does he have this right.”).
140. Id.
141. McMurrey v. Gray, 45 So. 2d 73, 77–78 (La. 1949) (“As this court has
pointed out, no iron-clad rule can be established to determine whether there has been
a use of such a servitude to interrupt prescription. But it may be said that, where
exploitation or drilling operations have been begun but have been stopped or
abandoned at a depth at which there is no reasonable hope of discovering minerals
in paying quantities, there has been no user of the servitude to interrupt prescription.
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1158 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
standard would allow minimal activities undertaken at insignificant costs
to facilitate the perpetual continuation of a mineral servitude, a proposition
repugnant to the civil law that favors reuniting the rights to minerals with
the ownership of the surface.142 
2. Nature of Use
In order to interrupt prescription, the servitude must be used “in the
manner contemplated by the instrument of grant or reservation.”143 Thus,
it has been held that “a geophysical exploration of the premises for the
purpose of determining by scientific methods the indication of minerals
underlying the surface is not a use of a servitude in the manner
contemplated by the grant thereof, and consequently, such exploration
does not interrupt the prescription then accruing.”144 
In a case most frequently cited as authority for the rule of
noncontiguity,145 the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained that “the
court paid no regard as to whether the ‘oil well’ there drilled was
successful or not. It was the drilling of the oil well that was there held to 
preserve the servitude. As a matter of fact, the well in that case was not a 
success.”146 
In Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard,147 the landowner conveyed
a mineral servitude in a tract of land to certain parties who then transferred
these rights to the plaintiff. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs
failed to exercise their mineral rights for 10 years; therefore, the mineral
rights were lost through 10 years of nonuse. Plaintiffs’ lessees had drilled
several wells, beginning seven years after creation of the servitude, none
of which proved to be commercially productive. These drilling operations
lasted for four years, and, for nine years, there was no drilling at all until
In other words, the drilling of the well and the exploitation must be in good faith
with reasonable expectation that the well will be a producer.”). See also Kellogg 
Bros., Inc. v. Singer Mfg. Co., 131 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
142. See, e.g., Mire v. Hawkins, 186 So. 2d 591, 597 (La. 1966) (noting “the
public policy of this State which does not favor unwarranted extensions of
liberative prescription on mineral servitudes; but, to the contrary, that policy
favors the timely return of outstanding minerals to the owner of the land”).
143. La. Petrol. Co. v. Broussard, 135 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931). The Court relied on
former article 796, Louisiana Civil Code, which provided, “By mode of servitude,
in this case, is understood the manner of using the servitude as is prescribed in the
title.”
144. Goldsmith v. McCoy, 182 So. 519, 523 (La. 1938).
145. Lee v. Giauque, 97 So. 669 (La. 1923).
146. Keebler v. Seubert, 120 So. 591, 593 (La. 1920).
147. La. Petrol. Co., 135 So. at 1.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1159
drilling operations were renewed. There was another lapse of eight years
before drilling was once again resumed.
The Louisiana Supreme Court had to determine if some or any of the
drilling operations were insufficient to interrupt prescription of the mineral
servitude through 10 years of nonuse. According to the Court, the general
rule was that drilling operations that terminated at a depth at which there
was no real hope of discovering minerals in “paying quantities” could not
be considered use of the mineral servitude sufficient to interrupt
prescription. Because one of the drilling operations ceased at a depth
where no real hope of discovering minerals in “paying quantities” existed,
the court found that these particular operations failed to interrupt
prescription. Without inclusion of these operations, a period of 17 years 
passed between drilling operations sufficient to interrupt prescription.
Thus, the court held that the servitude had prescribed through 10 years of
nonuse.
In another case,148 a mineral servitude was created on April 30, 1928.
A well was commenced on the servitude tract on March 3, 1938 and was
completed as a dry hole on March 13, 1938. The landowner contended that
the “drilling of the well in this case did not have the effect of interrupting
the prescription.”149 Plaintiff’s contention was that the well was not
commenced with any reasonable expectation of discovering minerals. The
Court rejected this contention, saying as follows:
Taking all [evidence of productive history of the field] into con-
sideration, and the legal presumption of good faith,150 we cannot
agree with the contention that this well was drilled without, in the
opinion of the driller, a reasonable prospect of success. That the
well was a failure is of no moment. The servitude existed of the
right to go upon the land and explore for oil, it was not confined
to the actual production of oil.151 
The courts continued to affirm the proposition that the drilling of a
well in “good faith,” and to a depth at which there was a reasonable hope
or expectation of producing minerals in “paying quantities,” is a sufficient
use to interrupt prescription accruing against a mineral servitude, even if
the operations result in a dry hole. “The right to the continued use of the
148. Lynn v. Harrington, 192 So. 517 (La. 1939).
149. Id. at 518.
150. This “legal presumption of good faith” will be discussed in infra Part V.B.
151. Lynn, 192 So. at 519.
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1160 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
servitude retained is not dependent upon the successful outcome of the
exploiting . . . .”152 
The Court in Hunter Co. v. Ulrich held that the unsuccessful drilling
operations nevertheless were sufficient to interrupt prescription because:
(1) Operations were conducted for a period of about eight months.
(2) Well was drilled to 5,340 feet which compared favorably with
other wells in area.
(3) 220 cores were taken.
(4) Complete log was kept.
(5) $48,000.00 was spent.
In another case,153 operations for the drilling of a well were com-
menced prior to the prescriptive date of a servitude. The geologist found a
“high spot” or a rise in the surface. A well was drilled to the Nacatosh
Sand. However, because the Nacatosh Sand had not been productive in 30
years, the Court held that such operation was not a “good faith” use, as 
“there was no reasonable possibility of obtaining production from the
Nacatosh Sand as this sand had long since depleted.”154 
Although this operation was not sufficient to interrupt prescription, the
Court issued an injunction to prevent the landowner from interfering with
the lessee’s further operation designed to drill to the deeper Travis Peak
formation. “The defendants should be enjoined from interfering with the
drilling of the well McMurrey No. 1 to deeper horizons, and plaintiffs
should be permitted to continue their efforts to interrupt prescription by
these drilling operations.”155 
3. Mineral Code Formulation
a. Preface
The jurisprudentially developed rules pertinent to the interruption of
prescription by “use” resulting from the conduct of drilling operations are
now codified in article 29 of the Mineral Code, which reads as follows:
Art. 29. How prescription of nonuse is interrupted
The prescription of nonuse running against a mineral servitude
152. Hunter Co., Inc. v. Ulrich, 8 So. 2d 531 (La. 1942).
153. McMurrey v. Gray, 45 So. 2d 73 (La. 1949).
154. Id. at 78.
155. Id. at 79.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  53 5/26/21  11:50 AM







   
    
 
    
     






   


















   
   
     
 
    
   
  
    
   
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1161
is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery and
production of minerals. By good faith is meant that the operations
must be
(1) commenced with reasonable expectation of discovering
and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular point
or depth,
(2) continued at the site chosen to that point or depth, and
(3) conducted in such a manner that they constitute a single
operation although actual drilling or mining is not conducted at all
times.156 
Although not explicitly so stated, article 29 has relevance only if the
operation is unsuccessful, resulting in a “dry hole.”157 Only then—and in 
the absence of some other use of the servitude—might it be necessary to
evaluate the “good faith” of the operator in conducting the unsuccessful
operation to ascertain if it was sufficient to interrupt prescription, despite
its lack of commercial success.158 Certainly, if the operation as proposed
and drilled by the operator results in a well that is put into commercial
production, prescription is interrupted effective as of the date on which
actual drilling operations are commenced within the prescriptive period,
without the need to evaluate the reasonableness of the operator’s
expectation.159 
At the same time, if a drilling operation that results in the completion
of a successful well nevertheless would have failed to meet the strictures
of article 29 had it been unsuccessful (by reason of the completion being
in a different “point or depth” than was originally anticipated), that
resulting production would itself serve to interrupt prescription, with the
only caveat being that production must commence prior to the prescriptive
date.160 
156. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:29 (2020).
157. “Insofar as the petroleum industry is concerned, Article 29 perpetuates 
the rule that dry hole drilling operations satisfying the stated criteria will interrupt
prescription.” Id. cmt.
158. The “operator” may be designated by contract, such as by a joint
operating agreement, or by the Commissioner of Conservation. Hunt Oil Co. v.
Batchelor, 644 So. 2d 191, 196 (La. 1994) (“The Commissioner has the power to
establish compulsory units and designate unit operators therefor.”); Enerquest Oil
& Gas, LLC v. Asprodites, 843 So. 2d 535, 539 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he commissioner has the power to establish compulsory units and designate
unit operators therefor.”).
159. Id. § 31:31.
160. Id.
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1162 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
b. Proof through Expert Testimony
To determine if the expectations of the servitude owner (or, more
typically, its lessee) were reasonable, the court will receive testimony from
experts, including geologists, petroleum engineers, as well as other
disciplines. If there is a divergence of opinion from scientists and
“experienced oil men,” one case suggests that the latter might prevail. For
example, in Kellogg Bros., Inc. v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,161 the court
stated that “the views entertained by practical oil and gas men . . . are 
entitled to equal if not greater recognition as experts in that particular
field” because of their extensive experience.162 
The Louisiana Supreme Court made an interesting comment on the
conflicting testimony of technical experts, countered by experienced
operators who “put their money where their mouth is,” in Lynn v.
Harrington,163 thusly:
The most we can gather from the geologists is that their opinions
are very fallible. That the most they can do is to point out what
they consider the most likely place to drill, with no assurance as
to results. That the determining opinion in drilling oil wells is that
of the man sinking and paying for the well. That many fields have
been developed in territory condemned by geologists.164 
It remains to be seen whether this seeming predilection in favor of the
operator who expends its capital still carries the day, in view of the
significant advances in drilling technology since the nascent stages of the
industry. 
c. Standards of Proof of Reasonableness of Driller’s Expectations
Concerning the element of “reasonable expectation,” is this standard
to be adjudged on an “objective” or a “subjective” basis?
While article 29(1) sets forth an objective standard, the requirements
of articles 29(2) and (3) are clearly subjective in nature.165 The second and 
161. Kellogg Bros., Inc. v. Singer Mfg. Co., 131 So. 2d 578 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1961).
162. Id. at 584 (emphasis added).
163. Lynn v. Harrington, 192 So. 517 (La. 1939).
164. Id. at 518–19.
165. “Some comment is appropriate on the rather curious mixture of subjective 
and objective standards in Article 26 [sic]. Operations must be in ‘good faith,’ but
‘good faith’ is proven only if the operations meet evidentiary standards requiring
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1163
third “evidentiary standards” give rise to certain concerns. Because these
“evidentiary standards” are apparently mandatory,166 problems might be
encountered if the drilling of a well that commences in compliance with
the requirements of article 29(1) is not “continued at the site chosen to that
point or depth.” 
For example, if a well is commenced with the intention to drill to a
depth of 16,000 feet (from which depth other wells in the area have
produced in “paying quantities”), and if, at a depth of 12,000 feet,
geological evidence is obtained that demonstrates that further drilling
would be useless because the original geological interpretation was not
valid (e.g., an unexpected fault trap167 is cut or basement rock168 is
encountered), the decision is made to terminate drilling. Because
operations for the drilling of that well are not “continued at the site chosen
to that point or depth,” the mandatory requirement of article 29(2) is not
met.
On the other hand, to continue the drilling of this well to 16,000 feet
would be a vain and useless act and would be contrary to the “reasonable
expectation” requirements of article 29(1). While it appears that such an
operation does not constitute a “use” sufficient to interrupt prescription in
accordance with the literal strictures of article 29, it is suggested that the
courts should allow the servitude owner to demonstrate that,
notwithstanding the non-compliance with these “evidentiary standards,”
the conduct of this operation was reasonable and in “good faith” under the
circumstances. However, one must note that the comments to article 29
explain, “Short of the standards stated in Article 26 [sic], then, no amount
of subjective good faith or effort will sustain a contention that a use has
occurred.”169 
As noted above, the requisites for “good faith” are expressed in the
conjunctive, such that each distinct element must be satisfied for the
that there be a ‘reasonable’ expectation of production, an objective standard.” LA.
REV. STAT. § 31:29 cmt. (2020) (emphasis added).
166. “‘Must’ is mandatory language.” Singleton v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety
& Corr. ex rel. Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., 878 So. 2d 555, 556 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2004).
167. A “fault trap” is a “structural trap, favorable for the retention of
petroleum, formed by the cracking and breaking of a rock plane.” PATRICK H.
MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS: MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS 
TERMS (17th ed. 2018).
168. “Basement rock” is “[e]ither igneous or metamorphic rock” which “does
not contain petroleum.” “[W]hen it is encountered in drilling, the well is
abandoned.” Id.
169. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:29 cmt. (2020).
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1164 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
operations that result in a dry hole to be deemed to be in “good faith,” and,
hence, to interrupt prescription. While elements (2) and (3) are essentially
“mechanical,” and it is easy to determine whether they have been met,
element (1) is different in character because it requires an evaluation of
the reasonableness of the expectation of the party using the servitude.
A recent case considered, but did not definitively resolve, this issue.
In Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals, LLC,170 a mineral servitude
was created on 8,000 acres in December 1971; only four sections,
containing approximately 1,100 contiguous acres, were at issue in the suit.
Wells were drilled on the lands burdened by the servitude in 1980,
1989, and 1998. All of the wells were dry holes.
The surface owner and the owner of a mineral servitude that it later
created challenged the continued viability of the 1971 mineral servitude.
In particular, the plaintiffs contested whether certain dry holes, albeit
timely commenced, constituted “good faith operations,” as article 29 of
the Mineral Code contemplates, and hence, were sufficient to interrupt
prescription.
After extensive discovery, cross motions for summary judgment were
filed. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and denied the motion by plaintiffs.
At issue was whether the “reasonable expectation” standard for article
29 is objective or subjective. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the
motion for summary judgment, finding that issues of fact existed. 
The defendants had offered expert testimony that the wells in question
were drilled with a “reasonable expectation,” based on a geological
evaluation from distant or remote fields in which production had been
obtained—in other words, objective evidence. The defendants did not
demonstrate that the wells in the remote fields (in some cases, several
parishes distant from the tracts involved) were geologically relevant or
correlative to the lands in dispute.
In contrast, the plaintiffs presented deposition testimony and
documentary evidence that the driller “had evidence and knowledge in its
possession at the time of the drilling of its well which demonstrated that
production in the more shallow formations was not expected.”171 That is
to say, the plaintiffs presented subjective evidence of the lack of a
“reasonable expectation” in support of their challenge to the continued
existence of the mineral servitude.
170. 37 So. 3d 1122 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 46 So. 3d 1274 (La.
2010). In the interest of full disclosure, your author represented the plaintiff in
this suit. See OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 409(3).
171. 37 So. 3d at 1127.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1165
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs,172 and because the case
was settled after remand, the resolution of this important issue awaits
another day.
Issues not resolved, given the procedural context of the Indigo case,
include the following:
1. Whether the “reasonable expectation” standard of article 29 is
to be evaluated objectively or subjectively.
2. Who has the burden of proof as to compliance with article
29?173 
3. Whether there is a presumption of “good faith” applicable to 
the activities of the servitude owner.174 
4. Role of Production in “Paying Quantities”175 
In the context of interruption of prescription by use, the role of
production in “paying quantities” is twofold.
Under article 29(1) of the Mineral Code, one of the principal
requirements for a use through drilling operations is that there must be a
“reasonable expectation of discovering and producing minerals in paying 
quantities at a particular point or depth.” If a drilling operation is
commenced with such expectation (and if the other requirements are met),
the operation will interrupt prescription even if unsuccessful; a dry hole is
sufficient if it meets the “good faith” requirement.
As observed previously, if production is obtained (even if obtained as
a result of a drilling operation that might be adjudged as being not
commenced with a “reasonable expectation of discovering and producing
minerals in paying quantities at a particular point or depth”), such
production itself—independent of the drilling operation (which had no
bearing on prescription)—will interrupt prescription, regardless of
whether it produces in “paying quantities,” provided that production
actually commences prior to the prescriptive date. 
As it relates to production as a use of the servitude, “[i]t is necessary
only that minerals actually be produced in good faith with the intent of
saving or otherwise using them for some beneficial purpose.”176 This
172. Indigo Mins. LLC v. Pardee Mins., LLC, 46 So. 3d 1274 (La. 2010).
173. See infra Part V.
174. The issue of whether there exists a “presumption of good faith” will be 
discussed in Part V.B, infra.
175. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Production in “Paying Quantities”—A Fresh
Look, 65 LA. L. REV. 635 (2005).
176. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:38 (2020).
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1166 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
codifies the jurisprudence that held that it “is unimportant whether this
production was in paying quantities so long as there was some production
or use of the servitude.”177 
Thus, for production to interrupt prescription against a mineral
servitude, production in fact is the relevant standard. Whether production
is in “paying quantities,” production in fact will interrupt prescription
accruing against the mineral servitude so long as the minerals are produced
“in good faith with the intent of saving or otherwise using them for some
beneficial purpose.”178 
Production in “paying quantities” is defined in article 124 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code. However, that definition is peculiarly pertinent
to the “Habendum Clause” of mineral leases.179 The essential element of
the codal definition is that production “is considered to be in paying
quantities when production allocable to the total original right of the lessee
to share in production under the lease is sufficient to induce a reasonably
prudent operator to continue production in an effort to secure a return on
his investment or to minimize any loss.”180 
To illustrate, if a mineral lease provides for a one-fifth lessor’s royalty,
“lifting costs”181 are measured against four-fifths of total production, even 
if an overriding royalty interest that would further reduce the net revenue
interest attributable to the working interest burdens the lessee’s interest.182 
In the case of a mineral servitude, if no mineral lease exists, and the
mineral servitude owner operates in its own right (as rare as that might
177. Mays v. Hansbro, 64 So. 2d 232, 234 (La. 1953).
178. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:38 (2020); see also id. § 31:88. It is interesting
to contrast the qualitative standard of production envisioned by Mineral Code
article 38 (pertinent to mineral servitudes) with the standard for mineral royalties 
under article 88, which is that production sufficient to interrupt prescription
accruing against a mineral royalty need “only . . . actually be produced and saved.”
The difference is explained by the fact that a mineral royalty, being passive in
nature, affords no opportunity for the mineral royalty owner to formulate an intent
to save or use the produced minerals for any purpose whatsoever, or to be ascribed
any attribute of being in good faith, or not.
179. See id. § 31:124. Article 124 appears in Chapter 7 of the Mineral Code
entitled “The Mineral Lease,” Part 4 of which is entitled “The Obligations of the
Lessee.” See also OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 3-15.
180. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:124 (emphasis added).
181. Stewart v. Amerada Hess Corp., 604 P.2d 854, 857 n.8 (Okla. 1979). This
term references the costs that the operator incurs, which are “necessary to lift the
oil from the ground.”
182. Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 693 (Tex. 1959) (“The entire income
attributable to the contractual working interest created by the original lease is to
be considered.”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1167
be),183 it is entitled to five-fifths (or 100%) of production, a higher or more
significant amount of production against which operating costs are to be
measured. Thus, assuming one could predict the post-completion “lifting
costs” prior to drilling with sufficient certainty, it is apparent that more
revenue accrues to the operator under the unleased servitude than to the
hypothetical mineral lessee, against which the same amount of expenses
is to be measured.
In a proper case (depending upon the amount of the lessor’s royalty
reserved under a mineral lease), production may be in “paying quantities”
for purposes of the mineral servitude, but not for purposes of a mineral
lease. Again, the production in “paying quantities” standard is only
relevant in determining if there was a “reasonable expectation” that a well
resulting in a dry hole was drilled “in good faith.”184 
Accordingly, if a well produces, but not at a level to meet the standard
of “paying quantities,” it might result in the termination of the mineral
lease, yet would nevertheless be sufficient to interrupt prescription on the
mineral servitude, if, as envisioned by article 38, minerals are produced
“in good faith with the intent of saving or otherwise using them for some
beneficial purpose.”
5. Effective Date of Start, Stop, and Start Anew of Interruption of
Prescription
a. Preface
Equally relevant to determining the date a servitude is created—a 
matter discussed in Part I.B hereof—is the date on which an interruption
takes place and thereafter ceases, as that date of cessation starts the
prescriptive period “anew.”
The Louisiana Mineral Code provides that an “interruption takes place
on the date actual drilling or mining operations are commenced on the land
burdened by the servitude.”185 Thus, the test for “commencement of
operations” differs in the case of a mineral servitude (“spudding in” is
183. See Mohawk Oil Co. v. Layne, 270 F. 851, 854–55 (W.D. La. 1921) (“Not
one landowner in a hundred develops his own land. Even if he should be
financially able to do so, not being in the oil business, he would not care to assume
the risk. The usual and almost universal custom is to lease the land to an oil
operator . . . .”). 
184. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:38. If production interrupts prescription, it need
not be in “paying quantities.”
185. Id. § 31:30.
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1168 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
required)186 and a mineral lease (unless, of course, the mineral lease
contains a clause defining “commencement of operations” as “turning
right”).187 
In Olinkraft, Inc. v. Gerard,188 the court stated the following rule
regarding what constitutes “spudding,” to wit:
While there is no decision directly in point on what constitutes
good faith spudding, the law is well established that when the
requirement is the commencement of a well on a critical date for
the purpose of maintaining viability of a lease beyond the primary
term or interruption of prescription of a mineral servitude, that the
activity involved must be such that it can be construed to be
performed in a good faith attempt to drill the well. The essence of
the good faith requirement is that the activities performed must be
necessary for the drilling of the well and they must be pursued
with diligent continuity.189 
At issue in Olinkraft was whether the use of a “spudder rig”190 to drill
a hole is sufficient to satisfy a contractual requirement that a well be 
“spudded in.” The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal determined
that drilling an 18-inch diameter, 22-foot hole with a water well drilling
rig was not good faith spudding based on the following factors: (1) the
pipe was not cemented into place as is the practice when installing
conductor pipe; (2) the specifications of the drilling contract for the well
in question did not provide for the installation of the conductor pipe; (3)
the “deep well drilling rig” was not brought to the location until three
186. Hilliard v. Franzheim, 180 So. 2d 746, 747 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1965)
(“[T]he term to ‘spud in’ has a well-defined meaning in the oil industry as the first 
boring of the hole in the ground, that is, the first actual penetration of the earth
with a drilling bit; it has a distinct meaning different from other terms of the
industry, such as to ‘commence to drill’, which refer to the first operations on the
land preliminary to the actual drilling or spudding in.”); see also Peironnet v.
Matador Res. Co., 144 So. 3d 791, 820 (La. 2013) (“Moreover, to maintain
continuous drilling operations, the Lessee had to commence actual drilling
operations, i.e., ‘having the bit in the ground and rotating same,’ . . . which, under
the industry lexicon, is referred to as ‘spudding’ . . . .”).
187. Allen v. Cont’l Oil Co., 255 So. 2d 842 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1971), writ 
denied, 257 So. 2d 156 (La. 1972); see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, 
supra note 5, § 5-04.
188. Olinkraft, Inc. v. Gerard, 364 So. 2d 639 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
189. Id. at 644.
190. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 167 (“A colloquialism for a small drilling
rig.”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1169
weeks after the hole was drilled by the water well rig; and (4) a conductor
pipe was not necessary and served no useful purpose for drilling a well
such as the one in question.
Consequently, the court held that the use of a “spudder rig” did not
constitute good faith spudding, but was “performed by defendant solely
for the purpose of attempting to comply with his . . . agreement.”191 
“Preparations for the commencement of actual drilling or mining
operations, such as geological or geophysical exploration, surveying,
clearing of a site, and the hauling and erection of materials and structures
necessary to conduct operations do not interrupt prescription.”192 This
overrules a line of jurisprudence that held that an interruption might result
from mere preparatory work.193 
“Prescription commences anew from the last day on which actual
drilling or mining operations are conducted.”194 Of course, if the
operations are successful and if production ensues, the continuation of that
production would, of its own force, interrupt prescription.195 
In a proper case, a court might need to determine if periods of time
between the conclusion of a distinct, prior drilling or reworking operation
and the date of further or subsequent operations indicate the continuation
of the prior operations in the sense that they are “conducted in such a
manner that they constitute a single operation although actual drilling or
mining is not conducted at all times,” or if the former operation was to be
deemed concluded as an abandonment of the former use, with the result
that prescription has commenced anew. 
For example, in McMurrey v. Gray,196 after the lessee of the mineral
servitude obtained a drilling permit, the site was prepared, and the lessee
used a portable drilling well to drill to the Nacatosh sand, which was at a
depth of 900 to 1,000 feet. Although no production was obtained from the
Nacatosh sand, the lessee applied for and was subsequently granted an
amended drilling permit to drill to the Travis Peak sand, which was at a
depth of about 6,000 feet. 
At about the same time that the lessee applied for the drilling permit,
he orally contracted with a drilling contractor, Baker, to drill a well to the
deeper Travis Peak sand. Prior to commencing this next operation, the
surface owners locked the gateway to the site, contending that the mineral
191. Olinkraft, Inc., 364 So. 2d at 645.
192. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:30 (2020).
193. Keebler v. Seubert, 120 So. 591, 592 (La. 1929). 
194. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:30.
195. Id. § 31:36.
196. McMurrey v. Gray, 45 So. 2d 73 (La. 1949).
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1170 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
servitude on the land had extinguished for 10 years of nonuse. Litigation
ensued to establish the continued efficacy of the servitude.
The Court first held that drilling to the Nacatosh sand did not interrupt
prescription because experienced oil men testified that there was no 
reasonable possibility of obtaining production from that sand because it
had been depleted. Then, the Court held that McMurrey had not abandoned
his operations and that the surface owners should be enjoined from
interfering with his deeper drilling operations. 
The Court considered additional factors when it concluded that the
lessee was engaged in what would now be referred to as a single operation,
including: (1) that the size of the casing used in his first drilling operation
was larger than needed to drill to the Nacatosh sand and large enough to
drill to the Travis Peak sand; (2) the lessee’s purchase of enough pipe and 
tubing before commencing operations to the Travis Peak sand; and (3) the
capping of the well, which would permit the lessee to continue drilling
rather than cementing and plugging the well when he reached the Nacatosh
sand as required by state regulators.
“Actual drilling or mining operations commenced within the
prescriptive period interrupt prescription although the operations are not
completed until after the date on which prescription would have
accrued.”197 
Thus, if operations otherwise in compliance with the requirements of
article 29(1) of the Mineral Code are commenced prior to the prescriptive
date, and if they are continued by drilling “at the site chosen to that point
or depth,” and if they are “conducted in such a manner that they constitute
a single operation although actual drilling . . . is not conducted at all
times,” then, regardless of the results of the operation, the interruptive
consequences of the operation are retroactive to the date of
commencement of the actual drilling operations, even if the operation is
concluded after the original prescriptive date.198 
Certainly, as stated in a recent case, “Nothing in our law prevents the
drilling of a well in the last year before prescription runs out.”199 One
would certainly hope so!
If this were not the rule, the servitude owner would be denied the full
benefit of the servitude’s 10-year prescriptive period as the owner would
have to start operations on a date sufficiently early enough to allow the
completion of the operations prior to the extinguishment of the servitude.
197. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:31.
198. Id. § 31:29.
199. Cannisnia Plantation, LLC v. Cecil Blount Farms, LLC, 293 So. 3d 157,
172 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2020).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  63 5/26/21  11:50 AM




    
    
 
 
    
   
     
 
     
 
   
   
  








    
   
 
   
  
    
  
   
    
 
 





      
    
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1171
b. Prescription Starting Anew after an Interruption
“When prescription is interrupted, it commences anew from the last
day on which operations are conducted in good faith to secure or restore
production in paying quantities with reasonable expectation of success.”200 
Caution should prevail in identifying or discerning “the last day on
which operations are conducted,” as contemplated by article 41 of the
Mineral Code. This author has heard the statement made that the date on
which the operator released the drilling rig is the relevant date. That may
be so, but if the rig remained on location for a period of time while logs
were evaluated or other tests conducted, the period of time that ensued
after the operator deemed the initial operation to be unsuccessful might be
quite relevant a decade later, if prescription is not otherwise interrupted. If
a third party is evaluating the situation and has no access to the records of
the prior operator under a mineral lease granted by a mineral servitude
owner, difficulties can arise. 
For example, on August 1, 2006, Smith sells all of the minerals under
a tract of land to Jones. Jones grants a mineral lease to Operator on
September 1, 2015. Operator goes onto the land on July 1, 2016, and 
commences drilling operations, which are unsuccessfully concluded on
September 1, 2016. What is the consequence on prescription?
Assuming that the operations comply with the “good faith”
requirements of article 29, prescription is interrupted as of July 1, 2016,
and commences anew as of September 1, 2016, the same day as the last
day of drilling.
c. Interruption by Conduct of Subsequent Operations
“When prescription has commenced anew following the cessation of
drilling or mining operations, it may later be interrupted by a good faith
attempt to complete the well or mine or place it in production conducted
in accordance with the general principles stated in Articles 29 through
31.”201 The emphasis is on the requirement that the activity be undertaken
in “good faith.” Thus, if the original operation resulted in conclusive
evidence, through logging or otherwise, that the tested zone could not be
productive, a further “attempt to complete the well . . . or place it in
production” would seemingly not be in “good faith,” as no reasonable,
prudent operator would be justified in an expectation that such activity
would yield commercial production.
200. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:41.
201. Id. § 31:32.
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1172 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
On the other hand, if prescription has “commenced anew” after one
unsuccessful operation conducted in “good faith,” subsequent operations
to “complete” the well or to “place it in production” will serve to interrupt
prescription, if the “general principles” of “good faith” are met. Article 32
does not, by its express terms, make any differentiation as to zone,
seemingly permitting the operations to be in the same zone, a shallower
zone, a deeper zone, or even a side-track, provided that the “general
principles” of “good faith” are satisfied.202 
However, this issue would seem to be academic if the second (or
subsequent) operation is commenced within the prescriptive period that
disregards any earlier operation that was not sufficient to interrupt
prescription.
EXAMPLE
On August 1, 2006, Smith sells all of the minerals under a tract
of land to Jones. Jones grants a mineral lease to Operator on
September 1, 2015. Operator goes onto the land on February 1,
2016 and commences drilling operations on Well A to the Marg
Tex sand, a geological zone in which other wells in the field have
been successfully completed. The well is dry, according to an
electric log run in the hole on March 15, 2016.
Unless another use is attempted, and assuming that March 15,
2016, was “the last day on which actual drilling . . . operations
[were] conducted,” the mineral servitude will prescribe on March
15, 2026.
Another well, Well B, is begun on the land to a subsurface depth
at which six prior wells were dry. The well was actually begun on
December 1, 2017, and was completed at a depth 1,000 feet above
the objective depth. The well began producing on February 1,
2018, until December 1, 2018.
Well B, had it been unsuccessful, would not interrupt
202. See id. However, contrast article 39 of the Louisiana Mineral Code. See 
id. § 31:39 (“After production has ceased and prescription has commenced anew,
it may be interrupted by good faith operation conducted in accordance with the
general principles of Articles 29 through 31 to restore production or to secure new
production from the same well or mine, whether from the same geological
formation or one different from that previously producing.”) (emphasis added).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1173
prescription because it was not in compliance with the
“evidentiary standards” of article 29 of the Mineral Code.
However, under article 36 of the Mineral Code, “[p]rescription of
nonuse is interrupted by the production of any mineral covered by
the act creating the servitude.” Thus, prescription would 
commence anew on December 1, 2018.
6. Interruption by Operations on Directional Wells Drilled on a 
“Lease Basis”
Unique issues of prescription are presented if the potential use is
associated with a well that is drilled as a directional well. A directional
well, also called a “slant well,” is defined as “a well that departs from the
vertical.”203 
The most common instance in which a well might be drilled
directionally, rather than as a “true vertical well,”204 is when topographical
impediments or conditions prevent the latter, more traditional mode of
drilling. An example is a well drilled so as to be “bottomed” under a
residential subdivision or other commercial development, but from a
different surface location rather than directly above the ultimate bottom
hole of the well in question.
Moreover, to drill a well that terminates under, say, the Mississippi
River would obviously necessitate a well to be drilled directionally from a
drill site on nearby land.205 In an environmentally sensitive area, several
directional wells can be drilled from a single drilling pad.
A directional well could, of course, be drilled on either a “lease basis”
or a “unitized basis.”206 If the “slant well” is drilled on a “lease basis,” the
issues considered herein are not implicated or altered, as the well is simply
203. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 167; see LA. REV. STAT. § 30:171(1)
(defining directional drilling as “drilling deviating from the vertical plane”).
204. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 135 (2019) (explaining a “true
vertical well” is one that is drilled without a deviation from vertical in excess of 5°).
205. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:171(1) (“Any department or agency of the state may
grant on lands of which it has title, custody, or possession: (1) A permit, lease, or
servitude to engage in directional drilling in search of minerals underlying
adjacent water bodies.”).
206. A “lease basis” well is a well that is not unitized. See, e.g., Eads Operating
Co. v. Thompson, 537 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (“The
Richard well was drilled on a non-unitized, lease basis in a geological stratum
which correlated to the geological stratum of the 1948 unitized well known as the
Miller No. 1 Zone.”). In the interest of full disclosure, your author represented the 
plaintiffs in this suit.
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1174 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
“on” the servitude tract, unless there is an intervening “property line”
between the surface location of the well and the bottom hole location. A
“property line,” for these purposes, is defined by conservation regulations
as “the boundary dividing tracts on which mineral rights, royalty, or leases
are separately owned, except that where conventional units shall have been
created for the drilling of the well, the boundaries of the unit shall be
considered the property line.”207 If a “property line,” as so defined, exists
between the surface location and the bottom hole location, and is situated
less than the offset distances prescribed in Statewide Order No. 29-E, the
well must be unitized.208 
If the well is drilled on a “lease basis,” the operator must ensure that
it has the legal right to drill under each tract through which the well’s
borehole will traverse.209 
Additionally, if the well is not unitized, and if different or distinct
mineral servitudes exist on each tract through which the borehole traverses
(reckoning from the surface location of the well to its concluding “take
point”), prescription is only interrupted, if at all, on the servitude tract
under which the well’s ultimate bottom hole is situated.210 Merely drilling
through intervening servitude tracts is irrelevant to the issue of
prescription accruing against that particular servitude as nothing more than
a piece of pipe traversing that tract is involved, having no more relevance
than a pipeline or road.
EXAMPLE
Ford,211 the lessee of a mineral servitude owner, Tennyson, 
desires to drill a “lease basis” well to be bottomed under a tract of
land burdened by Tennyson’s servitude. However, the surface of
207. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. XIX, § 1903A (2019) (“Statewide Order No.
29-E”).
208. See infra Part II.D.6 for consideration of directional wells drilled to
develop a unit.
209. The “borehole” is the “hole made by drilling or boring a hole.” MARTIN
& KRAMER, supra note 167.
210. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 98 So. 2d 236 (La. 1957) (in concursus
proceeding, ascertainment of party to whom royalties were due as a result of a
directional well drilled under the Mississippi River necessitated a determination
of the bottom hole of the well).
211. As this example requires multiple participants, the author again exercises
the prerogatives of authorship, and uses the names of his grandchildren (Ford,
Tennyson, Townes, and Tucker), previously employed in Chapter 11 of the
author’s Treatise on Mineral Leases (§ 11-03, n. 11 on Page 1034), as well as a
new (fifth) grandchild, Hartman.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1175
the target tract—which Ford identifies as the “optimum geological
location”212—constitutes a residential subdivision composed of
many homes. The rights to minerals under such homes are under
lease from the developer, Tennyson, who reserved minerals when
the subdivision was dedicated on March 4, 2011. 
Intervening between the well’s surface location and the proposed
bottom hole location under Tennyson’s servitude are three
separate tracts of land owned by Townes, Tucker, and Hartman,
respectively. 
Separate mineral servitudes burden each of the named parcels
(created June 30, 2012, June 21, 2013, and August 9, 2019,
respectively), only two of which are under lease to Ford, the
operator.
Ford has a mineral lease on Tucker and Hartman’s tracts, and he
obtains a surface and subsurface agreement from Townes, a tough 
negotiator who wanted to “roll the dice,” and remain unleased in
anticipation of being ultimately unitized with the well. 
Ford commences “actual operations” for the drilling of a “slant
well” as a test well on February 6, 2021, and reaches his objective
depth, underlying Tennyson’s subdivision, on March 3, 2021.
What is the status of each mineral servitude noted above if the
well is successfully completed on March 10, 2021?
212. In the industry, the “optimum geologic location” is that bottom hole
location at which the petroleum geologist believes there is the best opportunity to
encounter commercial production from the objective sand. See Nunez v. Wainoco
Oil & Gas Co., 606 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (“Otherwise,
Wainoco would not have been able to drill the Stone No. 1 well at the optimum
location for this unit because this type of well requires two acres for the necessary
reserve pits, water pit and water well.”); J-O’B Operating Co. v. Newmont Oil
Co., 560 So. 2d 852, 857 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (in a case in which the author
represented the plaintiff, court referred to a geophysical study “as would be
sufficient to determine the prospective potential of the subleased premises and, if
so determined to be prospective, the optimum location of a well”); Fuller v. XTO 
Energy, Inc., 989 So. 2d 298, 299–300 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2008) (explaining the
lessee’s methodology by which it “determined their optimum drilling locations
without reference to or consideration of surface ownership of the involved
properties”).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  68 5/26/21  11:50 AM








    












   
  
 
     
 
   




   
 
 
   
 
      
   
 
         
 
   
1176 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Because the well was drilled on a “lease basis,” the rules
pertaining to unitized operations are inapplicable. Since the target
was the tract underlying Tennyson’s mineral servitude, the
operations conducted on the well had no bearing whatsoever on
the accrual of prescription against the intervening servitudes 
burdening the tracts owned by Townes, Tucker, and Hartman. The
well path was merely an authorized use of the subsurface, but was
not an attempt to exploit the minerals under each distinct tract.
However, under article 31 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, 
prescription accruing against Tennyson’s mineral servitude was
interrupted as the borehole entered the subsurface the day before
the accrual of prescription.
B. Interruption by Production as a Use
1. General
“Prescription of nonuse is interrupted by the production of any mineral
covered by the act creating the servitude. The interruption occurs on the 
date on which actual production begins and prescription commences anew
from the date of cessation of actual production.”213 
Ascertaining the precise “date of cessation of actual production” may
be difficult if the person interested in the issue is not the person who
conducted the operation (thus lacking access to records, including billings
and reports). A challenging circumstance presents itself if such date of
cessation occurred almost a decade prior to the need to ascertain that date,
and the former operator is unavailable as a source. A source of information
for such relevant data is the Strategic Online Natural Resources
Information System (SONRIS), maintained by the Louisiana Department
of Natural Resources, Office of Conservation.214 However, while SONRIS 
contains a significant amount of relevant data as reported by an operator,
production from a well is reported on a monthly, not daily, basis.215 If this
is the only source of data available, caution suggests that one
conservatively use the earliest day of the month during which it is reported
that production ceased as the commencement anew of prescription.
213. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:36 (2020).
214. SONRIS is easily accessible through the website of the Office of
Conservation.
215. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 909(B) (2019) (“Such report [of
production] for each month shall be prepared and filed according to instructions
on the form on or before the twenty-fifth day of the next succeeding month.”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1177
When a servitude is maintained by production, the production alone is
sufficient to interrupt prescription.216 The Court in Castille v. Texas Co.217 
rejected the contention that “development” of the servitude was necessary,
even in the face of production. In Castille, the plaintiff sued to declare a
mineral servitude extinguished because the defendant failed “to produce
oil in a businesslike manner as contemplated by law.”218 
On an objection of no cause of action,219 the Court construed the
allegations of the petition to mean that the defendants did in fact produce
some oil during the term of the servitude, “for to produce oil in an
unbusinesslike manner implies that some oil was produced.”220 Thus, 
construing the allegations of the petition together, it was held to be
admitted by the plaintiff “that defendants, during the prescriptive period,
used the servitudes for the production of some oil.”221 The Court said:
As to the allegation of nondevelopment during the prescriptive
period . . . so far as prescription is concerned, it is a matter of no
importance whether there was development during that period,
since it appears that the servitudes were used, within that time, for
the production of oil from wells already drilled.222 
However, if the servitude owner must rely on production to interrupt
prescription (for the reason that the operations leading to that
production were not sufficient to meet the “good faith” requirement of
article 29 and are, therefore, not sufficient in their own right to
interrupt prescription), such production must actually commence prior
to the prescriptive date. The “date back” feature of article 31 would be
unavailing to the servitude owner because the operations do not
interrupt prescription.
EXAMPLE
216. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:38. As stated in article 38, production need not
be in “paying quantities,” provided that it is produced “in good faith with the
intent of saving or otherwise using them for some beneficial purpose.” See supra
Part II.A.4.
217. Castille v. Texas Co., 129 So. 518 (La. 1930).
218. Id. at 519.
219. An objection of no cause of action accepts as true the plaintiff’s
allegations and questions whether the allegations give rise to a remedy at law.
Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco Inc., 310 So. 2d 93 (La. 1975).
220. See Castille, 129 So. at 519.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 520.
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1178 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
On August 1, 2006, Smith sells all of the minerals under a tract
of land to Jones. Jones grants a mineral lease to Operator on
September 1, 2015. Operator goes onto the land on July 15, 2016,
and commences drilling operations to a subsurface depth at which
16 prior wells in the area were dry. The well became the
seventeenth dry hole at that depth when it was logged on
September 1, 2016. However, the Operator noticed an
unanticipated zone of interest on the electric log about 1,000 feet
above the total depth achieved in the borehole and decided to
attempt a completion. To everyone’s surprise, the well produced
from that unanticipated zone, commencing October 1, 2016. What
is the consequence on prescription?
If the original drilling operation was not in compliance with the
“evidentiary standards” of article 29 of the Mineral Code, it would 
not interrupt prescription. Since that operation did not interrupt
prescription, the “date back” feature of article 31 would not be
available to the servitude owner. Because an “interruption
[resulting from actual production] occurs on the date on which
actual production begins,” the servitude prescribed because actual
production did not commence prior to the original prescriptive
date of August 1, 2016.
After production has ceased and prescription has commenced
anew, it may be interrupted by good faith operation conducted in 
accordance with the general principles of articles 29 through 31 to
restore production or to secure new production from the same well
or mine, whether from the same geological formation or one 
different from that previously producing.223 
As stated in the comment to article 39 of the Mineral Code, this article 
“treats a situation which has not yet been of importance in the
jurisprudence” but which “might arise.”224 The article attempts to provide
a formulation for the circumstances under which reworking, recompletion,
deepening, sidetracking, or plugging back operations in the same wellbore
might effect an interruption of prescription after production has ceased.225 
Presumably, the jurisprudential standards as to what constitutes
reworking for purposes of the “Habendum Clause” of the mineral lease
223. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:39 (2020).
224. Id. cmt.
225. See supra Part II.A.5.b.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1179
would apply in these circumstances,226 and, if conducted in “good faith”
with a “reasonable expectation of discovering and producing minerals in
paying quantities at a particular point or depth,” such reworking
operations, even if unsuccessful, should interrupt prescription, in which
case other articles would thereafter apply as to the commencement anew
or further interruption of prescription.
Of course, if it is determined that reworking operations could not
reasonably be conducted, a new well could be drilled in accordance with
article 29 of the Mineral Code to interrupt prescription.
2. Extent of Interruption
a. Types of Minerals or “Other Substances”
“An interruption of prescription applies to all types of minerals
covered by the act creating the servitude and to all modes of its use.”227 
Therefore, if a mineral servitude affects more than one type of mineral (for
example, both oil and gas, as well as coal or lignite), production of one
mineral also maintains the mineral servitude as to all other minerals
covered by the servitude. This represents a change in the law as it existed
prior to the adoption of the Mineral Code.228 
In this regard, one must be mindful that, according to article 4 of the
Louisiana Mineral Code, the Code’s provisions apply to minerals
(including oil and gas) as well as to “other substances,” such as “the soil
itself, gravel, shells, subterranean water, or other substances occurring
naturally in or as a part of the soil or geological formations on or
underlying the land.”229 Hence, the Code recognizes and reinforces the
clear distinction under Louisiana law between “minerals” and “other
substances.”230 
226. See, e.g., Jardell v. Hillin Oil Co., 485 So. 2d 919 (La. 1986). In the
interest of full disclosure, your author represented a defendant-lessee in this case.
See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 4-11(c).
227. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:4.
228. See Cont’l Group, Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981).
229. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:4.
230. The distinction between “minerals” and “other substances” is well-
established in the jurisprudence. For example, in Gonzales v. Watson, 111 So. 416
(La. 1927), the Court held that, in enacting the real estate licensing law, now 
Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 37:1430–70, the legislature “did not have in
contemplation gravel or mineral leases, but, as stated, only ordinary everyday
leases, such as real estate agents generally negotiate.” 111 So. at 418. As one
commentator noted, “the court signifies by the use of the disjunctive ‘or’ that
gravel and minerals fall into definitely separate categories.” See G. R. J., Mineral
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1180 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The issue of the interpretation of a deed to discern the particular
minerals or “other substances” covered by such instrument is beyond the
scope of this Article,231 but it must be noted that, in a proper case, the
production of an “other substance” that is covered by the mineral servitude
will preserve the real right as to other minerals also included within the
ambit of the servitude.
b. Mode of Drilling or Mining
Additionally, article 40 of the Mineral Code instructs that interruption
arising from one mode of use—for example, “true vertical drilling”—will 
preserve all other modes of use, such as horizontal drilling. Again, this
represents a change in pre-Code law as the comment to article 40 notes:
[Former] Article 798 of the Civil Code [of 1870] provides that if
a servitude is used less extensively than the right given in the title
creating it, the servitude is reduced to that which is preserved by
possession during the prescriptive period. . . . Additionally, it is
intended that use of one particular method of mining would not
exclude other forms. Thus, strip mining would not exclude shaft
mining or drilling.232 
EXAMPLE
Smith sells a tract of land to Jones on August 1, 2006. The sale
states that “Smith reserves all oil, gas, and other minerals in and
underlying the property described herein.” 
Smith drills a well on the land as a true vertical well, starting on
September 1, 2015; the well is completed and produces oil in
“paying quantities.” 
On October 1, 2016, Smith undertakes to drill a horizontal well
on the land in search of natural gas at a deeper depth than the oil
production. Jones, the landowner, objects, contending that
Smith’s right to do anything other than drill a true vertical well in
search of oil has lapsed.
Rights - Gravel Not Included in Mineral Reservation - Intention of Parties Test
Applied, 5 LA. L. REV. 150, 150 n.1 (1942).
231. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5-27.
232. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:40 cmt. (2020).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1181
Who is correct?
Smith prevails based upon article 40 of the Mineral Code, which
states that an “interruption of prescription applies to all types of 
minerals covered by the act creating the servitude and to all modes
of its use.”
c. Geographical Reach
The geographical reach or scope of the effects of interruption of
prescription resulting from unitized operations or production is considered
in Part II.D.2 hereof.
3. Shut-In Wells233 
a. Preface
As previously stated, two particular activities constitute a “use” that
might interrupt prescription—drilling for, and production of, oil and gas
(or the mining of solid minerals or “other substances”). A “shut-in well”
is one that, by definition, has been drilled, but is not producing, usually
because of lack of market or associated facilities.234 Nevertheless, for
policy reasons, interruptive effect is ascribed to such a well, provided the
capacity of the well to produce is established by surface testing.
b. Interruption Resulting from a Shut-In Well
Articles 34 and 35 address the situation where a well is drilled, and
surface testing proves that the well is capable of producing in “paying
quantities,” and is shut-in, insofar as such well affects prescription
accruing against a mineral servitude. Thus, article 34 reads as follows:
When there exists on a tract of land burdened by a mineral
servitude, or on a conventional or compulsory unit that includes
all or part thereof, a shut-in well proved through testing by surface
production235 to be capable of producing minerals in paying 
233. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Neither Fish nor Fowl: The Louisiana Law of
Shut-in Gas Wells, 69 LA. L. REV. 43 (2008).
234. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 4-13(d)(1).
235. The Louisiana Office of Conservation has promulgated Statewide Order
No. 29-B, which dictates the manner in which the productive capability of a well
might be demonstrated through an “initial potential test.” LA. ADMIN. CODE tit.
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1182 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
quantities, prescription is interrupted on the date production is
obtained by such testing. . . . Prescription commences anew from
the date on which the well is shut in after testing.236 
This rule is in harmony with the jurisprudence, most of which involved
mineral royalties (rather than mineral servitudes), because the drilling of 
the well would have interrupted prescription against the mineral servitude, 
but not against the mineral royalty.237 
As one court stated, “An unused, potential well cannot interrupt
prescription until its potential is proven.”238 
c. Unitization of Shut-In Well
(i) Geographical Scope of Interruption
Consistent with the rules pertinent to the interruptive effect of unit
operations239 or production,240 article 34 of the Mineral Code states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
If only a part of the tract burdened by the servitude is included in
such a unit and the [shut-in] unit well is on land other than that
burdened by the servitude, the interruption of prescription extends
only to that portion of the tract burdened by the servitude included
in the unit.
In a similar manner, article 35 addresses the effect of the unitization 
of a tract on which a “tested shut-in well” already exists. Article 35
provides as follows:
43, pt. 19, § 121(C) (2019); see Webb v. Hardage Corp., 471 So. 2d 889 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1985).
236. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:34 (2020).
237. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 88 So. 2d 377, 380 (La.
1956) (involving a mineral royalty) (“The fact that the well was shut in for want
of a market and that no gas was sold from it until after the expiration of ten years
from the date of the royalty sale cannot defeat the rights of the defendant to share
in the production, once begun.”).
238. Sandefer & Andress, Inc. v. Pruitt, 471 So. 2d 933, 936 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1985).
239. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:33.
240. Id. § 31:37 (“Production from a conventional or compulsory unit
embracing all or part of the tract burdened by a mineral servitude interrupts
prescription, but if the unit well is on land other than that burdened by the
servitude, the interruption extends only to that portion of the servitude tract 
included in the unit.”).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  75 5/26/21  11:50 AM









        

















    






   
  
   
 
    
 
 
    
 
    
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1183
If the land, or part thereof, burdened by a mineral servitude is
included in a conventional or compulsory unit on which there is a
well located on other land within the unit capable of producing in
paying quantities, as required by Article 34, and shut in at the time
the unit is created, prescription is interrupted on and commences
anew from the effective date of the order or act creating the unit.241 
(ii) Temporal Scope of Articles 34 and 35
A temporal observation is appropriate with respect to these relevant
articles in a unitized context. Articles 34 and 35 are mutually exclusive in
that they differ according to when the unit is formed in relation to when
the well is shut in. 
Article 34 applies to a non-unitized servitude tract on which there is
situated a shut-in well. Yet, it also applies to a unit containing a tract
burdened by a mineral servitude in which the unit well is subsequently 
shut in. In other words, in the latter case, unit created first, well shut in 
later. 
In contrast, article 35 regulates the situation in which a non-unitized
well is shut in and, thereafter, a unit is created around that well (or, as the
article says it, well “shut in at the time the unit is created”). If such
subsequently-created unit includes lands burdened by a mineral
servitude—or a well shut-in first, unitized later, and assuming the shut-in 
well was surface tested prior to unitization and thereby shown to be
capable of producing minerals in “paying quantities”—then prescription
accruing against the servitude that has been brought into the unit, will be
interrupted as of the effective date of the unit, and immediately
prescription commences anew.
The comments to article 35 elucidate the principles embodied in the
Mineral Code as follows:
In the vast majority of cases, the principle already stated in Article
34 is of greater significance to mineral royalty owners than to
mineral servitude owners because if the well has been drilled on 
the servitude tract or on a unit after its formation, an interruption
of prescription will result from the drilling operations. However,
if the unit is formed after drilling, testing, and shutting in of the 
well, the rule will be of essential value to owners of mineral
servitudes since no interruption will have been wrought by the
drilling operations. Thus, Article 35 specifies that the effective
date of the order or act creating the unit governs the date of
241. Id. § 31:35.
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1184 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
interruption and commencement anew of prescription rather than
the actual date on which the unit well might previously have been
shut in.242 
As noted above, articles 34 and 35 are “mutually exclusive.”
Nevertheless, there is a factual circumstance in which they both might
come into play.
Thus, a unique, hybrid situation arises if a compulsory unit is formed
and is later enlarged to include additional lands. For example, if a shut-in 
well is drilled on a tract of land burdened by a mineral servitude, and
thereafter a unit is created (a circumstance covered by article 34), and the
drill site tract contributes lands both within and outside of the unit, and if
the unit is subsequently enlarged, consideration must be given to the
previously non-unitized acreage now brought into the unit by
supplemental order of the Office of Conservation. 
Under article 34, prescription accruing against a mineral servitude that
covers the portion of the tract within the original unit is interrupted when
the well is tested and it is shown to be capable of production. In this
instance, prescription commences anew when the well is shut in after
testing. 
However, prescription continues to accrue with respect to the portion
of the non-drillsite lands burdened by a servitude, as to the portion not
originally included in the unit. Thereafter, the unit is enlarged to include
additional acreage that includes the remainder of the non-drillsite servitude
tract, originally non-unitized. According to article 35, the portion of the
non-drillsite servitude tract newly brought within the boundaries of the
enlarged unit would be interrupted upon the effective date of the order or
act enlarging the unit, and commence anew that same date. In the event
the well remains shut in and never produces, the portion of the servitude
originally within the unit will prescribe at a date earlier than the other
portion of the non-drillsite servitude tract later brought into the unit.
While accurate, it must be admitted that this scenario would, as a
practical matter, presumably not be presented inasmuch as the prescriptive
period is 10 years, and it is unimaginable that the operator would not bring
the well into production in that period of time. Additionally, the lessee’s
right to maintain the mineral lease while the well is shut in is presumably
time-limited to a period well short of 10 years, pursuant to the lease’s
“Shut-in Clause,”243 thus providing sufficient motivation to get the well on
stream to avoid lease termination.
242. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:35 cmt. (2020).
243. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 4-13(d)(3).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1185
Nevertheless, if the parties had availed themselves of their rights under
article 74 to “shorten the applicable period of prescription of nonuse” to,
say, two or three years, this scenario might be a real (rather than merely
academic) concern.
(iii) Effective Date of Interruption
Article 35 does not provide an answer to the question of whether an
“order or act creating the unit” can have retroactive effect if the
(ostensible) date of prescription of the mineral servitude accrues “in the
gap,” that is, prior to the date of issuance of the order or confection of the
act, but after the stipulated effective date thereof.
Insofar as compulsory units are concerned, the Commissioner of
Conservation will generally make unit orders effective as of the date of the
public hearing (as that is the earliest—and usually last—date on which the
Commissioner will have received evidence in support of the order), while
the order (with such an effective date) may not be issued for several
weeks.244 If, in that interim period of time, prescription has accrued, is the
servitude “brought back to life” because of the effective date of the order?
In Baker v. Chevron Oil Co.,245 the vendor reserved a mineral
servitude in an act of sale dated March 29, 1956. After the expiration of
10 years, the owners of the mineral servitude brought suit to declare their
servitude viable and outstanding. It was established that a well was
completed on a nearby tract of land on January 6, 1966. The lessees
undertook to form a voluntary unit.246 The unitization agreement was dated 
March 4, 1966 and was circulated for execution. Certain parties did not
sign the agreement until April or May of 1966, and the document was
recorded in the conveyance records on May 12, 1966.
The Court framed the issue by noting that, inasmuch as no drilling 
operations were conducted on the servitude tract during the 10-year period,
the plaintiffs’ mineral interests had prescribed, unless the forming of the 
voluntary unit containing that tract and the drill site tract effected an
interruption of prescription.
244. See Policy Memorandum from La. Office of Conserv. (Aug. 20, 1985)
(on file with author); see also Pierce v. GoldKing Props., 396 So. 2d 528 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1981); Burley v. Sunbelt Royalty, Inc., 534 So. 2d 101 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1988); and Exxon Corp. v. Thompson, 564 So. 2d 387 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 1990).
245. Baker v. Chevron Oil Co., 258 So. 2d 531 (La. 1972).
246. A “voluntary unit” is “a unit specifically created by joint agreement of
the mineral lessee and the owners of all the other mineral or royalty interests
affecting the land in question.” MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 167.
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1186 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The Court found that “because a legal unit had not been established
on or before March 29, 1966, the ten-year prescription accrued, its course
not having been interrupted by the drilling and production on land other
than the [servitude] tract.”247 
d. Burden of Proof of Shut-In Conditions248 
As noted, article 34 alludes to “a shut-in well proved through testing
by surface production to be capable of producing minerals in paying
quantities.”
Who has the burden of proof in this regard? How does one establish
the existence of shut-in conditions sufficient to invoke articles 34 and 35?
The jurisprudence has addressed this issue in a lease-maintenance case in
which it also noted the requirements of article 34 pertinent to proof of shut-
in conditions through “testing by surface production.”
In Webb v. The Hardage Corp.,249 three separate mineral leases were 
granted for a primary term of five years in May 1976. The lessee drilled a 
well on each of the leased premises in April 1981, or one month prior to
the expiration of the primary terms of the leases. The wells were cored,
logs were run, casing was set, the wells were perforated, and the formation
was fracked. The only surface testing that the lessee performed was to flare
the gas for four or five hours. After flaring such gas, the wells were shut-
in for lack of a market for the gas. Work on the wells was completed in
June 1981. The initial potential test required by the Commissioner of
Conservation was not performed.
The lessee tendered shut-in royalty payments to the lessors, which
were refused and returned. In March 1983, the lessee performed an initial
potential test on one of the wells. The lessors filed suit to seek a declaration
of the termination of the leases and to enjoin the lessee from taking any
further action on the property in question.
Each of the mineral leases in question contained the following shut-in 
provision, to wit:
If lessee obtains production of minerals on said land or on land
with which the lease (sic) premises or any portion thereof has been
pooled, and if, during the life of this lease either before or after the
expiration of the primary term, all such production is shut in by
reason of force majeure or the lack either of a market at the well
or wells or of an available pipeline outlet in the field, this lease
247. Id. at 533.
248. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 4-13(d).
249. Webb v. Hardage Corp., 471 So. 2d 889 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1187
shall not terminate but shall continue in effect during such shut-in 
period as though production were actually being obtained on the
premises within the meaning of Paragraph 2 hereof . . . .250 
The issue presented was whether or not the lessee had timely
demonstrated the existence of shut-in conditions. The court stated as
follows:
Reading LSA-R.S. 31:124 [which defines “production in paying
quantities”] in conjunction with the terms of the leases, the
shutting-in of the gas wells on the three leased properties could
only extend the leases beyond their primary terms if the wells were
capable of producing in paying quantities. See Taylor v. Kimbell, 
219 La. 731, 54 So. 2d 1 (1951).251 
The court then noted that the lessor generally “has the burden of
proving the propriety of cancellation of a mineral lease,”252 but held that
“the situation encountered in this case presents an exception to that general
rule.”253 The court further stated:
A lessee cannot place the burden of proving the propriety of
cancellation on the lessor by simply alleging that a well that has
never been placed into actual production is capable of producing
in paying quantities. Rather, the lessee must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that prior to the expiration of the
primary term or the continuous drilling operations term a well was
completed and surface tested to the extent that the well was at that
time demonstratively capable of producing in paying quantities.
See Taylor [v. Kimbell, 54 So. 2d 1 (La. 1951)], supra.
Ordinarily, proof sufficient to carry this burden is a finding of
commercial productivity resulting from the performing of the
initial potential test required by the Department of
Conservation. . . . While other kinds of evidence of production
potential could also be considered, such as the results of logs and
250. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, it appears that the leases in
question were executed on the Bath 14-BR1-2A commercial form of printed lease,
prevalent in North Louisiana. This is the so-called “North Form.” See OTTINGER,
MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 1-17.
251. Webb, 471 So. 2d at 892.
252. Id. (citing Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., 391 So. 2d 485 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 1980)); see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 13-06.
253. Webb, 471 So. 2d at 892.
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1188 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
cores, the flaring of the wells for periods of time and the history
of the wells in the same zone in the field, the importance of actual
testing of surface production is obvious and is the most direct
indication of production capability.254 
The court, albeit in a lease-maintenance case, then noted, by analogy,
that the “importance of surface testing is illustrated by the provisions of
LSA-R.S. 31:34 and 31:90 which address the testing of shut-in wells in 
the context of interrupting prescription on mineral servitudes and mineral
royalties respectively.”255 According to the court, the initial potential test
“must be conducted during the primary term or the continuous operations
term in order to continue a lease in effect beyond the primary and the
continuous operation terms.”256 “Without such surface testing, the status
of the lease would ordinarily remain uncertain while the well is shut-in.”257 
The court concluded that the “ lessee should not be able to rely on the shut-
in clause to hold a lease beyond its primary term where the well’s capacity
to produce in paying quantities cannot be determined until further testing
and procedures are carried out at some later date.”258 
C. By Whom May Use Be Made?
1. General
A “use” sufficient to interrupt prescription of nonuse accruing against
a mineral servitude might result from either operations or production.259 
These might occur either on the land burdened by the servitude or in a unit
including all or a part of the servitude tract.
Whose use is eligible or sufficient to interrupt prescription accruing
against a mineral servitude? Who must undertake the activity such that it





258. Id. at 893.
259. As discussed in Part II.B.3 hereof, the policy embodied in the Mineral
Code also states that a “shut-in well,” while by definition not constituting
production, also interrupts prescription, which then starts anew as of “the date on
which the well is shut in after testing.”
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1189
2. Jurisprudence Prior to the Mineral Code
As one court observed in a case predating the Mineral Code, the
“burden of proof is upon the owner of the servitude to establish that he or 
someone in his name has made timely use of the servitude to prevent the
tolling or the accrual of prescription.”260 
A mineral owner who was a stockholder in a corporation that
conducted operations on the burdened tract was not, merely by reason of
being a stockholder, permitted to avail himself of the use of the servitude
because the stockholder was not personally a party to the contract that gave
rise to the operations.261 
The landowner’s utilization of a small quantity of gas for household 
purposes could not be considered a servitude owner’s use and, thus, would
not interrupt prescription.262 
In Nelson v. Young,263 drilling operations ceased in 1952, thus
commencing a new prescriptive period on a mineral servitude originally
created in 1917. In 1957, the surface owner granted leases even though his
lands were subject to the outstanding mineral servitude. The surface
owner’s lessee drilled a producing well in 1959; it produced until 1964. In
1967, the servitude owners sued to be declared owners of the mineral
rights. The trial court dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, basing its decision on the
provisions of former article 794 of the Louisiana Civil Code (now
260. Scott v. Hunt Oil Co., 160 So. 2d 433, 435 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1964)
(emphasis added). The court relied upon former Louisiana Civil Code article 804:
“When the prescription of non-usage is opposed to the owner of the estate to
whom the servitude is due, it is incumbent on him to prove that he, or some person
in his name, has made use of this servitude as appertaining to his estate during the
time necessary to prevent the establishment of the prescription.” The current
version of Louisiana Civil Code article 764: “When the prescription of nonuse is
pleaded, the owner of the dominant estate has the burden of proving that he or
some other person has made use of the servitude as appertaining to his estate 
during the period of time required for the accrual of the prescription.” LA. CIV.
CODE art. 764 (2020).
261. Sample v. Louisiana Oil & Refin. Corp., 111 So. 336 (La. 1927). This
holding is certainly concordant with the established precept that a “corporation is
a separate entity from its shareholders.” Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 673 So. 2d 668, 672 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
262. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp. v. O’Bier, 201 So. 2d 280 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1967); see also Magee v. Worley, 163 So. 3d 23 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2015)
(finding that evidence did not establish that taking by the surface owner of
residential gas occurred such as would constitute a use of a servitude).
263. Nelson v. Young, 234 So. 2d 54 (La. 1971).
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1190 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
repealed): “The servitude is preserved to the owner of the estate to which
it is due, by the use which any one, even a stranger, makes of it, provided
it be used as appertaining to the estate.”264 
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, but chose to rely on a theory
of quasi-contract. This conclusion was based on the approving “silence”
and acquiescence of the servitude owners when the landowner (who
owned no minerals) executed the mineral lease, and the lessee established
production under the lease. Through this approving silence, a quasi-
contractual relationship was established, whereby the landowner’s act
became the servitude owner’s act, thus interrupting prescription.265 
3. Adoption under the Mineral Code
The rule of Nelson v. Young has now been suppressed by article 43 the
Louisiana Mineral Code, which provides as follows:
A person is acting on behalf of the servitude owner only when
there is a legal relationship between him and the servitude owner,
such as co-ownership or agency, or when there is clear and
convincing evidence that he intended to act for the servitude
owner. Silence or inaction by the servitude owner will not suffice
to establish that a person is acting on behalf of the servitude
owner.266 
While a mineral lease is indisputably a “legal relationship between [a
lessee] and the servitude owner,”267 it is not the exclusive instance of such 
a relationship. For example, a servitude owner may execute a simple letter
authorizing a person to act on its behalf.
In a significant case,268 the plaintiff owned a mineral servitude that
was perpetuated by production until 1972, at which time prescription
264. LA. CIV. CODE art. 794 (1870) (emphasis added) (current version at LA.
CIV. CODE art. 757 (2020)).
265. “It follows that the voluntary acts of defendants were for the benefit of
the plaintiffs; they transacted the business of other persons. Thus a quasi contract
came into existence between plaintiffs and defendants.” 234 So. 2d at 61.
266. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:43 (2020).
267. “Probably the most common example of use by a representative or agent 
of the servitude owner occurs when his mineral lessee or an assignee of his lessee
engages in operations on the servitude land.” Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana
Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1149 (1987).
268. Producers Oil & Gas Co. v. Nix, 488 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1986). The court rejected the servitude owner’s contention that an application of
the 1975 Mineral Code to a mineral servitude created initially in 1941 would
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1191
commenced anew. In 1979, the landowner granted a lease and the lessee
conducted drilling operations on the land subject to the mineral servitude.
Producers had no contractual relationship with the landowner’s lessee,
Nix. Because Producers conducted no operations after production ceased
in 1972, the servitude would ordinarily expire in 1982, unless Producers
benefited from Nix’s use as to which it was “conceded that Nix’s work
qualifie[d] as good faith operations sufficient to interrupt prescription.”269 
The question presented was whether Nix’s operations complied with
article 42 as a use “made by the owner of the servitude, his representative
or employee, or some other person acting on his behalf.” Producers’s
reliance upon Nelson v. Young was rejected inasmuch as the Mineral Code
clearly overruled that case. “Thus, under the Mineral Code, these
operations did not interrupt prescription for the servitude owner.”270 
That the approach of Nelson v. Young has been abrogated is shown by
article 53, which states that articles 44 through 52 of the Mineral Code
“provide the only means by which the prescription of nonuse may be
interrupted by operations conducted by persons other than those
designated in Article 42.”271 
“A mineral servitude owner may adopt operations or production by a
person other than those designated by Article 42 if his servitude includes
the right to conduct operations of the kind involved.”272 
Some consideration must be given to the meaning or import of article
44’s limitation that adoption is only available to a servitude owner “if his
servitude includes the right to conduct operations of the kind involved.”
The articles on adoption seem to contemplate that the adopter’s
mineral servitude be without limitation, either geographically (vertical) or
geologically (horizontal).273 Thus, it is not clear if the owner of a mineral
violate constitutional proscriptions against the impairment of vested rights, saying
that “the expectation that laws about liberative prescription will not change is not 
a vested right.” Id. at 1102.
269. Id. at 1100.
270. Id. at 1101.
271. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:53. The comment to this article states that it was
“inserted out of an abundance of caution to make certain that the holding in Nelson
v. Young . . . is negated.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:53 cmt. (2020).
272. Id. § 31:44.
273. It is the author’s experience that there is not a universally accepted under-
standing of the difference between a “vertical” limitation and a “horizontal” lim-
itation—whether it be in the context of a stratigraphic limitation on a mineral
servitude, or, with respect to a mineral lease, a “Pugh Clause” or an “Absolute 
Depth Limitation Clause.” On more than one occasion, the author has encountered
a discussion wherein one party alludes to a “vertical” limitation or restriction, or
has stated that a mineral lease has expired “vertically,” only to be asked, “Don’t
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1192 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
servitude limited to the bottom depth of, say, 8,000 feet below the surface
of the earth,274 could adopt operations conducted by another which are
directed to a geological objective of, say, 12,000 feet. Because such
(deeper) drilling operations are not intended to exploit the shallower
depths,275 it is doubtful that such operations could be adopted because the
adopter’s servitude does not “include[] the right to conduct operations of
the kind involved,” that is, the adopter’s servitude does not permit that
servitude owner to drill deeper than 8,000 feet.
A more logical example concerns the types of minerals or “other
substances” covered by the servitude.276 As noted above, although an
“interruption of prescription applies to all types of minerals covered by the
act creating the servitude,”277 in a proper case it is necessary to discern
whether a mineral servitude encompasses a particular mineral or “other
substances.” For example, if a mineral servitude only relates to fugacious
or migratory minerals, such as oil and gas,278 the servitude owner would
not be able to adopt an operation conducted for the mining of lignite or
coal, as the servitude does not cover those minerals and, hence, his
servitude does not “include[] the right to conduct operations of the kind
involved.”
As a further illustration, what if a mineral servitude is created subject
to a “No Surface Operations Clause,” effectively denying the servitude
owner or its lessee the right to conduct drilling operations on the surface
you mean ‘horizontally’?” The confusion or misunderstanding resides in the fact
that “vertical” means, and in a visual sense runs, “north to south,” while horizontal
means, and visually runs, “east to west.” Nevertheless, in the jargon of the
industry, while “horizontal” might allude to a specific stratum under the earth, is
not such stratum reached “vertically” from the surface of the earth? And
conversely, the term “vertical” conjures the notion that the exterior perimeter of a 
unit is, in a sense, defined as extended into the earth, vertically, “from the surface
to China,” as says the jargon of the industry. Think “cookie cutter” into the earth.
Yet to some, that seems to deal with the “horizontal” because it is running “north 
to south,” into the earth’s subsurface. See supra Part II.D.1.b.
274. “A single mineral servitude is established on a continuous tract of land
notwithstanding that certain horizons or levels are excluded or the right to share
in production varies as to different portions of the tract or different levels or
horizons.” LA. REV. STAT. § 31:68.
275. See infra Part II.D.4.
276. See supra note 230.
277. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
278. See, e.g., Nat’l Food & Beverage Co. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 679,
694 (2012) (finding that a reservation of “all oil, gas and other materials in or
under the property,” “covered only fugacious resources”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1193
of the burdened land?279 Should this mean that the servitude owner is
unable to adopt operations that have been conducted on the surface of land
by a stranger since that owner himself could not in its own right conduct
the operations because of the contractual limitation?
With the exception of the recent case of Citrus Realty, LLC v.
Parker,280 in which adoption was found to be irrelevant to the issue before 
the court,281 no case has considered this precise issue. It is suggested that
the existence of a “No Surface Operations Clause” is not an innovation or
limitation contemplated by article 44 of the Mineral Code that implicates
“the right to conduct operations of the kind involved.” Rather, this author
submits that the allusion to “the right to conduct operations” references the
inherent features of a particular mineral servitude, such as noted or
illustrated in the preceding paragraphs (e.g., depth limitations, types of
minerals or “other substances” covered), and not to restrictions on surface
activity that are contractually imposed but which do not touch upon the
contractually defined scope or coverage of the real right.
Three consecutive articles of the Mineral Code provide the workings
of the precept of adoption of operations by the owner of a mineral
servitude.
An adoption must be made within three years of the servitude
owner’s knowledge of such operations or production and in any
event prior to the date on which his rights would otherwise
prescribe. This limitation does not affect the prescription
applicable to any action that the servitude owner may have against
another for the wrongful appropriation of his rights of exploration
or of production belonging to him.282 
Adoption of the operations of another is accomplished when the
servitude owner files for registry in the conveyance records of the
situs of his servitude an instrument describing the land subject to
the servitude, identifying the operations, specifying the date on
279. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5-09.
280. Citrus Realty, LLC v. Parker, No. 2018-CA-0516, 2019 WL 385194 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2019), writ denied, 2019 WL 2251536 (Mem.) (La. May
20, 2019). In the interest of full disclosure, your author filed a brief on behalf of
the Louisiana Landowners Association as amicus curiae in support of the
defendants in this case.
281. The court properly recognized that “those adoption procedures relate to
adoption of another’s use for purposes of interrupting prescription,” an issue not
involved in the case. Citrus realty, LLC, 2019 WL 385194, at * 7.
282. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:45 (2020).
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1194 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
which the operations commenced, and expressing the intent to
adopt them as his own.283 
When drilling or mining operations or actual production
otherwise sufficient to interrupt prescription takes place on a
compulsory unit including all or a part of the land burdened by a
mineral servitude, an interruption of prescription takes place
without formal adoption by the owner of the servitude.284 
This rule is harmonious with the fact that the operator of a compulsory
unit is viewed as a “representative” of all interests in the unit.285 It is not
clear if the phrase “takes place on a compulsory unit” only applies to the
situation where the drilling or production take place on an existing unit as
a unit activity, or whether the article also dispenses with the necessity of a
“formal adoption” where a well is drilled prior to the formation of the
compulsory unit and thereafter the unit is created.
Article 48 of the Mineral Code provides that “upon filing for registry
of the instrument required by Article 46, the servitude owner becomes
obligated to pay his proportionate share of the reasonable, actual costs of
development and operation of the well or mine.” For this reason, one
should only adopt operations if the adopted operations are “necessary” in
the sense that the servitude would prescribe in the absence of an adoption.
It is not apparent if a servitude owner—having adopted an operation
conducted on a “lease basis”—will be excused from cost responsibility
when the Commissioner of Conservation subsequently unitizes the well.
In any event, the servitude owner “is not obligated to [make such payment]
if the operations adopted were conducted by a possessor in legal or moral
bad faith and resulted in production to which the servitude owner is
entitled.”286 
283. Id. § 31:46. This is consistent with article 18 of the Mineral Code,
providing that “[a]ll . . . contracts . . . affecting mineral rights are subject to the
laws of registry.”
284. Id. § 31:47.
285. Mire v. Hawkins, 186 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1966). Other characterizations
of the nature of the relationship between the designated operator and other interest
owners in the unit have been made, including “forced agent,” id. at 599 (McCaleb
J., dissenting); “joint venture” of a “common interest,” id. at 604 (Fournet, C.J.,
dissenting); an “agent pro hoc vice,” Dixon v. Am. Liberty Oil Co., 77 So. 2d 533,
539 (La. 1954); “managing owner,” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d
376, 392 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987), and negotiorum gestor or “manager,” Taylor
v. David New Operating Co., Inc., 619 So. 2d 1251 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
286. See State v. Jefferson Island Salt Mining Co., 163 So. 145 (La. 1935)
(finding the producer to be a trespasser who acted in bad faith, the amount of the
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1195
“If the operations adopted were unsuccessful, the servitude owner is
not only obligated to pay costs as required by Article 48, he also waives
any right to damages against the party conducting the operations.”287 
“The servitude owner may adopt the operations of another as a matter
of right. Consent of the party conducting them is not required.”288 The
reason that there is a dispensation of the need to seek or obtain the consent
of the operating party is explained in the comment to article 50:
The motive for Article 50 is to make the opportunity to adopt
operations of another a reality. If this Article were not adopted, it
might be possible for a party drilling a well or opening a mine to
attempt to deny the servitude owner the right to adopt the
operations or at least to delay his adoption and possibly promote
the extinction of the servitude. The servitude owner should not be
made vulnerable to such possible conduct.289 
Articles 51 and 52 of the Mineral Code provide the basic rules as to
responsibility for costs in the event of adoption or failure to adopt, as the
case may be:
The owner of a mineral servitude may adopt the operations of
another even though his rights are under lease and his lessee is
unwilling to share in the costs of development and operation. If
the operations have resulted in production to which the servitude 
owner is entitled and the servitude owner’s lessee refuses to
participate in the operations after production is first obtained, the
lessee is not entitled to participate in production from the
operations except by express agreement with the mineral servitude
owner. In the absence of agreement, the mineral lease, if otherwise
maintained according to its terms, remains in force except as to
the well or wells or mine or mines as to which the servitude owner
has asserted his claim and in which the lessee has refused to
participate.290 
Although the servitude owner fails to adopt operations by
damages was fixed as the value of the mineral at the well without deducting the
cost of production.).
287. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:49.
288. Id. § 31:50; see Patrick S. Ottinger, Permission Granted: The
Requirement of Consent under the Louisiana Mineral Code, 80 LA. L. REV. 1285,
1290 (2020).
289. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:50 cmt. (2020).
290. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:51.
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1196 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
another, he may claim the proportion of production allocable to
his interest which was obtained prior to the lapse of three years
from his knowledge of the operations resulting in production or
the date on which his servitude prescribed, whichever occurs first.
If he does so, he is obligated to pay his proportionate share of the
cost of development and operation accrued prior to the date on
which his servitude prescribed unless the person conducting the
operations was in legal or moral bad faith.291 
At issue in a recent case was whether the owners of a mineral servitude
pertaining to clay (a “substance” to which the provisions of the Mineral
Code were applicable)292 were entitled to revenue associated with the 
surface owner’s exploitation of that substance.293 The reservation in the 
instrument that created the mineral servitude contained a “No Surface
Operations Clause,” disallowing the conduct of operations on the surface
of the land.294 On that basis, the surface owner contended that the servitude
owner had no right to the revenue associated with the clay produced by the
surface owner because the servitude owners had no right to exploit the clay
in their own right. A further contention was that the servitude owners never
adopted the operations conducted by the surface owner. The trial court
accepted this position. 
Reversing the trial court’s ruling for the surface owner, the appellate
court stated as follows:
As an initial matter, we agree with Appellants that the trial court’s
primary reliance on Articles 42 through 46 of The Mineral Code
is misplaced, as those articles fall under Chapter 4, Part 4, Subpart
C of The Mineral Code. Chapter 4 concerns “The Mineral
Servitude” generally, while Part 4 concerns “Commencement of
Prescription.” Subpart A, applicable to “General Principles,”
includes Article 28, which provides “[p]rescription of nonuse of a
mineral servitude commences from the date on which it is
created.” Subpart B, Article 29, in turn, states “[t]he prescription
of nonuse running against a mineral servitude is interrupted by
good faith operations for the discovery and production of
291. Id. § 31:52.
292. Id. § 31:4.
293. Citrus Realty, LLC v. Parker, No. 2018-CA-0516, 2019 WL 385194 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2019), writ denied, 2019 WL 2251536 (Mem.) (La. May
20, 2019). The author filed a brief on behalf of the Louisiana Landowners
Association as amicus curiae in support of the defendants in this case.
294. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5-09.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1197
minerals.” Subpart C of Part 4, under which fall the articles relied
upon by the district court, is entitled “By Whom a Use May be
Made.” . . . Given the foregoing authority [on principles of
statutory interpretation], we presume the Legislature deliberately
placed Articles 42 through 46 under that part of Chapter 4
concerning prescription for a reason. We, therefore, conclude that
those articles are relevant to the issue of “use” as it relates to
prescription, and not to the substantive issues presented by the
facts of this case. For example, the trial court relies on Article 46
of The Mineral Code relative to “Procedure for Adoption” to
suggest Appellants did not “adopt” the operations of Appellees
and therefore cannot benefit from Appellees’ labors in extracting
the clay. However, those adoption procedures relate to adoption
of another’s use for purposes of interrupting prescription.295 
D. Unitized Operations or Production
1. Preliminary Comments on Unitization
A use resulting from operations conducted on, or production obtained
from, a well that might interrupt prescription can be associated with a well
that is either non-unitized or unitized. There are certain foundational
principles of a unitized well that must be examined before taking up the
subject of the interruptive effect of a use by way of a unitized well. 
a. Types of Units
Article 213(6) of the Mineral Code defines a unit as follows:
“Unit” means an area of land, deposit, or deposits of minerals,
stratum or strata, or pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as to 
which parties with interests therein are bound to share minerals
produced on a specified basis and as to which those having the
right to conduct drilling or mining operations therein are bound to
share investment and operating costs on a specified basis. A unit
may be formed by convention or by order of an agency of the state
or federal government empowered to do so. A unit formed by
order of a governmental agency is termed a “compulsory unit.”296 
295. 2019 WL 385194, at *6–7.
296. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213(6).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  90 5/26/21  11:50 AM









    
  














     
     
         
 
       
 
 
    
   
 
  
      




   
    
   
 
1198 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Hence, there are two types of units under Louisiana law, namely,
conventional and compulsory.297 Within the two types of units, there are
several variants of those units.
While the differences between a conventional and a compulsory unit
are many and profound, these differences have no particular influence on
the matters that the Louisiana Mineral Code addresses, as such articles,
where they do regulate matters involving a unit, refer to a “conventional
or compulsory unit.” Thus, the codal rules do not differentiate between the
type of unit involved, applying equally to each type.
b. “Vertical” and “Horizontal” Features of Unitization
When the Louisiana Office of Conservation creates a compulsory unit
pursuant to statutory authority, the compulsory unit has certain intrinsic
features that might be called “vertical” and “horizontal.” There are five
kinds of compulsory units.298 
With regard to a conventional unit,299 while it has a “vertical feature,” 
whether it also has a “horizontal feature” depends upon the language of
the contract that created it. It is not uncommon to encounter a conventional
unit in which no subsurface geological limits of a unitized sand are 
described or identified.300 In these instances, the conventional unit
involves no “horizontal feature.”301 
297. See Patrick S. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization in Louisiana, 49 ANN.
INST. ON MIN. LAW 21 (2002).
298. These are “drilling and production” units, LA. REV. STAT. § 30:9; a
“fieldwide” or “reservoirwide” unit (sometimes called a “441 unit”) references
Act No. 441 of 1960, id. § 30:5C; a “deep pool” unit, id. § 30:5.1A; an “ultra deep
structure” unit, id. § 30:5.1B; and a “coal seam natural gas producing” unit, id. § 
30:5.2.
299. “It is often said that there are three types of units—‘compulsory’
(sometimes called ‘forced’, ‘governmental’ or ‘Commissioner’s’), ‘voluntary’
and ‘declared.’ Actually, it is more accurate to say that there are two types of
units—‘compulsory’ and ‘conventional.’ Of the latter type, there are two kinds— 
‘declared’ and ‘voluntary’ (also called ‘contractual’ or, sometimes,
‘conventional’).” See Ottinger, supra note 297, at 24.
300. Illustratively, the commercially printed forms of mineral lease in
prevalent use in Louisiana contain a “Pooling Clause” that authorizes the
unilateral creation by the lessee of a “declared unit” by filing an instrument or
declaration “describing the pooled acreage,” with no stated requirement that any
unitized zone or stratum be distinctly identified. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE 
TREATISE, supra note 5, § 4-21.
301. In this instance, it is often said that the unit covers subsurface depths
“from the surface of the earth to China,” but more precisely, it would cover depths
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1199
The creation of a compulsory unit intrinsically introduces both a
“horizontal feature” and a “vertical feature” with respect to the drilling of,
or production from, the unit well.302 Consequently, a well only constitutes 
a compulsory unit well if it comports with these two necessary aspects or
features.
In forming a compulsory unit, the Commissioner of Conservation
orders a “Sand Definition,” which is a geologically defined subsurface
structure being unitized, normally called a “zone,” “sand,” “horizon,” or
“stratum.”303 The “horizontal feature” involved in compulsory unitization 
is the intrinsic requirement that the well’s bottom hole must be completed
within the subsurface geological limits of the unitized sand as defined in
the order.304 
In Midnight Drilling, LLC v. Triche,305 citing prior precedent,306 it was 
noted that “the court specifically considered the location of the bottom
“to Hades,” or to the center of the Earth. Cf. Alyce Gaines Johnson Special Tr. v.
El Paso E & P Co., 773 F. Supp. 2d 640, 645 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 438 Fed. Appx.
340 (5th Cir. 2011) (“As the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear Louisiana property
law embraces the colorful Latin maxim of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos (‘for whoever owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and
down to Hell’).”).
302. See supra note 273 for the author’s commentary.
303. “At the request of an applicant (operator or any interested party), an oil
unit or a gas unit is established for a sand, a zone or a formation. For the
unitization purposes, a sand implies a stratigraphic interval containing a reservoir
stratum capable of producing hydrocarbons (oil or gas and condensate) . . . . For 
a conservation unit to be established, a sand, a zone or a formation is defined in a
specific well (referred to as the ‘Definition Well’) with the depths (electric log
measurements) of the top and the base of the defined interval identified as 
encountered in the well.” Madhurendu B. Kumar, Geological Aspects of
Unitization in the Petroleum Fields of Louisiana: A Brief Overview, THE
PETROLEUM GEOLOGIST, p. 30 (November/December 2007), available at http://
www.dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC/geo_div/TPG_Kumar-Articles.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/SS3R-TKFM].
304. The commissioner’s rules require that the pre-application notice and
application for a public hearing contain a “definition of the sand proposed for
unitization with such sand defined in each reservoir thereof by reference to well
log measurements.” See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR CONDUCTING HEARINGS
BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF CONSERVATION OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
(effective October 11, 1983); see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, §§ 3901– 
37 (2017).
305. Midnight Drilling, LLC v. Triche, No. 2012 CA 1043, 2013 WL 3149456
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013).
306. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 98 So. 2d 236 (La. 1957).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  92 5/26/21  11:50 AM








    
 
 






   
 
   








     
     
   
 
   
  
     
 
   
 
 




     
 
  
1200 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
holes of the respective wells to determine to whom the royalties were
owed.”307 
The “vertical feature” associated with compulsory unitization dictates
that the unit well’s bottom hole, in the case of a true vertical well, or “take
points,” in the case of a horizontal well,308 must be within the exterior
geographic perimeter of the unit as established by the order to constitute a
unit well.309 However, nothing dictates that the surface location must be 
within the unit boundary, as the well can be directionally drilled from a
location outside of the unit to be completed at a subsurface location that
satisfies both of these features.
2. Interruptive Effect of Use
Prior to the adoption of the Mineral Code, the law concerning the
interruptive effect of unitized operations or production was both
inconsistent and illogical. Whether operations or production would
interrupt prescription as to the entirety of the servitude tract, both within
and without the unit, or only as to the portion of the servitude tract within
the unit, was dependent upon whether the unit was a compulsory or
conventional unit and whether the unit well was located on the servitude
tract or off of it.310 
The following table illustrates the pre-Code rules pertinent to the
interruption of prescription accruing against a mineral servitude by 
unitized operations or production, to-wit:
307. Midnight Drilling, LLC, 2013 WL 3149456, at *5.
308. See infra note 365.
309. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:9(B) provides that a “drilling unit, as
contemplated herein, means the maximum area which may be efficiently and
economically drained by the well or wells designated to serve the drilling unit as 
the unit well, substitute unit well, or alternate unit well.” See Delatte v. Woods, 
94 So. 2d 281, 286 (La. 1957) (“Thus, the sole question before us is whether the
basic Order No. 280-A of the Commissioner of Conservation, unitizing a portion
of the leased land with other lands, designating Well No. 2 as the unit well, and
limiting said unit to one well, constituted a production of oil, gas or other minerals
affecting all lands within said unit and thus relieved the defendant of any drilling
operations towards production or the ‘spudding in’ or commencement of actual
drilling on any portion of the entire leased premises so as to have kept in full force
and effect the lease here in controversy. We are constrained to hold in the
affirmative.”).
310. Although not relevant to this Article, further inconsistency was 
introduced by the consideration of whether the interest was a mineral servitude or
a mineral royalty.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1201
Compulsory Conventional
Well on Tract Full311 No jurisprudence
Well off Tract Limited312 Limited313 
For the most part, the Mineral Code codifies—and, in some instances,
clarifies or changes—the jurisprudentially developed rules.314 One area
where the law has been changed in the interest of consistency is the extent
to which unitized operations or production interrupts prescription.
As previously noted, the Mineral Code now instructs that mere 
“[u]nitization of a portion of a tract burdened by a mineral servitude does
not divide the servitude.”315 However, a unitized use may effect a division
in accordance with various articles of the Mineral Code.316 
As seen above, there was no particular “rhyme or reason” to the
jurisprudentially developed rules. The Mineral Code now provides that if
unitized operations or production is otherwise sufficient to interrupt
prescription, then such operations will interrupt prescription accruing
against the portion of the mineral servitude included within the unit, and,
if the unit well is located on the mineral servitude, it will also interrupt
prescription on the portion of the servitude tract situated outside of the
unit.317 As noted previously, this rule applies whether the unit is
311. Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen, 187 So. 2d 720 (La. 1966). “Full”
interruption means both the prescription was interrupted as to both the unitized
and non-unitized portions of the servitude.
312. Jumonville Pipe & Mach. Co., Inc. v. Fed. Land Bank of New Orleans,
87 So. 2d 721 (La. 1956). “Limited” interruption means that prescription was
interrupted only as to the unitized portion of the servitude.
313. Elson v. Mathewes, 69 So. 2d 734 (La. 1954).
314. “The Mineral Code is designed in large measure to supplant by way of
codification the extensive jurisprudence that developed in this area of the law.”
GEORGE W. HARDY, EXPOSÉ DES MOTIFS: SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA 
MINERAL LAW—A BASIS FOR REFORM 3 (1971).
315. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:71 (2020).
316. McDougal, supra note 267, at 1126. (“The general thrust of these three
articles [33, 34, and 37] is that a use on a portion of the unit not burdened by the
servitude will interrupt prescription for the portion of the burdened land included
in the unit, but not for the portion of the servitude not included in the unit. Thus,
these articles divide the servitude into unit and nonunit portions for purposes of
prescription of nonuse. What article 71 really means is that the ‘mere’ fact that
land burdened by a servitude is included in a conventional or compulsory unit
does not ‘automatically’ trigger a division of the servitude.”).
317. LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:30, 31:33–35, 31:37 (2020).
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1202 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
conventional or compulsory, but it is subject to the author’s caveat in the
next section regarding a voluntary unit not signed by all of the owners of
interest in production.
A visual presentation of this situation follows, with the shaded area
reflecting the areal extent of the interruption resulting from unitized
operations or production depending upon the location of the unit well.318 
As previously noted,319 as a limited area where “freedom of contract” 
is allowed, parties may provide that “an interruption of prescription
resulting from unit operations or production shall extend to the entirety of
the tract burdened by the servitude tract [sic] regardless of the location of
the well or of whether all or only part of the tract is included in the unit.”320 
The invocation of this permitted alteration to the rules noted above is not
uncommon in more sophisticated mineral transactions.
318. In his Mineral Rights class at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University, this author advocates that, in order to verify maintenance of a
mineral lease or a mineral servitude, it is necessary to use “tunnel vision” when
one or more mineral leases and mineral servitudes burden a tract of land, and there
exists a number of units including such tract of land. See OTTINGER, MINERAL
LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 3-08(b).
319. See supra Part I.G.3.
320. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:75; see also White v. Evans, 457 So. 2d 159, 162
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 207 (La. 1985) (without
discussing the issue of applying the Mineral Code retroactively to a servitude
created prior to its enactment, the court found that the language of “the pooling
agreement in question expresses such an agreement as Art. 75 contemplates”;
consequently, it was held that the servitude was maintained in its entirety,
including that portion of the servitude tract not included within the producing
voluntary unit.).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1203
3. A Word of Caution about Voluntary Units
Although the rule announced in articles 33 and 37 is clear, certain
issues are presented regarding its application in certain instances. There is
no real question as to the application of the articles in the case of
compulsory units, which are well defined both statutorily and
jurisprudentially.321 
Similarly, the articles present no real concern in reference to declared
units because the jurisprudential treatment of such units—and the resultant
modification of the printed lease forms to address issues arising
therefrom—virtually ensures that a properly formed declared unit will be
a valid, “100%” unit.322 However, because the Mineral Code does not
define the term “conventional unit” precisely, it is unclear how or if the
rule applies to a voluntary unit formed by an agreement which has not been
executed or adopted by a landowner in whose favor prescription would 
accrue in the absence of a use.323 
As noted in the Official Comments to article 213 of the Mineral Code,
the definition of the term “unit” “includes conventional units of all kinds,
whether established by declaration under a pooling power, by a contract
executed by all parties affected, or otherwise.”324 While it is commendable 
that because the legislature did not provide a more precise, restrictive
definition of “conventional unit,” it allowed the parties to craft institutions
or arrangements of their own desires. Furthermore, the lack of a precise
definition and the absence of any guideposts as to the creation of a
conventional unit give rise to certain questions as to when the rules of
articles 33 and 37 might not be applicable.325 
According to articles 33 and 37 of the Mineral Code, if unitized
operations conducted on or production secured from a conventional unit
well situated off of the servitude tract has the consequence of interrupting
prescription accruing against that portion of the servitude tract situated
within the voluntary unit, then clearly the landowner of the servitude
tract—in whose favor prescription would otherwise accrue in the absence
of a use—is an “affected” party. If the landowner has not signed the
321. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:9(B) (2020).
322. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Touchet, 86 So. 2d 50 (La. 1956);
Viator v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., Tr., 88 So. 2d 1 (La. 1956); Mallett v. Union
Oil & Gas Corp. of La., 94 So. 2d 16 (La. 1957).
323. See Ottinger, supra note 297.
324. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2020) (emphasis added).
325. Certainly, the voluntary unit agreement must be in writing. See Midnight
Drilling, LLC v. Triche, No. 2012 CA 1043, 2013 WL 3149456 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2013), writ denied, 125 So. 3d 432 (La. 2013).
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1204 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
voluntary unit agreement, one could argue that the non-signatory 
landowner should be “not bound by it in any way.”326 
In a case predating the adoption of the Mineral Code, it was held that
production from a conventional unit did not interrupt prescription accruing
against a mineral servitude because the owner of the land burdened by the
servitude was not a party signatory to it.327 
It might be argued that a landowner who creates a mineral servitude 
will be deemed to have done so in reference to all applicable and pertinent
laws, including articles 33 and 37 of the Mineral Code, so that an intrinsic
consequence of the creation of a mineral servitude is that operations or
production from a “conventional unit,” even without the involvement or
participation of the landowner, might interrupt prescription. Even so, the
question remains, under what circumstances will this result follow if fewer
than all “affected” parties have signed the voluntary unit agreement?
As stated, uncertainty is presented because the Mineral Code does not
define the term “conventional unit” as used in articles 33 and 37.328 
Perhaps there is no problem with a “declared” unit constituting a
“conventional” unit because the jurisprudence has adequately addressed
the legal requirements for the formation of such a unit. There is, however,
a question as to when or under what circumstances a “voluntary unit
agreement” constitutes a “conventional” unit within the contemplation of
these articles.
326. Carter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948); see also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1983 (2020) (“Contracts have the effect of law for the parties . . . .”); 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1985 (2020) (“Contracts may produce effects for third parties
only when provided by law.”).
327. Alexander v. Holt, 116 So. 2d 532, 536 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1959) (“The
[mineral servitude owner’s] inclusion of the 35.56 acres in the conventional
agreement was by his own act, not concurred in, consented to, or approved by [the
landowner]; nor is it shown by any act on the part of [the landowner], he has, in
any manner, approved or acquiesced in the agreements or in the subsequent
proceedings. The owners of a servitude are powerless to extend their mineral
rights without the consent of the landowners who, under the law, must clearly and
definitely state or act in such a way so as to show that it was their intention to
interrupt the running of prescription and start it anew.”).
328. In a non-mineral servitude context, the absence of a codal definition of
the term “conventional unit” contributed to the rendition of a fundamentally
flawed and erroneous decision as it relates to “Pugh Clauses.” Banner v. GEO 
Consultants Int’l, Inc., 593 So. 2d 934 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992). While this
decision is clearly erroneous as a matter of “Pugh Clause” law, it is correct under
the law of lease divisibility. Cf. Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929); see 
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 10-16.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1205
To illustrate, assume that every person having an interest in production 
from the identified conventionally pooled unit well executes the
agreement. Presumably that would constitute a “conventional” unit as
contemplated by articles 33 and 37 of the Mineral Code. Assume, then,
that fewer than all of the parties having an interest in production from that
unit well have executed the agreement. Is this a “conventional” unit? What
if, say, only 5 out of 10 parties having an interest in production from the
identified, conventionally pooled unit well have executed the agreement? 
Is this a “conventional” unit as contemplated by these articles? What about
2 out of 10 parties? Sooner or later, a court might determine that a given
agreement does not effectively form a “conventional” unit as contemplated 
by articles 33 and 37 of the Mineral Code because an insufficient number
of affected parties have signed the document.
As noted, all of the jurisprudence on this subject predates the adoption
of the Mineral Code. Thus, while one may argue that the legislature
enacted articles 33 and 37 of the Mineral Code to resolve any ambiguity
or inconsistency in prior jurisprudence, the fact remains that, until the
Code is amended to more precisely define “conventional unit” or a
definitive court decision is rendered, one will not be able to predict with
certainty how or if these articles will be applied to a conventional unit that
the landowner has not signed or, more fundamentally, to a “conventional”
unit that significantly less than all of the parties in interest have signed.
At issue in AIX Energy, Inc. v. Bennett Properties, LP329 was whether
a certain mineral servitude had prescribed for nonuse for 10 years.
Although neither operations nor production occurred on the servitude
tract, it was included in a voluntary unit created by agreement, but the 
landowner never signed that agreement. The court noted:
There is no evidence that their predecessor in interest, Thomas
Sale, Jr., signed the unit agreement, but there is compelling
evidence that Sale tacitly consented to or ratified the agreement
by signing division orders that included an express ratification
clause, accepting payments from unit production, and otherwise
acting consistently with having joined the unit.330 
On this showing, the court held that Sale was bound by the agreement
through principles of either ratification or acceptance.
The owner of the land then contended that a successor to Sale was not
bound by any such ratification since it was not reflected in the public
329. AIX Energy, Inc. v. Bennett Properties, LP, No. 13-CV-3304, 2016 WL
5395870 (W.D. La. Sept. 26, 2016).
330. Id. at *1.
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1206 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
records of DeSoto Parish. The court rejected this argument on the basis of
article 3339 of the Louisiana Civil Code, finding that the actions of Sale
that resulted in a ratification or acceptance of the voluntary unit agreement
constituted a “similar matter pertaining to rights and obligations evidenced
by a recorded instrument,” which, under article 3339, “are effective as to
a third person although not evidenced of record.”331 
Because the mineral servitude was included within the voluntary unit,
and was held to be binding on the landowner through principles of
ratification or acceptance, the servitude did not prescribe, but was
perpetuated through article 37 of the Louisiana Mineral Code.
4. What Constitutes Unitized Operations or Production?
The principles now provided with respect to unitized operations and
production are applicable “provided such operations are for the discovery
and production of minerals from the unitized sand or sands.”332 The myriad
of circumstances that might be presented in the conduct of drilling
operations has given rise to various issues of whether a particular operation
or a modification of an ongoing operation constitutes unitized or “lease
basis” operations for various purposes, including the interruption of
prescription. 
Thus, in Matlock Oil Corp. v. Gerard,333 the issue was whether the
conduct of certain operations, which the mineral servitude owner’s lessee
contended were unitized operations, interrupted prescription against
certain mineral servitudes. The court concluded that the mineral servitudes
prescribed in August of 1969 unless certain operations conducted in the
early part of 1969 constituted unitized operations. The court examined the 
facts pertaining to this operation and concluded that the lessee “simply did
not intend to obtain production from the Lower Hosston Formation 
through Matlock-Fuller Well No. 1” and that “no bona fide attempt was
made to test this particular formation; therefore, there was no good-faith 
drilling as to the unit established for drilling and production from the
Lower Hosston Formation.”334 
The case of Sandefer & Andress, Inc. v. Pruitt was a concursus
proceeding to determine the ownership of minerals in a tract of land.335 A 
331. Id. at *4 (emphasis omitted); see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, 
supra note 5, § 1-14(f).
332. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:33 (2020).
333. Matlock Oil Corp. v. Gerard, 263 So. 2d 413 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 265 So. 2d 241 (La. 1972).
334. Id. at 418.
335. 471 So. 2d 933 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1207
mineral servitude was created in 1936. Two wells were drilled on the
servitude tract and produced for a brief period of time in 1940. A third well
on the servitude tract was drilled in 1954. Based upon the drilling and
production activities on the surface of the servitude tract, prescription
presumptively accrued before the drilling of the well in 1954.
“If the only issue were on-tract production, then this conclusion would
completely dispose of the case. There is, however, an extensive history of
unitization and drilling on adjacent tracts.”336 
While there was some unit activity, none of the wells included any
portion of the servitude tract. The servitude tract was not unitized until
1978. Three wells, the Gaines No. 1, the Gaines No. 2, and the Gaines No.
3, were drilled. The court held that the “Gaines Nos. 2 and 3 were simply
not deep enough to create a user of the Bodcaw Unit.”337 In order for unit
operations to be sufficient to interrupt prescription accruing against a
servitude burdening the non-drillsite tract, the unit well must reach the
unitized sand. The mineral servitude prescribed.
In Malone v. Celt Oil, Inc.,338 plaintiffs transferred their interest in
property, but reserved an undivided one-half interest in the minerals.
Drilling on one of the wells in question on the property was commenced
one month before the accrual of prescription. Plaintiffs filed suit for the
recognition of their mineral servitude alleging that the drilling of the well
in question was a sufficient “good faith” operation to interrupt prescription
under article 29 of the Mineral Code. 
The trial court held that the initial drilling of the well in question,
certain logging tests, and later recompletion of the well after prescription
had accrued did not constitute one continuous operation under article 29
of the Mineral Code. Rather, the activities associated with the later
completion of the well were separate operations. 
On appeal, the issue was “whether a mineral lessee’s action in
recompleting a well at a shallower formation constituted a single operation
with the initial drilling so as to be good faith operations sufficient to
interrupt the ten year liberative prescription of non-use established for
mineral servitudes.”339 The appellate court noted that article 29 was a
codification of the jurisprudence that “good faith” drilling is a bona fide
attempt to obtain production.340 Merely drilling through a shallower sand
336. Id. at 935.
337. Id. at 936.
338. Malone v. Celt Oil, Inc., 485 So. 2d 145 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.), writ 
denied, 488 So. 2d 692 (La. 1986).
339. Id. at 146.
340. “As the readactor’s comment indicates, this article is simply a broad
restatement of the existing jurisprudence.” Id. at 147.
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1208 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
without evaluating or testing the shallower sand was not sufficient to
interrupt prescription. However, if the shallower sand is evaluated during
the drilling process and extensive tests are conducted during the period of
the servitude, prescription is interrupted. 
Because the court found that the initial drilling of the well in question,
and the subsequent recompletion and production from that well, were not
one single operation under article 29 of the Mineral Code, there was no
need to determine if there was testing of the well that constituted a bona
fide effort to obtain production. Consequently, the court held that the initial
drilling of the well did not interrupt prescription, and the plaintiff’s
mineral servitude was prescribed by 10 years of nonuse.
5. Operations Conducted Prior to Approval by Commissioner
If an operator conducts an operation—drilling or reworking—on a
“true vertical well” before the Louisiana Office of Conservation issues a
permit or order which, for regulatory purposes, recognizes or characterizes
the well as a unit well, does the pre-approval operation nevertheless have
the effect of interrupting prescription on mineral servitudes on non-
drillsite tracts included within the unit in which such operations are being 
conducted? In other words, does the absence of administrative approval
preclude the prescription-interrupting effect of the operation as being on a
unitized basis?
An illustration of this problem is as follows. A compulsory unit well
ceases to produce, and, some 9 years and 11 months later, a new operator
elects to drill a substitute unit well rather than attempt reworking
operations in the primary unit well. It takes a period of time to prepare the
application to the Commissioner for the designation and approval of a
substitute unit well. The operator gets a permit to drill the well, which will
eventually be designated as the substitute unit well, but the drilling permit
does not so designate the well, pending the application for approval.
Operations on the second well begin before accrual of prescription against
a mineral servitude affecting a unitized, non-drillsite tract of land, and the
well is not designated as the substitute unit well until after the accrual of
prescription. The non-drillsite landowner demands a release of the mineral
servitude, asserting that the operations on the well were not “unit
operations,” but were “lease basis” operations on the drill site tract,
because the Commissioner had not so designated the well as a substitute
unit well until after the servitude prescribed.
The following cases indicate that the intent of the operator controls,
notwithstanding the manner in which the Commissioner of Conservation
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  101 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
 










   
  
   
 
 
   
 











      
    
 
      
     
     
  
    
    
     
   
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1209
has or has not characterized the operation at the time the operation is
conducted.
In Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. Kiene,341 the landowner
contended that operations within a unit that were conducted
unsuccessfully to a non-unitized zone had no effect on prescription
accruing against a mineral servitude covering a unitized tract, although the
well was plugged back and tested to the unitized sand. The opponent
argued that, because the well was not permitted to the shallower unitized
sand, it could not be considered a unitized operation sufficient to interrupt
prescription accruing against a mineral servitude partially included within
the unit. 
The court found that the failure to secure pre-drilling approval did not
disqualify the operation as constituting unit operations, noting that it was
apparent from the testimony of the representative of the Office of
Conservation that exceptional locations can be and are approved
after a hearing either before or after a particular well is drilled.
This witness further testified that he had never known of such a
request to be denied when a well had been tested and found to be
commercially productive.342 
The issue was next considered in Gorenflo v. Texaco Inc.,343 where the
court considered the landowner’s contention that “even if the leases were
validly pooled and even if operations were timely commenced at the
Milford Cobb No. 1 site, such operations were not unit operations because
they were not permitted as such by the Department of Conservation on the
date the primary term expired.”344 The court rejected this contention,
saying that the “provisions [cited by lessor] do not indicate that drilling
under a permit which gives the well a name which does not show its status 
is illegal.”345 
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court summarized the law on this
issue in the last of this trilogy of cases, Nunez v. Wainoco Oil and Gas
Co.346 The Court relied on Bass and Gorenflo and stated as follows:
The jurisprudence indicates that it is the intent of the operator and
341. 437 So. 2d 940 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
342. Id. at 944.
343. Gorenflo v. Texaco Inc., 566 F. Supp. 722 (M.D. La. 1983), aff’d, 735 
F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1984).
344. Id. at 728.
345. Id. at 729.
346. Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955 (La.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 925 (1986).
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1210 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the operations conducted which determine whether drilling
operations constitute unit operations or merely lease operations.
In Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. Kiene, 437 So. 2d 940 (La.
App. 2d Cir.1983), the well was permitted for non-unitized sand
but was drilled within the boundaries of a unitized sand. When the
permitted sand was found not to be commercially productive of
hydrocarbons, the well was plugged back and tested at other
intervals, including the unitized sand. Although production was
not obtained from the unitized sand and thus the well was never
permitted as the unit well, these operations were sufficient to
interrupt prescription on a servitude tract within the unit.
Similarly, in Gorenflo v. Texaco, Inc., 566 F.Supp. 722 (M.D.
La.1983), operations for the drilling of a well, conducted before
the well was permitted as the unit well, were found sufficient unit
operations to maintain the lease. The court noted that there was no
indication that “drilling under a permit which gives the well a
name which does not show its status [as a unit well] is illegal.” Id.
at 729. Indeed, the amended permit, which designated the Stone
Well No. 1 as the unit well for Sand Unit F, indicated that the
amendment action was a change in the well “name” from lease to
unit. Such a procedure does not seem to be of sufficiently
significant stature to affect the relationships between the
parties.347 
6. Directional Well Drilled on Unitized Basis
In Part II.A.6, consideration was given to the issues attendant to a
directional well drilled on a “lease basis.”
In the case of a unit well that is directionally drilled to be ultimately
bottomed under the unit (accommodating the “horizontal” feature in the
case of a compulsory unit), and distinctly for purposes of articles 30, 33,
34, 35, and 37 of the Mineral Code, the well would be deemed to be “on”
the tract under which the well’s ultimate bottom hole exists, regardless of
whether the precise location of the surface of the well is within or without
the unit boundary, or whether the path of the borehole lies under any
particular unitized tract.
In this regard, emphasis is placed on the word “on,” as it relates to
where a well is deemed to be situated for purposes of articles 30, 33, 34,
35, and 37 of the Mineral Code. Consider the case of Wilcox v. Shell Oil
347. Id. at 964 n.28.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1211
Co.,348 the first decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court to scrutinize a
lessee’s exercise of the “pooling power” in a mineral lease. The language
in the “Pooling Clause” implicitly required the unit to be formed prior to 
drilling of the unit well:
The commencement of a well or the completion of a well to
production, and the production of oil or gas therefrom, on any 
portion of an operating unit in which all or any part of the land
described herein is embraced shall have the same effect, under the
terms of this lease, as if a well were commenced or completed on
the land embraced by this lease.349 
Although no well was drilled on Mr. Wilcox’s land, the lessee drilled
a well on Mr. Breaux’s land that was completed on August 6, 1952. A
declaration of unit was filed on September 2, 1952, including a portion of
Mr. Wilcox’s land with the Breaux well. Mr. Wilcox challenged the
validity of the unit on the grounds that it was not properly formed.
The Court held that, because the well was drilled and completed prior
to the unitization, it did not satisfy the express requirements of the lease’s
“Pooling Clause” that the unit well be commenced “on” the unit or
completed “on” the unit. That is, the lease required that the unit exist prior
to drilling, or else it could not be said that the well was commenced “on”
the unit or completed “on” the unit. The Court held that the unit was
invalid, such that it did not serve to maintain Mr. Wilcox’s lease in force
and effect.
While the issue in Wilcox was more temporal than geographic (or,
more precisely, a mixture of both), still, at least for purposes of the
“Pooling Clause” in a mineral lease, the contractually anticipated attribute
that a well must be “on” a unit for a certain consequence to follow means
that the unit must first exist so that the well can then be said to be “on”
that unit.350 
In each of the three cases noted in the preceding section,351 the well in
question was drilled within the geographic boundary of a compulsory unit
as a “true vertical well.”352 In those instances, under any view there is a 
348. Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 76 So. 2d 416 (La. 1954).
349. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
350. That the unit must first exist for a well to be “on” the unit presented a 
“predicate” for the operation of the “Pooling Clause” in the Wilcox case. See
OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 2-06.
351. See supra Part II.D.5.
352. The well involved in Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co. was deemed to
constitute a “straight hole,” notwithstanding that it deviated from true vertical
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1212 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
well being drilled within, and hence “on,” the compulsory unit in question.
That is to say, in those cases, the wells involved met and satisfied the
“vertical feature” of compulsory unitization (a matter to be hereafter
discussed) on the date on which the wells were “spud.”
Consideration should be given to a situation in which a well is drilled
from a surface location outside of the unit boundary and directionally
drilled to a targeted bottom hole location that would complete the well in
the unit sand or zone, as defined in the relevant order of the Commissioner
of Conservation.353 
In the case of a well drilled directionally from a location outside of the
unit, but to be completed within the unit, and if a mineral servitude covers
lands within the unit, and prescription accruing against the servitude is
nearing expiration, on what date is the prescription interrupted by the
commencement of actual drilling operations for the well? To be more
precise, how does the rule of article 30 operate with respect to such a well? 
That article, in relevant part, states that an “interruption takes place on the
date actual drilling or mining operations are commenced on the land
burdened by the servitude or, as provided in article 33, on a conventional
or compulsory unit including all or a portion thereof.”354 Yet, as noted, the 
surface location of the well in question is not situated “on the land
burdened by the servitude,” nor is it situated “on a conventional or
compulsory unit.” 
Because this hypothetical well is located neither “on” the servitude
tract nor “on” the unit including such servitude tract, it is submitted that
the wellbore must “cut” the vertical plane of the unit before it can interrupt
prescription. Even “actual operations” for a well that is neither “on” the 
servitude tract nor “on” a unit including the servitude tract are irrelevant
to the unit until the borehole enters the area overlain by the unit.355 
This conclusion is supportable if one considers that, when a well is
drilled on a unit basis from a surface location within the exterior perimeter
of the unit, prescription is interrupted on the date on which the well is 
with a deviation of “significantly less than five degrees” from the vertical. 488
So. 2d 955, 957 (La. 1986); see LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, § 135 (2019).
353. See supra note 303.
354. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:30 (2020) (emphasis added).
355. The ascertainment of the precise date on which the borehole “breaks the
plane” of the unit is facilitated by the fact that the rules and regulations of the
Office of Conservation require the operator of a well that is directionally drilled
to procure, as the well is drilled, a “directional survey” that establishes both the 
path and trajectory of the borehole measured in depth, displacement, and date. LA.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, pt. 19, §§ 135–45.
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  105 5/26/21  11:50 AM








    
 
   
  
  










   
  
    
 
   
 
       
  
  
           
  
  
   
  
     
   
   
     
    
   
  
       
2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1213
spud-in. This is so because, on that date, the vertical feature of compulsory
unitization is met ab initio. 
In contrast, if the unit well is drilled from a surface location not
situated within the exterior perimeter of the unit, the vertical component is
not met or satisfied until the drill bit breaks the vertical or exterior plane
of the unit. While it is not a perfectly apt analogy, the drilling of a
directional wellbore from a location outside of the unit is tantamount to
preparatory actions that are irrelevant to the interruption of prescription
until the vertical plane of the unit is traversed.
This view is consistent with the previously noted precept that the
proper interpretation is the interpretation that least restricts the ownership
of the land conveyed, as in the case of mineral servitudes. In other words,
the court should embrace the interpretation that tends to free the land from
the burden of the mineral servitude.356 
7. “Cross-Unit Wells”
A relatively new innovation—perhaps demonstrative of the
proposition that engineering technology is often ahead of the law—is the
“cross-unit well.”357 The full rationale and reasoning behind such wells are
beyond the scope of this Article, but in summary, a “cross-unit well” is a
well that the Office of Conservation permits to be drilled in and through
two or more units, principally in the Haynesville Shale.358 It is not a
directional or slant well, but a well that is drilled as a “true vertical well”
to a certain subsurface depth, and then takes a 90° turn and is drilled as a
horizontal lateral into multiple units.359 Anecdotally, horizontal laterals
356. “The law favors the free and unrestrained use of immovable property. It 
follows that any doubt as to the interpretation of a servitude encumbering property
must be resolved in favor of the property owner.” McGuffy v. Weil, 125 So. 2d
154, 158 (La. 1960); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 (2020) (“Doubt as to the
existence, extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in
favor of the servient estate.”).
357. “Law must bend to science; it must accommodate technology.” Patrick
H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Responses
to a New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 321 (2015).
358. “‘Cross-unit well’ means a well drilled horizontally and completed under
multiple drilling units that is designated by the commissioner after notice and
public hearing to serve as a unit well, substitute unit well, or alternate unit well
for said units.” LA. REV. STAT. § 30:9.2(A)(2) (2020).
359. For a comprehensive examination of “cross unit” wells, the reader is
referred to Wm. Timothy Allen, III, Recent Developments Related to Louisiana
Unitization and Drilling, 62 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 58, 65 (2018).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  106 5/26/21  11:50 AM










    
 












   
 
   
  
   
  
   
 
 




      
 
 
   
         





1214 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
have been drilled in the Haynesville Shale, extending as far as 15,000 
feet.360 
The Commissioner of Conservation has issued orders in the
Haynesville Shale in Northwestern Louisiana361 authorizing the drilling of
“cross-unit wells,” initially in accordance with a Policy Memorandum of
the Commissioner of Conservation,362 and later pursuant to Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 30:9.2, enacted in 2015.363 This memorandum sets forth 
the policy of the office and the procedures for applications for such units.
Among other things, the memorandum states: “Production from each cross
unit lateral well shall be separated and metered individually and this
information shall be reported to the Office of Conservation in a manner to 
be prescribed by this office.”364 
In the case of a “cross-unit well,” the surface location is located in one 
unit and the ultimate terminus point of the well’s lateral member is in
another unit. Multiple perforations are introduced to the lateral, and each
constitutes a “take point” for unit production.365 Significant issues of
gauging and measurement are necessary to ensure that each owner in the
unit is allocated its just and equitable share of unit production.
The implications on prescription accruing against any mineral
servitudes in multiple units are obvious—and significant. It must be noted
360. “At the end of 2017, Chesapeake Energy drilled its first 15,000-ft lateral
in the Haynesville. Located in Caddo Parish, the GEPH 30&19&18-16-15 1HC
flowed a recordshattering IP24 of 48 MMcf/d in May. After 170 days, the well
continues to produce 25 MMcf/d and has flowed a total of 5.8 Bcf. The company
is currently drilling its second and third 15,000-ft laterals in the play. Another five
may be drilled in 2019.” Chesapeake 15,000-ft Haynesville HZ Still Flowing 25
MMcf/d, DRILLINGINFO (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.plsx.com/news/article/ches
apeake-15000-ft-haynesville-hz-still-flowing-25-mmcfd [https://perma.cc/D6YZ
-PGFD].
361. Kennedy v. Saheid, 209 So. 3d 985, 994 n.3 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016),
writ denied, 215 So. 3d 681 (La. 2017) (“This court would take judicial notice
that March 2008 marked the beginning of the land-leasing boom associated with
the Haynesville Shale formation.”).
362. See Policy Memorandum from La. Office of Conserv. (Nov. 2, 2012) (on
file with author) (concerning “[h]orizontal cross unit lateral wells in shales, tight 
gas sands and unconventional reservoirs”).
363. Act No. 253, 2015 La. Acts.
364. Policy Memorandum from La. Office of Conserv., supra note 362, at ⁋ 3.
365. A “take point” is essentially a perforation in a horizontal well’s lateral 
that permits the introduction of oil and gas in the process of production. See 
Springer Ranch, Ltd. v. Jones, 421 S.W.3d 273, 285 (Tex. App. 2013) (“Along
the horizontal displacement are takepoints through which hydrocarbons flow into
the well.”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1215
that a “cross-unit” is not a particular type of unit. Rather, a “cross-unit
well” is authorized by the Office of Conservation, after public hearing, to
be drilled in and through multiple, adjacent drilling and production units
as created by the Commissioner. Each such unit remains a “stand-alone” 
unit, and the Commissioner grants the authority for one well to cover
multiple units. 
In a proper case, operations conducted on, or production secured from,
a cross-unit well will maintain a mineral lease, or interrupt prescription
accruing against a mineral servitude, assuming that such operations or
production otherwise meets the requirements of the mineral lease or of the 
Mineral Code (as the case may be). Hence, a landowner whose unitized
land is burdened by either a mineral lease or a mineral servitude has a 
legitimate interest in whether the burdening mineral right will be
continued or perpetuated by the penetration of a lateral into a unit to only
a slight extent. 
The text of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 30:9.2 assuages this concern
in reference to what is defined as a “short unit,” that is, “a unit in which the
proposed well shall have less than five hundred feet of perforated lateral.”366 
A “short unit” is avoided by the filing of a timely objection by a “cross-unit
person,” defined as “an interested owner, interested party, or represented 
party as defined in LAC 43:XIX, other than a mineral lessee.”367 If such an
objection is timely filed, and the other provisions of this statute are met, the
Commissioner lacks the authority to authorize or permit the drilling of a
“cross-unit well that is proposed to have less than 500 feet of perforated
lateral in any unit to be served by the cross-unit well.”368 
From these observations, and recognizing that an order authorizing the
operator to drill a “cross-unit well” is permissive, not mandatory,369 this 
author suggests that, until the drill bit enters a particular unit, crossing a
common unit boundary, it is not a unit well as to that second (and perhaps
third) unit. Only when the drill path crosses the unit boundary can it be
said that the “cross-unit well” constitutes a unit well for, or “on,” that
second (and perhaps third) unit, with whatever effect on prescription
results with respect to servitudes or other interests in the second (and
perhaps third) unit. This is yet another application of the “‘on’ means ‘on’”
principle noted above.
366. LA. REV. STAT. § 30:9.2(A)(3) (2020).
367. Id. § 30:9.2(A)(1).
368. Id. § 30:9.2(C)(2).
369. Language commonly seen in such an order typically provides that “the
applicant is hereby authorized to drill, designate and utilize two (2) cross unit
horizontal wells as alternate unit wells.”
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1216 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
E. Interruption by Acknowledgment370 
If no use has occurred on a mineral servitude, it will prescribe after the
lapse of 10 years. The law prescribes a method to interrupt prescription in 
the absence of a use, namely, an acknowledgment by the owner of the land
burdened by the servitude. It is logical that only a landowner may
acknowledge a mineral servitude for purposes of interrupting prescription
inasmuch as such action effectively creates a new servitude, and only a
landowner can create a mineral servitude.371 
Why would the landowner acknowledge the servitude to interrupt
prescription? After all, if there is no use, the rights to minerals will be
reunited with the landowner.372 
The simple answer is, for any reason that is valid in the mind of the
landowner. For example, a father or grandmother who donated the
minerals to his or her children or grandchildren might wish to allow the
mineral value to remain in such donees, rather than his or her own estate.
A corporation or limited liability company that granted a mineral servitude
to its shareholders or members might wish to continue that arrangement,
perhaps with the creation of an executive right so as to allow leasing rights
at the entity level. The landowner might receive a cash consideration for
acknowledging the mineral servitude, thereby continuing said servitude.
Again, there might be other reasons, such as settling a lawsuit or dispute,
that are of interest to the landowner.
The facts in James v. Noble373 disclose that James, the landowner,
granted a mineral servitude in 1916. Minors acquired an interest in the
mineral servitude, and the law at the time stated that prescription was
suspended against minors until the minors attained majority. As such, the
mineral servitude would have prescribed on August 18, 1943, unless the
landowners acknowledged the servitude. In this instrument, the landowner
acknowledged the outstanding servitude. Plaintiff later contended “that the
acknowledgment is null for lack of consideration.”374 
Rejecting this contention, the Court stated that the landowner “has not
favored us with authorities to the effect that a special consideration must
370. The case law involving the effect of an acknowledgment on a mineral
servitude was examined in Eugene A. Nabors, The Louisiana Mineral Servitude 
and Royalty Doctrines: A Report to the Mineral Law Committee of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, 26 TUL. L. REV. 172 (1951–52).
371. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:16 (2020) (describing the mineral servitude as one
of the three “basic mineral rights that may be created by a landowner”).
372. See supra Part I.F.
373. James v. Noble, 36 So. 2d 722 (La. 1948).
374. Id. at 723.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1217
be given to support an acknowledgment and we know of no law that 
requires it.”375 
The Court held “that the legal requirement for an acknowledgment
sufficient to interrupt ten years prescription for nonuser of a mineral
servitude must be expressed and certain, must have been made for that
purpose and must adequately describe the property to which it applies.”376 
Applying this rule, the Court found that the “acknowledgment in this
case is clear and explicit and shows on its face that it was purposefully
executed to interrupt the then running prescription.”377 
The requisites for a valid acknowledgment are now codified in the
Louisiana Mineral Code. Thus, it is now provided that “[t]he prescription
of nonuse may be interrupted by a gratuitous or onerous acknowledgment
by the owner of the land burdened by a mineral servitude. An 
acknowledgment must be in writing, and, to affect third parties, must be
filed for registry.”378 
As a logical corollary to the requirement that an acknowledgment must
be in writing, parol evidence is not admissible to establish an
acknowledgment.379 Because the effect of a proper acknowledgment is to 
create a new servitude with a new commencement date of prescription, it
is obvious that a third person is entitled to rely upon the “public records
doctrine” if the public records do not reflect a recorded written instrument
of acknowledgment.380 
“An acknowledgment must express the intent of the landowner to
interrupt prescription and clearly identify the party making it and the
mineral servitude or servitudes acknowledged.”381 
This article perpetuates the jurisprudential rule “that the legal
requirement for an acknowledgment sufficient to interrupt ten years
prescription for nonuser of a mineral servitude must be expressed and
certain, must have been made for that purpose and must adequately
describe the property to which it applies.”382 The rule’s principal purpose
375. Id.
376. Id. at 724.
377. Id.
378. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:54 (2020).
379. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Succession of Miller, 69 So. 2d 21, 23 (La. 1953)
(“However, parol evidence will not be considered in cases where there is a
claimed interruption by acknowledgment.”); see OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE 
TREATISE, supra note 4, § 413(2).
380. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2721; McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100 (La. 1909);
see OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 1-14.
381. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:55.
382. James, 36 So. 2d at 724. 
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1218 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
is the avoidance of the significant consequence of interruption of
prescription that might otherwise result if the landowner makes a casual
or inadvertent reference to an existing servitude.
Although it is not stated in the text of articles 54 or 55, for the
acknowledgment to be valid and effective, it must be accomplished prior
to the accrual of the prescription of nonuse. This should be inferred from
the requirement in article 54 that acknowledgment must result from the
actions of “the owner of the land burdened by a mineral servitude.” If
prescription accrues, the mineral servitude no longer burdens the land. As
noted previously, a mineral servitude that has prescribed for nonuse is not





post-extinguishment resurrection by way of
Although consideration is not needed to support an
“express” and “in writing” guards against a landowner’s inadvertent
acknowledgment.
In Wise v. Watkins,385 the Court held that a sale of land that contained
a reservation of “one-half of all oil, gas, and other minerals in and under
said land which has heretofore been reserved by [an ancestor-in-title] in
sale to this Grantor” did not constitute an acknowledgment of the
outstanding mineral servitude sufficient to interrupt prescription accruing
thereagainst. The Supreme Court stated, as follows:
This Court has on numerous occasions stated that the
acknowledgment required by this article of the Code must be more
than a bare acknowledgment. It must be accompanied by, or
coupled with, the purpose and intention of the party making the
acknowledgment in order to interrupt the prescription then
accruing.386 
To affect third parties, the instrument effecting the acknowledgment
must be recorded.387 Certainly, a written acknowledgment comporting
383. See supra text accompanying note 24.
384. James, 36 So. 2d at 724. (“[T]here is no provision in our law requiring a
special consideration for an acknowledgment.”).
385. Wise v. Watkins, 62 So. 2d 653 (La. 1953).
386. Id. at 654. The Court specifically declined to follow its earlier decision in
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 88 So. 723 (La. 1921),
which, under similar facts, had held that such a reservation did have the effect of
interrupting prescription because the earlier decision was not “a sound
pronouncement of law.” Wise, 62 So. 2d at 655.
387. Goldsmith v. McCoy, 182 So. 519, 522 (La. 1938) (“We therefore
conclude that a contract, whether intended to create or acknowledge an existing
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1219
with the codal requirements is a “contract” as contemplated by article 18
of the Mineral Code, which instructs that “[a]ll sales, contracts, and
judgments affecting mineral rights are subject to the laws of registry.”
EXAMPLE
On August 1, 2006, a mineral servitude is granted. No use is
made of it. On July 15, 2016, the landowner executes an
instrument acknowledging the mineral servitude and expressing
the intent to interrupt prescription. On August 2, 2016, the
landowner executes a mineral lease, which is immediately
recorded. On August 4, 2016, the acknowledgment is recorded.
On August 5, 2016, the mineral servitude owner grants a mineral
lease, which is immediately recorded. Which mineral lease is
good?
The landowner’s lease is valid because the “public records
doctrine” protects the lessee because the acknowledgment was not
of record on the date of recordation of that lease. The mineral
servitude owner may have a claim against the landowner, but the
assertion of such claim should not prejudice the right of the
landowner’s lessee.
F. Consequences on Mineral Lease of Extinction of Servitude
If the prescription of nonuse is not interrupted by one of the means
noted in the previous sections, the mineral servitude will come to an end— 
it will be extinguished.388 
One must consider the effect of the extinction of a mineral servitude
on any mineral lease that might relate to such prescribed mineral
servitudes. As in many cases, “It depends.”
If a landowner grants a mineral servitude on its land at a time when
the land is not subject to an existing mineral lease, the owner or grantee of
the mineral servitude is vested with the executive interest, that is, the right
to grant a mineral lease.389 While the mineral servitude owner, not the
landowner, has the right to grant a mineral lease, such a lease is necessarily
discontinuous servitude or a continuous nonapparent servitude against which
prescription was accruing, in order to affect third parties in good faith, must be
recorded in conformity to the law of registry in this State.”).
388. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1) (2020).
389. “A mineral lease may be granted by a person having an executive interest
in the mineral rights on the property leased.” Id. § 31:116.
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1220 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
dependent upon the continuation of the mineral servitude on the basis of
which it was granted.390 
If, under this scenario, the mineral servitude prescribes, the mineral
lease falls with it. This is a natural consequence of the notion, previously
noted, that one may not grant a third person any rights greater than those
the grantor holds.391 Under this circumstance, regardless of whether the 
payment of delay rentals maintained the mineral lease, the lease falls
concurrently with the mineral servitude under which the mineral lease was
granted.
On the other hand, assume that a landowner grants a mineral lease at
a time when no mineral servitude burdens the land. Assume further that
the mineral lease provides for a primary term of 10 years, and as is
customary, the lease can be perpetuated by the payment of delay rentals in
the absence of operations or production.392 After the grant of the mineral
lease, the landowner conveys a mineral servitude and, availing itself of
article 75 of the Mineral Code, stipulates that the prescriptive period is
shortened to, say, six years. The mineral servitude created is subject to the
previously recorded mineral lease.393 If, despite the maintenance of the
mineral lease by the timely and proper payment of delay rentals, there is
no use of the servitude in the six-year period, the servitude will prescribe,
but the mineral lease will continue in accordance with its terms. This is so
because the mineral lease was not dependent upon the servitude created
after the grant of the mineral lease. The rights to the minerals would revert
to the then surface owner of the land, subject to the mineral lease.394 
390. “A mineral lease may be granted by the owner of an executive interest 
whose title is extinguished at a particular time or upon the occurrence of a certain
condition, but it terminates at the specified time or on occurrence of the condition
divesting the title.” Id. § 31:117.
391. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 2-09.
392. See id. § 4-08.
393. Coyle v. N. Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 174 So. 274, 276 (La. 1937) (“The 
defendants purchased an interest in the mineral rights with the knowledge of and
subject to the existing lease.”).
394. See Plaquemines Par. Gov’t v. Getty Oil Co., 673 So. 2d 1002, 1008 (La.
1996) (“The effect of the compromise is that the Lobrano lease was granted by a
landowner, not a mineral servitude owner. Thus the termination of the Rose and
Morris servitudes would have no effect on the validity of the lease. A landowner
is entitled to create one lease covering several noncontiguous tracts; operations
on any of the tracts are sufficient to maintain the lease as to the entirety of the land
burdened. La. Mineral Code art. 114. Therefore, we conclude that the Lobrano
lease remains valid and binding on 100% of the compromise lands.”).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1221
III. EXTENSION OF PRESCRIPTION
A. Contractual Extension Prior to the Mineral Code
Under article 3505 of the Louisiana Civil Code, “an obligor may by
juridical act extend the prescriptive period,” “[a]fter liberative prescription
has commenced to run but before it accrues.” This article was adopted in
2013.395 While the Civil Code did not previously provide for the extension
of a prescriptive period, the ability to do so was jurisprudentially
recognized.
In Mulhern v. Hayne,396 the Court held that the execution by a
landowner and a mineral servitude owner of a “joint lease” resulted in an
interruption of prescription. Subsequent to its rendition, later courts
consistently distinguished or questioned the Mulhern decision.397 
Finally, Mulhern was repudiated, albeit not expressly overruled, in
Achee v. Caillouet.398 The Achee Court rather disingenuously stated that
the Mulhern Court’s reference to an interruption of prescription used the
word in the “layman’s” sense, not in the legalistic sense used in the Civil
Code.399 This superficial departure from its earlier decision failed to 
disguise the fact that the court was changing the rule to protect the
landowner from an inadvertent, unintentional interruption. After Achee, 
the execution of a “joint lease” by a landowner and a mineral servitude
owner resulted in an extension, not an interruption, of prescription.
B. Extension under the Mineral Code
“A landowner may extend a mineral servitude beyond the prescriptive
date for a period less than that which would result from an interruption by
an acknowledgment. The extension must meet all of the requirements for
an acknowledgment and must specify the period for which the servitude is
extended.”400 
395. Act No. 88, 2013 La. Acts 1301.
396. Mulhern v. Hayne, 132 So. 659 (La. 1931).
397. See, e.g., Spears v. Nesbitt, 2 So. 2d 650 (La. 1941).
398. Achee v. Caillouet, 1 So. 2d 530 (La. 1941).
399. Id. at 536. (“In those cases in which we said that the effect of the
landowner’s joining the owners of the servitude in making a mineral lease was to
‘interrupt’ the running of prescription, we meant that the prescription was 
interrupted in the sense that it was broken into, hindered, or stopped, as defined
in the dictionary, and not in the sense that the word is used in the Civil Code 
relating to the acknowledgment of a debt.”).
400. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:56 (2020).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  114 5/26/21  11:50 AM




   
  
  
    
 
 
     







   
 
  











   
 
        
      
      
        
1222 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Article 56 is motivated by the principle that the “greater includes the 
lesser.”401 Since a landowner may interrupt prescription by an
acknowledgment, there is no reason why a landowner should not be able
to accomplish less than a full interruption, such as an extension for a period
of time less than 10 years. This liberality does not violate public policy, as 
the extension may only be “for a period less than that which would result
from an interruption by an acknowledgment.”
“An extended mineral servitude is subject to the rules relating to
interruption of prescription.”402 Thus, where the intention to enter a “joint
lease” is found, and production ensues from the granting of that mineral
lease, such production interrupts prescription.403 
EXAMPLE
A mineral servitude is reserved in a sale of land on August 1, 
2006. On August 1, 2015, the landowner and the mineral servitude
owner jointly execute a mineral lease for a primary term of three
years, in which it is expressly declared to be the intention of the
parties to extend prescription for the “duration of the lease.” On
August 1, 2017, the lessee begins a well on the land. The well is a
dry hole according to an electric log run in the well on September
15, 2017. What is the consequence on prescription?
Assuming that the well meets the requirements of article 29,
prescription commences anew on September 15, 2017.
IV. SUSPENSION OF PRESCRIPTION
A. General
While an interruption of the prescription of nonuse ultimately results
in prescription commencing anew, and an extension adds additional time
to the then remaining period of prescription, a suspension will “stop the
clock” for the duration of the suspension.404 
401. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 2-04(k).
402. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:57.
403. Armour v. Smith, 170 So. 2d 347, 350 (La. 1964).
404. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3472 (2020).
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1223
B. Suspension Resulting from the Minority of the Owner of a Servitude
“The prescription of nonuse is not suspended by the minority or other
legal disability of the owner of a mineral servitude.”405 This rule restates a
statutory provision which was first enacted in 1944,406 and later
incorporated into the Revised Statutes.407 These provisions reversed a line
of jurisprudence that extended the rules of former article 802 of the
Louisiana Civil Code to mineral servitudes.408 The courts previously held
that the minority of a mineral servitude owner suspends the prescription
accruing against the servitude as to all co-owners during the minority,
including majors.409 
A limitation on this former rule—now suppressed by article 58 of the
Mineral Code—was recognized if the minors were introduced into title
“by manipulation or subterfuge.”410 In this cited case, the Court refused to
apply the rule of Sample v. Whitaker where the servitude owners admitted
“that the purpose of the transfers [to minor children] were for the purpose
of suspending the servitude.”411 On the basis of this admission, the Court
found that the transfer to the minors “was a mere arrangement among the
parties to preserve the mineral rights from the running of prescription,
using the minors’ names for that purpose.”412 
C. Suspension Resulting from Obstacle
“If the owner of a mineral servitude is prevented from using it by an
obstacle that he can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse
does not run as long as the obstacle remains.”413 
Before examining those matters that, under article 59, would
constitute an obstacle sufficient to suspend the accrual of the prescription
of nonuse, it is appropriate to note those situations that have not been held 
to constitute an obstacle.
405. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:58.
406. Act No. 232, 1944 La. Acts 687.
407. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:5805. The adoption of the Louisiana Mineral Code
did not explicitly repeal this statute.
408. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 763 (“The prescription of nonuse is not suspended
by the minority or other disability of the owner of the dominant estate.”).
409. Sample v. Whitaker, 135 So. 38, 40 (La. 1931).
410. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc. v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co., 181 So.
865, 867 (La. 1938).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:59 (2020).
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1224 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
The mere granting of a mineral lease by a landowner whose land is
subject to a full mineral servitude is not an obstacle that would suspend 
the running of prescription.414 Moreover, the courts have rejected as
meritless the “contention that the purchase of mineral rights subject to a
previous exclusive lease is the purchase of a suspended servitude, the
prescription of which is also suspended.”415 Additionally, the existence of
another mineral lease granted by the mineral servitude owner has been
held to not constitute an obstacle to the use of the servitude.416 
In Hightower v. Maritzky,417 the plaintiff sued to have the defendants’
mineral rights in a 200-acre tract of land declared prescribed. The
defendants defended by asserting that the mineral servitude was not
subject to prescription for several reasons. Among other things, the
defendants contended that “the stipulation in the deed from Hightower to
[defendants’ ancestor], that Hightower should have the exclusive right to
lease the land for the production of oil or gas, established an obstacle in
the way of [defendants’ ancestor] exercising his real right on the land.”418 
Rejecting that contention, the Court stated that the obstacle doctrine
applies “to those obstacles only which the owner of the servitude or real
right has not consented to.”419 Since the servitude owner had agreed to the
reservation of the executive right, the inability to lease the land was, in a
sense, of the owners’ own making and, hence, was an arrangement to
which he had consented.
414. Gayoso Co. v. Ark. Nat. Gas Corp., 145 So. 677, 680 (La. 1933).
However, the Court suggested that an obstacle would be presented if “an effort
[had] been made by [the mineral servitude owner] to exploit the land, and had the 
effort been met with resistance by [the landowner].”
415. Coyle v. N. Cent. Tex. Oil Co., 174 So. 274, 276 (La. 1937); see also
Gailey v. McFarlain, 193 So. 570, 576 (La. 1940) (“There is no doubt under the
law of registry, that the purchaser or grantee of mineral rights or a servitude takes
his ownership thereof subject to pre-existing recorded leases covering the same
mineral rights.”).
416. Baker v. Chevron Oil Co., 258 So. 2d 531, 534 (La. 1972). (“[I]f the
leasing of a mineral interest combined with failure of the lessee to develop the
property constitutes an obstacle which could suspend the running of prescription
on an outstanding mineral servitude, then such mineral interest could be kept in
effect indefinitely by the simple expedient of arranging for a lease of the interest
prior to its expiration.”). See OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra
note 4, § 413(2).
417. Hightower v. Maritzky, 195 So. 518 (La. 1940).
418. Id. at 520.
419. Id.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1225
In Deas v. Lane,420 the landowner sold some mineral interests after he
had previously sold all of his mineral interests. The Court correctly held
that the mineral rights subsequently sold could not prejudice the rights of
the original mineral purchasers and, therefore, were not an obstacle under
article 792 of the Louisiana Civil Code.421 
The courts have held that, in order for a certain circumstance alleged
to constitute an “obstacle” to result in the suspension of prescription
accruing against a mineral servitude, the circumstances must totally
impede the ability of the servitude owner to operate on the servitude. 
Thus, in Hanszen v. Cocke,422 the servitude owner interposed the
existence and pendency of a lawsuit challenging the existence of a mineral
lease as being an “obstacle.” However, the court found that the asserted
circumstances did not result in the suspension of prescription because on
the servitude tract, there were areas where operations were not impeded
because the suit did not affect those other areas. Adopting the reasoning
of the trial court, the appellate court stated:
It is unnecessary, however, for this Court to determine whether
or not the institution of the Pan-Am suit did constitute an obstacle 
to the exercise of the Picton servitude on those portions of
‘Amanda Plantation’ involved in the suit for it is clear that even if
it be conceded, for sake of argument, that the suit was an obstacle
to the user of the servitude, that plaintiffs’ contention is without
merit since the obstacle did not affect the whole of ‘Amanda
Plantation’, there being a portion thereof subject to the Picton
servitude which was not then under lease and which was not
involved in the Pan-Am suit and upon which plaintiffs could have
exercised their right of servitude.423 
* * *
Since drilling was thus permissible on at least a part of the
servitude area at all times, there was no obstacle to the user of the
servitude; since ‘if a definite mineral interest is granted (or
reserved) by a single instrument covering the whole of a continuous
tract of land only one servitude is created thereby, and the proper
exercise of it on any part of the tract interrupts the accruing of
420. Deas v. Lane, 13 So. 2d 270 (La. 1943).
421. Id. at 276. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 755 (2020). (“If the owner of the
dominant estate is prevented from using the servitude by an obstacle that he can
neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse is suspended on that
account for a period of up to ten years.”).
422. Hanszen v. Cocke, 246 So. 2d 200 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
423. Id. at 205.
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1226 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
prescription as to any and all of the remaining portion.’424 
In a recent case,425 the court rejected an argument that prescription was
suspended because portions of the land were used for military purposes,
thus constituting an “obstacle.” The court found that there was a period of
time, greater than 10 years, during which the plaintiffs were not impeded
from conducting operations. Moreover, even if an obstacle existed, it did
not affect the entirety of the servitude. Thus, a military “obstacle” did not
suspend prescription, and the servitude prescribed.
In a more recent case,426 the court rejected the contention that
excessive rains and the terms of a USDA easement constituted an obstacle
to the use of a mineral servitude.
“An obstacle to drilling or mining operations or to production of any
mineral covered by an act creating a mineral servitude suspends the
running of prescription as to all minerals covered by the act.”427 This is a
logical corollary to Mineral Code article 40, which provides that an
“interruption of prescription applies to all types of minerals covered by the
act creating the servitude and to all modes of its use.”
“Issuance of a compulsory unitization order establishing a unit that
includes all or part of a tract burdened by a mineral servitude does not
constitute an obstacle to its use.”428 This rule codifies the holding of the
Louisiana Supreme Court429 that the designation of non-drilling areas
within drilling units created by orders of the Commissioner of
Conservation did not constitute an obstacle to use of mineral servitudes on
lands within the non-drilling area. The Court stated that the classification
does not prevent the use of the servitude, it merely controls the method of
the user. To hold otherwise would be “inconsistent with the objectives,
aims and policies of our conservation law.”430 The Court stated:
Denying the existence of an obstacle said to result from an order
of the Department of Conservation creating nondrilling areas in a
424. Id. at 206.
425. Cent. Pines Land Co. v. United States of America, 274 F.3d 881, 896 (5th 
Cir. 2001).
426. Petro-Chem Operating Co. v. Flat River Farms, L.L.C., No. 51,212-CA,
2017 WL 786868 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. Mar. 1, 2017).
427. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:60 (2020).
428. Id. § 31:61A.
429. Mire v. Hawkins, 186 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1966).
430. Id. at 595. The Court declined to follow its earlier decision in Boddie v.
Drewett, 87 So. 2d 516 (La. 1956), which held that orders of the Commissioner
of Conservation that restrict drilling to a certain area in the unit cause an obstacle
to user of the servitudes in the nondrilling area.
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1227
unit, as in this case, is consonant with the public policy of this
State which does not favor unwarranted extensions of liberative 
prescription on mineral servitudes; but, to the contrary, that policy
favors the timely return of outstanding minerals to the owner of
the land.431 
Most of the cases involving obstacles that suspend prescription of
nonuse involve facts where the recalcitrant landowner—in whose favor
prescription would run if the mineral servitude owner does not timely
“use” the servitude—prevents operations through devices that interfere
with, or deny, access to the burdened land.432 
If a landowner files suit against the servitude owner, contending that
the mineral servitude no longer exists, and the landowner obtains an
injunction against the servitude owner, preventing it or its lessee from
conducting operations that constitute a use, and if the servitude owner
prevails in the litigation, the prescription should be suspended from the
date of the injunction, if not earlier, to the date on which the judgment
adverse to the landowner is final, and the period of time of such suspension
should be added to the servitude. The servitude owner cannot conduct
operations in the face of the injunction, and should not be penalized under
such circumstances.
It is important to recognize that the circumstances that might constitute
an obstacle for purposes of suspending prescription against a mineral
servitude present a different focus than a situation that might give rise to
the invocation or assertion of a force majeure under a mineral lease. The
author recalls a situation where a client, as a lessee under a mineral lease
granted by a mineral servitude owner, believed that its obligations under
its mineral lease were excused by a weather event that met the
requirements of a “Force Majeure Clause” under the lease.433 The client
was correct in that the “Force Majeure Clause” did explicitly mention
“significant rain event,” or words to that effect. However, the factual
circumstances did not constitute “an obstacle that he [could] neither
431. 186 So. 2d at 597.
432. Hall v. Dixon, 401 So. 2d 473 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981) (landowner
removed survey stake and locked the gate; obstacle held to suspend prescription
as against all co-owners, even those who did not contribute to the obstacle); 
Corley v. Craft, 501 So. 2d 1049, 1051–52 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (landowner
dug out the only access road, blocked access to replacement road by bulldozer,
refused access because the drilling permit was not personally signed by the
Commissioner of Conservation, and reported his own property to the DEQ as
constituting a “solid waste disposal site”).
433. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 13-34(k).
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1228 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
prevent nor remove,” sufficient to suspend prescription accruing against
the underlying servitude. Under such a situation, the result is that the lease
lapses upon extinction of the mineral servitude, such servitude not being
suspended under the theory of obstacle.434 
EXAMPLE
A mineral servitude is reserved in a sale of land on August 1, 
2006. On July 28, 2016, the lessee of the mineral servitude owner
attempts to enter the property by way of the only access road to
conduct drilling operations. The landowner has denied access to
the property by laying lumber across the road. The access is
denied until August 5, 2016, when the landowner removes the 
impediment to access. What is the status of the mineral servitude?
If the denial of access over the “only access road” is in fact an
obstacle “that he can neither prevent nor remove,” the servitude
owner would have nine days (the period of the duration of the
“obstacle”), or until August 14, 2016, within which to commence
operations. If, however, there is another means of access which is 
not impeded by the landowner, it would not constitute an
“obstacle” that would suspend prescription. The mineral servitude
owner should not, however, be required to engage in “self-help”
to remove the obstacle.435 
V. BURDEN OF PROOF
A. General
“The extinguishment of a servitude by nonuse for a given period is a
prescription and not a peremption.”436 Thus, as has been demonstrated, the
prescription of nonuse is susceptible to interruption, extension, or
suspension.437 Obviously, proof of a prescription-altering event must be
shown.438 
434. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:117 (2020).
435. See OTTINGER, MINERAL LEASE TREATISE, supra note 5, § 13-09(e) for a
discussion of the judiciary’s disdain of the remedy of “self-help.”
436. Gayoso Co. v. Ark. Nat. Gas Corp., 145 So. 677, 678 (La. 1933).
437. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3462–72 (2020).
438. Texas Co. v. Crawford, 212 F.2d 722, 725 (5th Cir. 1954) (if the servitude
is not used, “the right prescribes, but like all other prescriptions, must be pleaded
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2021] ALL GOOD THINGS MUST COME TO AN END 1229
If the prescription of nonuse has ostensibly—“on the face of things”— 
accrued, the issue arises as to who bears the burden of proof to show that
the servitude has, or has not, prescribed. Previously, in reference to predial
servitudes, courts held that
when the prescription of non-usage is opposed to the owner of the
estate to whom the servitude is due, it is incumbent on him to
prove that he, or some person in his name, has made use of the
servitude as appertaining to his estate, during the time necessary
to prevent the establishment of such prescription.439 
Courts have also held that “[w]hen the prescription of nonuse is
pleaded, the owner of the dominant estate has the burden of proving that 
he or some other person has made use of the servitude as appertaining to
his estate during the period of time required for the accrual of the
prescription.”440 This is harmonious with the general rule that the “party
pleading the exception of prescription has the burden of proving that
prescription has accrued. This is the rule unless prescription is evident
from the face of the pleadings, in which case the plaintiff bears the burden
of showing the action has not prescribed.”441 
If production is the basis for the interruption, the fact of production,
the date of commencement, and the duration thereof is easily shown,
particularly because production need not be in “paying quantities.”442 
If the servitude owner contends that prescription has been extended, 
the burden is on the servitude owner to show compliance with the 
requirements of article 56 of the Mineral Code by introducing the
appropriate written agreement. 
In a similar manner, if the asserted basis of interruption of prescription
is the existence of an act effecting an acknowledgment, the burden is either
met or not met by the introduction of the written instrument, duly recorded,
as envisioned by articles 54 and 55 of the Mineral Code. As mentioned
above, parol evidence is not admissible for this purpose.
If, however, the servitude owner contends that prescription has been
interrupted by the conduct of “good faith” operations, the servitude owner
and proved by the one owning the land, for the simple reason that it may be
waived”).
439. Compare de la Croix v. Nolan, 1 Rob. 321, 324 (La. 1842), with LA. CIV.
CODE art. 764 (2020), as it pertains to predial servitudes. 
440. See Smith v. Andrews, 215 So. 3d 868, 878 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017);
see also OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 4, § 411.
441. Pineda v. Ruppel, 639 So. 2d 858, 860 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted).
442. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:38 (2020).
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1230 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
carries the burden of showing that the use has satisfied the requirements
of articles 29 and 42 to 43 of the Mineral Code. In that regard, it is
necessary to determine when drilling activities or production began and
ended, and who conducted them. This is sometimes difficult, particularly
if the relevant activities were undertaken many years in the past. While the 
rules and regulations of the Louisiana Office of Conservation require an
operator to file certain reports, reflecting dates of operations and
production,443 as a practical matter, there is often no way to independently
confirm the completeness or correctness of such information.
Additionally, the absence of reported information does not necessarily
mean that an unreported operation did not take place.
In Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. Kiene,444 the court stated the 
following concerning the nature of the inquiry into the sufficiency of a use
as constituting an interruption of prescription:
The question of whether the operations engaged in in connection with
a particular well constitute a use of the servitude in such a manner as
to interrupt the running of prescription is a question of fact dependent
upon the particular circumstances under which the operations were
conducted and the factor of good or bad faith on the part of the
operators [sic] is inextricably connected with, although perhaps not
wholly decisive of, the factual situation presented.445 
B. Presumption of Good Faith
Early cases suggest that the servitude owner who demonstrates the
timely existence of a dry hole is entitled to a “presumption of good faith.”446 
Because the operation either does or does not satisfy the article 29
requirements for a “good faith operation,” the only consequence for failure
to meet the article 29 standards is that prescription is not interrupted—the 
dry hole simply did not interrupt prescription. Despite the court’s reference
in Bass to “the factor of good or bad faith,” a landowner’s overcoming of
443. It is a criminal offense to make a “false entry or statement of fact” in any
report filed with the Louisiana Office of Conservation. See LA. REV. STAT. § 30:17.
444. Bass Enter. Prod. Co. v. Kiene, 437 So. 2d 940 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
445. Id. at 945.
446. Keebler v. Seubert, 120 So. 591, 592 (La. 1920) (“There is nothing
justifying the conclusion that the operations were not conducted in good faith.”);
Lynn v. Harrington, 192 So. 517, 519 (La. 1939) (“Taking all these things into
consideration along with the legal presumption of good faith . . . .”); Kellogg
Bros., Inc. v. Singer Mfg. Co., 131 So. 2d 578, 580 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961)
(“Without denying the existence of the presumption [of good faith] . . . .”). This
author does not believe these cases remain authoritative for this proposition.
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this “presumption of good faith”—by demonstrating a failure to establish
compliance with article 29—is not necessarily indicative of the operation
being in “bad faith.” While admittedly a point of semantics, the opposite of
“in good faith” in this context is not necessarily “in bad faith”; it is simply
not “in good faith” as contemplated by article 29.
C. Elements of Proof
As noted in the comments to article 29, that article’s formulation gives
rise to “the rather curious mixture of subjective and objective standards.”
In a close case, the rule of interpretation is that “[d]oubt as to the existence,
extent, or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in
favor of the servient estate.”447 
In a typical case, evidence would have to be submitted to establish
each of the following elements to establish the existence of a “good faith” 
use of a mineral servitude, to wit:




Date of creation 28 Written agreement
Date of “spudding in” 30 Engineering testimony
Date of commencement anew of 
prescription
30, 36 Same as above
Operations were commenced with 
reasonable expectation of
discovering and producing minerals
in “paying quantities” at a particular
point or depth
29(1) Geological testimony
Operations were continued at the
site chosen to that point or depth
29(2) Engineering testimony
Operations were conducted in such a
manner that they constitute a single
operation although actual drilling . . .
is not conducted at all times
29(3) Engineering testimony
Use was by the owner of the
servitude, his representative or
employee, or some other person
acting on his behalf
42-43 Written evidence of
relationship
447. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 (2020) (emphasis added) (made applicable by LA.
REV. STAT. § 31:2 (2020)).
353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd  124 5/26/21  11:50 AM








    
      
   
   
 
    






















       
      
      
  
      
     
      
1232 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
Obviously, in a particular case, certain of these elements might be
irrelevant, uncontested, or actually stipulated, thereby removing the need 
for proof.
Finally, if the servitude owner institutes suit to judicially establish the
existence of the servitude, and if the landowner resists on the basis of the
accrual of prescription of nonuse, the defendant-landowner must file an
objection of prescription, which the court may not supply.448 
CONCLUSION
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, a “mineral servitude is the
right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of
exploring for and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and
ownership.”449 
The mineral servitude has been an important institution of Louisiana
law for a century.450 As previously noted, the Supreme Court has referred 
to the mineral servitude as being “the most valuable property in the
state.”451 
While unquestionably a “valuable property,” the mineral servitude is, 
if anything, perishable by its very nature. That is to say, it will be
extinguished after the lapse of 10 years without a “use.”
Viewed differently, one often hears it said, in lay terms, that a mineral
servitude “is good for ten years unless used.” While perhaps not
functionally inaccurate, a better way to understand the matter is that a
mineral servitude “lasts forever”—or, using a common law term, a mineral
servitude exists “in perpetuity”—“unless a ten-year period of time lapses
without a use.”
It is, therefore, critical for one interested in the “life” (or, from the
viewpoint of the landowner, “demise”) of a mineral servitude to
understand the variety of ways in which prescription might be affected.
Finally, it is noted that, with the exception of conducting operations to
interrupt prescription, and the quality of production that is obtained from
448. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 927 (2020) (“The court may not supply the
objection of prescription, which shall be specially pleaded.”); see also LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3452 (2020) (“Prescription must be pleaded. Courts may not supply a
plea of prescription.”).
449. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (2020).
450. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1922).
451. DeMoss v. Sample, 78 So. 482, 484 (La. 1918).
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an operation,452 prescription accruing against a mineral royalty is generally 
interrupted in the same manner as a mineral servitude. Therefore, some of
the commentary herein might pertain to a mineral royalty also.453 
It is hoped that this Article has removed the uncertainty regarding the
manner in which the prescription of nonuse pertinent to a mineral servitude
can be avoided.
452. Compare id. § 31:38 (with regard to a mineral servitude, “minerals [must]
actually be produced in good faith with the intent of saving or otherwise using
them for some beneficial purpose”), with id. §31:88 (with regard to a mineral
royalty, “minerals [must] be produced in paying quantities but only that they
actually be produced and saved”).
453. See generally OTTINGER, MINERAL SERVITUDE TREATISE, supra note 4,
at Ch. 5.
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